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Abstract 
This thesis follows in development theory's post-impasse attempts to theorise an 
understanding of social change according to which people in developing countries would 
be active producers of their own development without this descending into the relativistic 
impotence of post-development; that is, the search for an understanding of development 
in which the field can retain its normative commitment and contribution to a better world 
for all without the neo-imperialistic implications this has had in the past. To do so we 
must first overcome prevalent caricatures of twentieth century development's 'we develop 
it' mentality and recognise that this search is not a uniquely modern one: it has been an 
implicit concern of development theory since the field's conception. The concept of 
'development' itself, particularly the way in which it theorises the relationship between the 
internal and external aspects of social change, lies at the heart of development theory's 
failures to meet this challenge. A reconceptualisation of the internal-external problem, 
based on the concept of 'progress' from which development was initially differentiated 
and which puts the active individual at the heart of social change, can provide a way 
forward, with important implications for development policy and theorists.  
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 “[T]he secret hope of our time [is] that man's life in politics, which is to say, man's life 
in history, shall come to an end. History, as we now understand it, envisions its own 
extinction – that is really what we nowadays mean by 'progress' – and with all the 
passion of a desire kept secret even from ourselves, we yearn to elect a way of life which 
shall be satisfactory once and for all...”  
– Lionel Trilling (1951[1970]: 200) 
 
Introduction 
1. Context and Argument 
“What they … accept, adapt, or reject [from the Western example] is a matter which each 
man will, in due course, decide for himself.” 
 
The above citation expresses an attitude towards development that many would identify 
as peculiarly modern and sensitive. It speaks to the foundation of 'development' as an 
enterprise: the belief that however imperfectly realised in practice the West has done 
something right – democracy, prosperity, freedom, equality – which it would be valuable 
to share with the rest of the world. Yet it also speaks to the understanding – a modern and 
sensitive understanding – that these desirable things cannot simply be transplanted from 
one society to another, and certainly ought not to be imposed. It reminds us that 
development must ultimately be something done by a people rather than for them. This is, 
according to Jan Nederveen Pieterse (2012: 5), the twenty-first century thing to say: 'we 
develop' rather than 'we develop it,' which was the twentieth century way of thinking. Yet 
this citation comes from the 1950s, the period of pro-Western development hubris, the 
quintessential 'we develop it.' (Although the gendered language may have given it away – 
we know better now). Moreover, it is found in a prominent book whose title alone is 
enough for Mehmet (1995[1999]: 61) to condemn it: Daniel Lerner's The Passing of 
Traditional Society (1958[1968: 411). This thesis will find that this should not come as a 
surprise, for development theorists have never truly held the arrogantly simplistic views 
we are wont to attribute to them. They have always been concerned with this 'internal-
external problem'; that is, the problem of finding a balance between the desire to achieve 
the values of development and the recognition that they cannot and must not simply be 
imposed. Consequently, the means of overcoming the failures of twentieth century 
development theory and practice must lie elsewhere. 
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Of course, development theory has a long history filled with a diversity of approaches and 
the present thesis does not claim to capture the dynamism of its story in all its glory. It 
shall make use of broad categories such as 'modernisation theory' and 'development 
theorists.' Readers familiar with the complexity concealed beneath such terms may find 
their presence jarring, particularly giving the contemporary fixation with the particular 
over the universal, the concrete over the abstract, the multiform over the unified. It must 
be said in this regard that there is no question of abstracting or generalising versus not 
abstracting or not generalising. The latter is not possible. It is instead a question of what 
level or kind of abstraction is appropriate for one's own purposes. When this thesis uses a 
term such as 'development theory' or 'modernisation theorist' it has in mind what Husserl 
called 'ideational abstraction,' which represents a unity of direction rather than a unity of 
being. The German philosopher Ernst Cassirer described this mode of abstraction in his 
The Logic of the Cultural Sciences (1942[2000]) with reference to Jakob Burckhardt's 
famous account of the 'Renaissance Man.' The Renaissance Man does not correspond to 
any particular individual associated with the Italian Renaissance – Botticelli, Leonardo, 
Petrarch, Raphael, Michaelangelo Brunelleschi, Machiavelli et al present us with as wide 
a variety of characters to have ever been grouped together. Burckhardt unites them not 
because they look alike but because, writes Cassirer,  
 
“they stand in a certain ideal connection to one another; … each in his own way 
cooperates in the construction of what we call the 'spirit' … or the culture of the 
Renaissance. … The particular individuals belong together not because they are alike or 
resemble each other but because they cooperate in a common task, which, in contrast to 
the Middle Ages, we sense to be new and to be the distinctive 'meaning' of the 
Renaissance.” (1942[2000]: 70-73) 
 
The general concern of this thesis might be described in these terms as identifying the 
distinctive 'meaning' of development, the common task in which development theorists 
cooperate, and with that in mind seeking a way beyond its problems. Three main claims 
will be made: first, that development ought to be understood as a particular 
conceptualisation of social change built upon a differentiation from the concept of 
progress; second, that the basic problem with the concept of development is that, because 
it is self-conscious – intentional and teleological – social change, it sees the internal and 
external motive forces of change as originally separate, and that the history of 
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development theory can be read as an attempt to overcome this problem by reconciling 
the two; and third, that a conscious, as opposed to self-conscious, understanding of social 
change, based upon the concept of progress and with what will be called the 'active 
individual' at its heart, can reassess this problem and thus offer the basis for a true 
alternative to development. The active individual will be conceptualised as mediating 
between the internal and external, giving both their meaning in this interaction. This 
active individual, it will be argued, plays an important role in the understanding of social 
change contained in the concept of progress but was pushed into the background in the 
concept of development, leaving behind a 'reactive' individual.  
 
The distinction between the two – and its policy consequences – will be illustrated in the 
sections on education: education is intimately bound up with ideas about social change, 
because it is to produce the types of individuals one expects to do the work of making 
social change a positive thing. Consequently, looking at approaches to education 
prevalent in eras of 'progress' and of 'development' can reveal assumptions about 
individuals and their role and place in the practice of social change that otherwise would 
remain obscure. It will be argued in these sections that, reflecting development's 'self-
conscious' understanding of social change, education for development sees the role 
schools as one of preparing the advent of a future society; conversely, reflecting progress' 
'conscious' understanding of social change, the goal education for progress will be 
conceptualised as helping people create a meaningful present. 
 
Thus the central argument of the thesis is twofold: critical and constructive. On the 
critical side it argues that we must move away from existing critiques of twentieth century 
approaches to development which exaggerate their strength and their Eurocentrism. 
Development is here critiqued as a particular conceptualisation of social change rather 
than the Western conceptualisation. On the constructive side the thesis argues that 
moving beyond development must involve reclaiming the active individual, returning to 
the concept of progress from which development was initially differentiated to find a 
basis for an alternative that would transcend the dichotomies constructed by development 
theorists between the world of development and the world without it. The concept of 
progress, it will be argued, allows us to reintegrate the active individual into our 
understanding of social change and thus rethink the internal-external problem. 
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As we enter the post-2015 development era this is an issue of great importance. In a field 
that is overwhelmingly concerned with reinventing itself in order to overcome its past 
failures, the interpretation of the past plays a significant role in shaping the future. 
According to the documents published for the Post-2015 development agenda the UN 
(2013: 40) believes that its new era cannot represent 'business as usual.' What does this 
refer to? Not the Millennium Development Goals, of which the new 2030 Agenda has 
been presented as a necessary and natural evolution (UN, 2015: 4), nor even to the 'lost 
decades' of neo-liberal structural adjustment, which can scarcely be considered 
'development' at all (Clark, 2015). In fact it refers to the vague idea of 'twentieth century 
development' mentioned above, the 'we develop it' attitude to which today's development 
industry can oppose a 'we develop.' The interpretation of that era is therefore still highly 
relevant. By re-interpreting what it is in the 'twentieth century' approach that must be 
overcome, this thesis will attempt to lay the foundations for an alternative future path for 
development theory and practice.  
 
Contrary to modern caricatures of twentieth century approaches it has always been 
recognised by development theorists that development cannot simply be 'given' to the 
developing nations. Nor, however, can it be a purely internally generated, inward-looking 
phenomenon. Development, positive social change, must always be a combination of 
internal and external motive forces. The history of development theory, this thesis will 
argue, is characterised by a series of attempts to reconcile the two and solve what we shall 
call the 'internal-external problem,' which has generally taken the form of how external 
Western influences can be incorporated into the internal life of another society in a way 
that would constitute genuine development. That past approaches failed, in modern eyes, 
to find a satisfactory balance does not alter this fact. Yet we imagine monsters of error in 
development theory's past – assumptions of Western superiority, disdain for and mistrust 
of developing societies, neo-imperialist attempts to Westernise the world – and these 
monsters have a great influence on what we imagine for the future of the field. 
 
Said monsters have haunted development theory for decades. Almost 25 years ago 
Wolfgang Sachs issued the now-famous proclamation that development was dead. With 
the characteristic literary flourish of the post-development theorist, he wrote that the 
dreams and schemes of development stood “like a ruin in the intellectual landscape” 
(Saches, 1992: 1). At the time there were good reasons for believing this to be the case. 
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The post-war optimism, according to which the developing nations might be able to 'catch 
up' with the industrialised West within a few decades, had faded with each successive 
year of stagnation, until in the 1980s it finally morphed into a full-blown crisis of faith. 
To the modern reader, however, Sachs' proclamation must seem premature. The 
development industry is thriving: innumerable NGOs, INGOs, charities, and 
governmental agencies compete for our attentions and funds; universities across the globe 
turn out thousands of graduates in development studies; hundreds of conferences are 
organised for academics and policy-makers. Most prominently, the UN continues to 
exercise its influence. The Millennium Development Goal (MDG) era came to an end in 
2015, and for the past few years the UN has sought to define a new, post-2015 
development era. Yet despite talk of a 'people-centred' and 'transformative' new approach 
that will put an end to 'business as usual' and bring about the 'most inclusive development 
era to date,' the familiar idealistic rhetoric of development, formerly so full of life, rings 
hollow in the 2030 Agenda (UN, 2015). Its 169 goals (compared to the eight MDGs) are 
too narrow to capture the imagination and too unreachable to inspire. The 2030 Agenda 
reads like a list of desirable things, and it is only by imagining monsters of error in the 
past – imagining that we are the first to be concerned about 'participation' or 'local 
cultures' or 'sustainability' – that we can convince ourselves that it represents is a bold 
new era. 
 
The source of this peculiar situation lies in the field of development's difficulties in 
dealing with the challenges it faced in the 1980s and 1990s. In addition to the failures of 
real-world development there were severe theoretical challenges, with post-development 
theorists such as Wolfgang Sachs calling into question the virtues of development as an 
enterprise pursued by the West for the global South. Particularly painful were the links 
made between the development discourse and colonial or imperial discourses of cultural 
and racial superiority. Development, it was argued, was Eurocentric, combining an 
arrogant assumption that the European trajectory of social change was a universal model 
and a neo-imperialist imposition of the Western way of life. These critiques are, of 
course, not unique to development studies. Every intellectual tradition and social 
convention has been interrogated for its supposed origins in some form of exploitation or 
exclusion. But in development studies, with its consciously normative and idealistic 
underpinnings, they have hit harder than most; they have eaten away at its sense of self 
and its raison d'etre. Yet on the other hand, this very raison d'etre, the sense that 
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development studies is necessary for progressive and positive social change, has kept the 
field alive while its carefully constructed edifice was being deconstructed. Thus it has 
simultaneously enhanced the impact of the post-development critique and prevented it 
from having the full destructive force envisioned by Sachs.  
 
The result of this dual process is a development era that is oddly uncomfortable in its own 
skin. One particularly damaging aspect of the post-development critique was that 
development involved a neo-imperialist imposition of Western ideals and institutions. 
Thus development became seen as a threat to non-Western peoples, rather than the 
friendly helping hand it was supposed to be. As mentioned above, the idealistic rhetoric, 
implicit or explicit virtues, and universal aspirations have changed little since the post-
war era. The UN wants development to do the same job as it always has – the creation of 
a world free from want and fear. But according to Ban Ki Moon, the post-2015 era will be 
different: it will be the most inclusive development era to date. The A Million Voices 
(2013) report is the result of a worldwide consultation process conducted by the UN over 
a number of years in preparation for the post-2015 era. It summarises the outcome of a 
vast, inclusive conversation on 'the world we want.' By coincidence, the world we want is 
the same as the UN has been advocating for over half a century. Indeed, the report reads 
like most other 'statement of purpose' documents produced by the UN. The difference 
now is that each statement on the 'world we want' can be prefigured by “The consultation 
in Peru concluded...” or “As was repeatedly brought up during the consultation in 
Ukraine...” Thus rather than being proudly proclaimed by Western intellectuals and the 
UN itself, the ideals that the post-2015 era stands for – the same ideals that development 
has always stood for – are the outcome of a million-man focus group. The UN can 
therefore reassure itself that it is not imposing Western values, but simply giving the 
people what they want. Development education has not escaped this assessment of the 
problems of twentieth century development and the associated attempt to move away 
from Eurocentrism. It is now largely subsumed under the rubric of 'global citizenship 
education,' which, as the name implies, takes a global perspective rather than promoting a 
narrowly Western one. 
 
It goes without saying that for many this will not be good enough from a supposedly fresh 
new development approach, but how much further are critiques such as those advanced 
by the likes of Sachs likely to take us? Their effectiveness requires policy-makers who do 
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not believe that universally valid ideals exist, but do not know that the ideals they are 
promoting actually belong to a specific cultural tradition. Only then will the revelation 
that policy x relies on a Western understanding of y have the desired effect. It is by no 
means contradictory to recognise on the hand that democracy rests on a certain 
understanding of the individual's relationship with society, and to believe on the other that 
it is a political system to be emulated by all. We are more aware than ever of the 
assumptions that shape our understanding of development and our visions for the future; 
it does not necessarily follow that these visions cannot be propagated globally. If it did, 
development would be as dead as Sachs hoped. As it doesn't, there is room for further 
critiques which take its universalist impulse as a given. 
 
That is what this thesis hopes to contribute to: the search for an understanding of 
development in which the field can retain its normative commitment and contribution to a 
better world for all without the neo-imperialistic implications this has had in the past. The 
errors of development theory's past seem monstrous indeed and it is no wonder that we 
should want to distance ourselves from them. Yet the effort of distancing is not the same 
as change. Decades of caricaturing post-war development theory has given us the 
impression that we are already in a new development era simply by virtue of the fact we 
want to be. However, “it is not enough to want change, not even enough to work for it – 
we must want it and work for it with intelligence.” (Trilling, 1951[1970]: 223) That is, we 
must work for change with a sound historical sense. With that in mind, this thesis aims to 
help us reconsider what it is in development theory's past that needs to be critiqued in 
order for the field to move beyond its failures. In so doing it looks for a way of 
conceptualising social change through which the normative element of development 
studies could be maintained without this becoming an imposition of Western values and 
practices and hence implying the passivity of the developing people in their own 
development.  
 
Certainly the reader should not expect to find a fully fleshed out alternative to 
development; that would be beyond the scope just mentioned, the assessment of 
development theory in light of the internal-external problem and the consequent need for 
the active individual to be explicitly re-incorporated into our basic conceptualisation of 
social change.. Nevertheless, dissatisfaction with the MDGs and their SDG successor was 
a key motivating factor in the conception of this project, and they shall be returned to in 
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the conclusion where it will be possible to consider what the development landscape 
might look like were the active individual to be re-housed in its ruins. The post-2015, like 
so many development eras before it, represents an attempt to 'bring the people back' into a 
process of development from which they have become detached. Going forward, it is 
important to think clearly about the nature of the 'people' who can be accommodated in 
our understanding of social change: are they active producers, as we profess to desire 
them to be, or merely passive recipients? 
 
2. Methodology 
“The truth is that good reading does not come out of systems, just because each great 
book … establishes its own language, manner, and point of view. A great book is in effect 
a view of the universe, complete for the time being. You must get inside it to look out upon 
the old familiar world with the author's unfamiliar eyes.” 
– Jacques Barzun (1945[1981]: 215) 
 
The material with which this thesis works is written texts – primarily books but also 
scholarly articles and policy documents. This raises a number of problems, concerns, and 
limitations including but not limited to bias, choice of texts, and interpretation. What the 
reader is, understandably, concerned about is a lack of objectivity. Is the author not 'just' 
reading books, picking individual ones from the shelf almost at random and interpreting 
them according to subjective bias and interest? What the reader expects is that the desired 
objectivity be supplied by a methodology. Although it is today a commonplace to say that 
there is no such thing as true objectivity – no 'view from nowhere' – a methodology offers 
the reader an objective standard, in the sense of existing outside the subjectivity of the 
author, by which to judge the work. Is the method appropriate to the author's aims? Did 
the author follow the method properly? Were the proper sources identified and tested 
according to the procedure? The methodology tells the researcher what to look for, where 
to find it, and how to identify it; and by passing it on to the reader the study gains in 
objective merit. Given this understanding of the purpose of methodologies, it seems odd 
that this section, although it appears at the beginning of the thesis, is being written 
towards the end. One could not imagine a physicist, a chemist, or a statistician performing 
their study and only then turning to the methodology. However, it does make sense within 
the approach to reading followed in the thesis. The initial approach – and underlying 
rationale – is based on the work of the American literary critic Lionel Trilling and French 
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historian Jacques Barzun. The fruits of this initial approach form the basis for a more 
focussed re-reading of the material, guided by the methodology of Quentin Skinner.  
 
Trilling and Barzun developed their method while working together at Columbia 
University (Trilling, 1966: 4-6; Barzun, 1976[2002]: 176). Because they did not regard it 
as a methodology in the strict sense of the word they never gave it systematic treatment, 
but its guiding principles can be gleaned from various essays and from their approach to 
the teaching of modern literature at Columbia. Both believed strongly that modern 
literature should not be studied at university, and until the middle of the nineteenth 
century most would have agreed with them. Contemporary literature – like all aspects of 
contemporary culture – was to be experienced on one's own; only then could it aid in an 
individual's prolonged effort towards the cultivation of the self. When modern poets, 
novelists, and artists appeared in the curriculum it was to provide biographical and 
historical background to the work, along with an explanation of difficult passages. “That 
was all. It amounted to a sort of beginner's workout for reading reflectively, reading for 
self-cultivation.” (1989: 18) For Trilling, understanding art was about experiencing the 
vitality of its creation (1966: 10). While scholarly analysis can help us recover the lost 
power of classic literature this is not necessary in the case of modern literature because 
the context that gives it life is still with us. Analysis tends only to accelerate the process 
by which a modern work becomes a classic, thereby distancing us from it. Too much 
scholarship in the humanities and social sciences, Barzun felt, is concerned with the 
application of systems that allow the scholar to uncover hidden motives or list themes and 
metaphors (1991[1992]: 165-166). While these studies are certainly not without value, 
Barzun believed that they conflated a distinction made by Pascal (1660: I.1-2) between 
two orientations of the mind, l'esprit de geometrie and l'esprit de finesse.  
 
The root of the distinction lies in the familiarity of their objects of study. The 
mathematical spirit is concerned with objects that are “palpable, but removed from 
ordinary use” (Pascal, 1660: 1.1). That is, they are strange in the sense that they exist 
outside ordinary human understanding, but they are 'palpable' in the sense that once this 
strangeness has been overcome they are easy to understand and use because their 
definitions are clear and their principles unchanging. For example, scientists can 
demonstrate that the universe is expanding by identifying 'redshift' in light reaching the 
Earth from supernovae: an expanding universe would stretch the waves of light, shifting 
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them towards the red end of the colour spectrum. Remoteness and palpability combine to 
make rigorous methodologies the foundation of research in l'esprit de geometrie. Pascal's 
'intuitive mind,' by contrast, is concerned with objects of study that exist within everyday 
speech and understanding but that are, for that very reason, far more fluid and 
changeable. They are in plain view, but messy. The concepts it is concerned with are easy 
to recognise yet difficult to grasp because each individual uses them in slightly different 
ways, and in using them alters the concepts themselves. Moreover, the relationships 
between the elements are not clear or definable in advance. It is 'conditions,' numerous 
and tangled, that produce effects, not identifiable 'causes.' As a consequence, the wisdom 
of starting one's research with a methodology that tells one where to look – which all 
must do to be of any use – is rather more dubious in this case. Rather, writes Pascal 
(1660: 1.1), “[o]ne has only to look, and no effort is necessary; it is only a question of 
good eyesight, but it must be good, for the principles are so subtle and so numerous that 
it is almost impossible but that some escape notice.”  
 
Underlying Pascal's distinction is an ontological claim that the reality investigated by 
l'esprit de finesse is one of human action – of conscious individual activity, contingency, 
and uncertainty – whereas the reality of l'esprit de geometrie is governed by 'forces.' In 
the former there are no determining forces; only individuals pursuing their consciously-
chosen ends. This is the realm of culture, art, ideas, economics, history – life in general. 
Over the past half century or so much work has been done in the various branches of the 
study of culture to counter this supposedly bourgeois tendency to exaggerate the imprint 
of individual action and creativity and intention on the course of ideas and events. 
Foucault, in the introduction to his Archaeology of Knowledge (1972[1977]: 12-13), 
praises Marx for effecting this “decentering [of] human consciousness from the 'original 
subject of historical development.” As a consequence, a good deal of scholarship that 
Pascal would have associated with l'esprit de finesse is now concerned with uncovering 
the hidden forces underlying our social reality. Edward Said, who while using Foucault's 
methodology claims to appreciate the imprint of individuals and their works on the shape 
of a discourse, nevertheless subordinates this individuality to the influence of power 
relations: 
 
“[I]f it is true that no production of knowledge in the human sciences can ever ignore or 
disclaim its authors' involvement as a human subject in his own circumstances, then it 
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must also be true that for a European or American studying the Orient there can be no 
disclaiming the main circumstances of his actuality: that he comes up against the Orient 
as a European or American first, as an individual second.” (1978[2003]: 11 – emphasis 
added) 
 
Thus the individual's thoughts are ultimately determined by his or her place in the West-
Rest power structure; a racial and cultural distinction to Marx' class distinction. The 
denigration of the influence of the individual author is similarly implied in the phrase 
'production of knowledge'. To the Romantic mind, knowledge is created or discovered in 
an act of individual genius. For Said, to show that an author exists within a set of power 
relations is to demonstrate their lack of freedom as a knowledge-creator. Their knowledge 
is socially produced, reflecting a place in those power relations in their historical moment. 
Said continues: 
 
“And to be a European or an American in such a situation … meant and means being 
aware, however dimly, that one belongs to a power with defined interests in the Orient, 
and more important, that one belongs to a part of the earth with a definite history of 
involvement in the Orient almost since the times of Homer.” (1978[2003]: 11) 
 
It is true enough that an awareness of the long history of European involvement in the 
Orient could make it seem 'natural' or legitimate to a European that the continue that 
involvement, although there are of course many who have studied the West's involvement 
in the non-Western world and concluded that it would be better off had it been left alone. 
But what this method does not tell us much about is the content of the knowledge that is 
created. It has something to do with the interests of the West in the non-Western world, 
but Said does not explain how every European or American knows – however dimly – 
what those interests are and how best to achieve them. Nor does this account for the work 
of scholars from nations with little imperial interest in the Orient, such as Germany. More 
importantly for our present purposes, the applicability of such a methodology requires, 
according to Pascal's distinction, that its object of study be implicit – that is, 'removed 
from ordinary use.' The work of Said and others who make similar arguments rest on the 
largely unexamined proposition that these biases about Western superiority and non-
Western inferiority exist at a deeper level than ordinary ideas, hidden from individuals 
who believe that they are studying the Orient objectively but are in fact coloured by a 
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'dim awareness' of the West's superiority over that part of the world. Only then can even a 
dim awareness of something colour the entire superstructure of knowledge built upon it. 
If, however, we look at development theory we see that it is an explicit idea rather than an 
implicit assumption that there is something universal in the Western trajectory of social 
change. The West has or aspires to something that the rest of the world should also 
possess – democracy, equality, free markets, human rights, prosperity, universal 
education and healthcare, and so on. It is an idea that exists alongside other, often 
conflicting, ideas, influencing them and being influenced by them – ideas about how 
development ultimately has to be indigenous, how universal models must be adapted by 
local leaders to fit local contexts, and so on. One does not have to uncover nefarious 
power relationships and hidden forces to demonstrate that the 'West is best' idea exists. 
The trick is not to uncover something hidden from ordinary sight but to investigate the 
place of something visible yet out-of-focus within development thinking and to determine 
its place within the whole.  
 
The consequences of confusing this are visible in Arturo Escobar's famous and influential 
Encountering Development (1995) particularly in how he interprets speeches, which 
frequently require decontextualisation to make them fit a discourse that is held to be 
independent of the individual intentions of the speaker. For example, Escobar discusses a 
speech given by Robert McNamara to his fellow World Bank board members, in which 
the then-president of the Bank advocates setting an ambitious target of a 5% annual 
increase in small farm output in Africa. McNamara believed this was possible based in 
part on the example of Japan. Thus the speech was given to people known to McNamara, 
who shared a similar background knowledge of land and agricultural policies in 
developing countries, and was intended to gain support for an expressly ambitious target. 
The desirability of adopting this target is the focus of the speech rather than the specific 
means that would actually be used to achieve it wherever it came to be implemented. This 
context is entirely ignored by Escobar. He criticises McNamara's “reliance on a model 
(Japan), without recognizing any historical specificity” (Escobar, 1995: 160). In fact, this 
was as a prominent example of successful land reform, which contributed in the post-war 
years to a rapid expansion of the Japanese agricultural sector. It was not intended to 
provide a model to be replicated elsewhere; it was, rather, evidence that the rapid 
expansion of agriculture envisaged by McNamara is not as over-optimistic as it may have 
first appeared. That it has been done before is evidence that it can be done, not that it 
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must be done in the same way everywhere else. 
 
Escobar (1995: 60) continues: “The principle of authority [in McNamara's speech] is 
clear: 'I believe the goal to be feasible', when the 'I' is uttered as representative of all 
bankers investing in development.” On the contrary, it is quite clear from the context of 
the speech, which is a personal appeal to fellow World Bank board members, that the 'I' 
refers to McNamara himself. The speech is aimed at 'bankers investing in development,' 
not representative of them. The goal he has proposed may seem unrealistic to his fellow 
bankers, but he believes it is possible and has tried to convince them with his speech. 
McNamara concludes by admitting that the World Bank, like everyone else, does not 
have all the answers. They have enough general knowledge to get the project started, but 
beyond that experiments will have to be undertaken and learned from, specific to local 
situations. According to Escobar's (1995: 160) interpretation, “[q]ualifying this principle 
of authority only makes it stronger … If 'the Bank' does not have clear answers, nobody 
else does.” Here Escobar has altered the emphasis of the statement, from the modest 
'nobody, including the World Bank, has all the answers' to the arrogant 'the World Bank 
does not have all the answers, therefore no one else can either.' Again, the former makes 
sense within the context of a speech designed to garner support for an ambitious project: 
'I know we don't have all the answers but no one else does either, so we should not let that 
deter us.' The latter makes sense only given Escobar methodological approach which 
straitjackets what it is possible for McNamara to say. 
 
It is worth making clear that there is nothing in principle wrong with what Escobar is 
trying to do here – bring to light assumptions of Western superiority within development 
thinking. Problems arise when it becomes the basis for textual interpretation and for one's 
understanding of development thinking generally. Ultimately, Escobar is not reading texts 
on development theory; he is reading power relations through the medium of texts. As 
such, he ignores – or his methodology blinds him to – the individual tone of McNamara 
speech, instead reducing it to an instance of Western-centric arrogance. As with Said, he 
attributes such supreme power to the development discourse over the minds of individual 
development theorists and practitioners that their identities, interests, and intentions are 
finally reduced to those of one of the two monolithic categories that he finds at the heart 
of the problems of the development discourse: the West and the Third World. Where 
Foucault had said that a discourse becomes linked with institutions and practices of 
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power, Escobar elides the two. Which knowledge is created and how knowledge is used 
become conflated. Because the focus is on a power relationship, his critique is most 
interested in what power does with knowledge. Though it aims to analyse the relations 
between institutions, knowledge, socio-economic processes, technologies etc, there is a 
failure to distinguish adequately between them. Everything is condensed into a single 
unit. The analysis of this unit is diverted toward the end user – power – and the individual 
elements are retrospectively judged based on this perception. Thus with Escobar, the 
methodology works like a template. It is placed over the material and it is the job of the 
researcher to see what shows through the gaps. His object of study – whether 
development theory as a whole or a specific text – is reduced to a mere appendage, a case 
study to demonstrate the usefulness of the methodology. As a consequence, what the 
reader of Encountering Development receives from Escobar is not a view of development 
theory but a facsimile, “an offprint made for methodic purposes,” in Barzun's (1989: 16) 
words.  
 
This was, to repeat, precisely the concern Barzun and Trilling had about the analytical 
study of modern literature: “it is fair to say that the modern student, the 'major' in 
English or American studies or in one of the other departments, has no cultivating 
encounter with the works of art he or she has been assigned. George Eliot has been read 
for the plight of women or for images of running water; the Post-Impressionists testify to 
sordid society and individual alienation...” (1989:15) Having finally been persuaded by 
the university hierarchy to introduce a modern literature module, Barzun and Trilling 
developed an approach to reading texts that would avoid the pitfalls of misapplying 
l'esprit de geometrie and maintain the immediacy and vitality from which literature gains 
its value as a vehicle for personal development. Barzun (1989: 83) described the 'method' 
as follows:  
 
“[T]he group [of students] would read the books assigned and discuss them with the aid 
of all relevant knowledge – historical, aesthetic, logical, comparative, philosophical, 
[etc.] … no holds barred. But what was relevant? Ah, that was the purpose of the 
exercise: to develop judgement to the point where nothing foolish, nothing forced, nothing 
'viewy,' nothing unnecessary is used that might stand in the way of understanding and 
enjoyment.”  
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There are three key aspects to this. First, the work itself should be read rather than, or at 
least before, summaries of it. “Some of the results of scholarship may be brought in to 
shed occasional light on and around the work, but the work is there to shed its own 
light.” (1991[1992]: 146) Second, the work should be read comprehensively – that is, the 
whole work should be read and read reflexively rather than strategically. “Only at this 
price can the mind form true and distinct images.” (1991[1992]: 145) Third, the work 
should be read with a good deal of surrounding knowledge. This is slightly different from 
saying that it should be read 'in context.' To identify beforehand what the 'proper' context 
is requires a methodology. What Barzun and Trilling had in mind was simply varied and 
voracious reading, which would produce “a map of the mental life with one region of it 
extremely familiar, because it is 'home.'” (1976[2002]: 390) That is, a region of which 
one has specialist knowledge but that is not cut off from the rest of the world of ideas. 
Context-relevant knowledge “can grow in regions apparently far removed from [the 
work being studied]. … The great point is that none of the elements brought to bear is 
ever regarded as determinant, as cause; it is only a condition whose force is gauged, like 
everything else in immediate experience, by the esprit de finesse.” (1989: 84) 
 
Consistent with Pascal's (1660: 1.1) belief that in matter of the intuitive understanding 
“[w]e must see the matter at once, in one glance, and not by a process of reasoning, at 
least to a certain degree,” Barzun and Trilling's 'method,' which they named cultural 
criticism, presupposes “the factitiousness of theory and the unsuitability of system...” 
(Barzun, 1989: 84) The point of the approach was not to analyse and break down or to 
discover hidden meanings or instances of this or that, but to “[seize] upon the character 
of the whole altogether, by inspection.” (Barzun, 1989: 14) It achieved this by attempting, 
as far as possible, to create a situation where “there are no barriers between ideas, there 
is no jargon, no prevailing theory or method. There are books and readers, as on the first 
day of publication.” (Barzun, 1991[1992]: 196) Identifying the steps to take, what to look 
for, where to look and so forth is in the case of l'esprit de finesse itself an act of 
judgement that must be informed by an engagement with the material itself from the 
perspective of one's prior knowledge and experience. Thus the work must be read with “a 
great deal of attention, knowledge, and experience of reading,” rather than being guided 
by a methodology devised and applied in advance; for Barzun and Trilling, the reader is 
and must be “ultimately on his own, his sole resources being strenuous reading and a 
demanding imagination.” (Barzun, 1976[2002]: 135)  
 16 
 
That last citation raises the problem of personal bias and rigour noted in the opening 
paragraph. There is no easy answer to this question as there is, according to the 
understanding of 'reading' expressed here, no special technique to supply it. One's 
'demanding imagination' is of course subject to and coloured by a host of assumptions, 
preferences, and prejudices. This is not in itself a bad thing. Indeed, Trilling (1966: 5) 
regarded a sense of oneself as “a person rather than as a bundle of attitudes and 
responses” as a precondition for the 'imagination of the real.' The 'view from nowhere' is 
not only impossible, it is in the case of l'esprit de finesse also undesirable because the 
intuitive understanding is predicated upon a meaningful engagement among the material, 
the self, and the world. This sense of self is also an important part of intellectual honesty, 
which demands that we are honest with ourselves; that is, that we are aware of the 
intellectual and social position from which we are reading and writing. However, Barzun 
pointed out in his Clio and the Doctors (1974: 48) that the strongest safeguard against 
bias lies in the nature of l'esprit de finesse itself. Because it avoids dealing in signs, 
metaphors, and hidden motives that can only be accessed using the correct methodology, 
the 'evidence' it considers “is in plain sight and the bias also.” The sources still need to 
be interpreted, but they are public: there is nowhere to hide and thus biases will soon be 
exposed, though they may have been overlooked by the researcher. 
 
Barzun and Trilling hoped that the outcome of their method of reading would be to 
encourage in the reader the development of a 'historical sense,' different aspects of which 
appear throughout their writings. This thesis will return to it later, as it has an important 
role to play in the understanding of the 'active individual.' For now we need only note that 
the historical sense “enables the independent mind to criticize … the advanced attitudes 
that misread the present from ignorance of the past. All the novelty-hunting that is later 
seen as faddishness, and not discovery, is assessed sooner and more truly than the mind 
ballasted with history.” (Barzun, 1974: 128) 'Faddishness' is, as was mentioned in the 
first part of the introduction, rife in development studies. In a field of theory and practice 
built upon hope yet haunted by failure the new is seized upon and the past discarded more 
readily than elsewhere. Barzun (1974: 128-9) could easily have been describing modern 
development studies when he wrote that by “[i]magining monsters of error in the past, 
they overvalue their own fresh proposals and attitudes, and in their name persuade men 
to acts and opinions as inept or unjust as those they supplant. Too often the new is old 
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error painted over, and the indignation that sustains it blinds the projector to drawbacks 
and difficulties.” The 'monsters of error' implanted into our imagination by the radical 
critiques of the post-war development model give rise to a great deal of indignation. 
W.W. Rostow's The Stages of Economic Growth (1960[1977]), for example, has come 
down to us through the lens of post-development critiques as an instance of a linear 
understanding of social change with Western capitalism at the apex. This is what 
Brohman (1995: 125) had in mind when he dismissed an entire school of thought as 
having offered little more than a 'celebration of the achievements of the advanced 
industrial countries.'  
 
Even if an interested student looks past the reference books and picks up the work itself 
they will find a summary in the introduction containing precisely what they have been led 
to believe: a linear model of development ending with Western capitalism. Having found 
the instance of Eurocentrism they were looking for there would be no need to read on 
through a book so riddled with old-fashioned biases and prejudices. Yet they would have 
found in later chapters Rostow's conjectures on the post-capitalist society in which 
development would come to fruition: “the end of all this [development] is not compound 
interest forever; it is in the adventure of seeing what man can and will do when the 
pressure of scarcity is substantially lifted from him.” (1960[1977]: 166) Capitalist 
society, for Rostow, would eventually consume its own conditions. Development would 
not end with capitalist mass consumption but once it had overcome that society. Nor was 
Western historical social change something to be emulated; indeed, it was to be avoided 
as far as possible. Certainly this student would not be as confused as Mehmet 
(1995[1999]: 72) upon finding that Rostow, 'the prophet of capitalism,' legitimised state 
intervention in the economy as a vital part of development. 
 
These sections are not hidden away; it takes no special methodology to uncover them or 
to divine their meaning. Indeed, it is more likely a methodology that hides them from us. 
What it requires is that one reads “as one reads a face – with a great deal of attention, 
knowledge, and experience of reading.” (Barzun, 1989: 84) The great benefit of Barzun 
and Trilling's approach to reading is that by its comprehensiveness and broadness of 
scope it encourages – indeed requires – this. It may be questioned at this point how, if one 
is 'just' reading texts, it is possible to come up with a different interpretation than anyone 
else. This question could easily be turned around: it is in fact far more likely that one 
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would produce a different interpretation with this method, with its emphasis on 
independence and a personal encounter resulting in an individual synthesis. Indeed, an 
individual synthesis is precisely the point. It is only when one is strictly following a 
methodology that the question of how and why you have found something original can be 
raised. If you're following the same procedure as others, how have you reached different 
results? Avoiding fashionable methodologies helps avoid the equally fashionable 
misinterpretations they have engendered, bringing into focus problems and alternatives 
obscured by them. Concern with the Eurocentrism of development theory has, it will be 
argued, obscured the internal-external problem and elided the concept of development 
with what was once and could be again an alternative to it: the concept of progress.  
 
The approach initially taken in this thesis, based on the thoughts of Barzun and Trilling, is 
thus a highly inductive one, even within the context of textual interpretation. The method 
is one designed not to be a method, in the formal sense, at all, in order to enhance and 
maintain for as long as possible the open-ended nature of inductive research. This, Barzun 
and Trilling believed, was of particular interest to the disciplines dearest to them – history 
and literary criticism – where the researcher must form from a vast range of largely 
qualitative data a coherent narrative and where, therefore, critical judgement rather than 
the application of concepts will produce the most valuable results. Any work in these 
fields will, consciously or unconsciously, extend far beyond their strict boundaries into 
different academic territories. The same is true of development theory, where one must 
grapple with a fantastic range of thought, including politics, economics, history, 
sociology, philosophy, sociology, psychology, international relations and more, not to 
mention areas of study dealing with the more technical aspects of social change.  
 
There are, however, dangers stemming from this interdisciplinary nature. It is too easy to 
fall into the trap of thinking that development theory merely touches upon these and 
incorporates aspects of them. Such an approach leads students of development to learn 
about the 'politics of state-building' or the 'economics of urbanisation' without an 
appropriate grounding in the first-order disciplines of politics or economics, resulting in 
an understanding of these subjects based on the ready-made concepts provided rather than 
critical judgement. Elsewhere I have explored the consequences of this with regards to the 
concept of 'neo-liberalism', a catch-all caricature of economic thought at the height of the 
Chicago school used to judge past and present approaches to development which is the 
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closest many students of development get to this key discipline (Clark, 2015). The 
avoidance of such interdisciplinary narrowness, as one might call it, ought to be built in to 
the research process. Barzun and Trilling's approach does precisely that, for while it 
allows, like all inductive approaches, for a shifting focus it aims to keep the initial 
exploratory phase open as long as possible so that on the winding path one takes through 
the material one is always accompanied by “a map of the mental life” (1976[2002]: 390). 
The aim is that the narrowing down phase of inductive research is not accompanied by 
narrowness.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
As a consequence early reading for this project was, as Barzun (1974: 144) recommends 
for all new students, “hearty and catholic to the verge of indiscriminate,” being aimed at 
building up a ‘map of the mental life’ prior to charting a path through it. As a rule the 
whole book was read, except in cases of essay collections comprising various authors. 
Given the modern preoccupation with contextualisation this should not be a particularly 
strange approach, inefficient though it may be. Adding to the inefficiency, thorough notes 
were taken along the way. 'Thorough' here means that notes were taken in a way that 
summarised the whole work as opposed to 'strategically' in line with particular interests 
held at the time. This has the double benefit of allowing one to revisit notes with a new 
focus and have something spring out that seemed only of contextualising relevance 
before, and of allowing one to easily return to a specific section of the book.  
 
At this stage the choice of authors and texts was guided by three main considerations. 
First, the need to fill in the ‘home’ region of the mental map, development studies. 
Particularly for the post-war era this was based on the overview of development theory 
received during my master's in international development (although we certainly did not 
actually read such out-dated texts. What would be the point? They are but museum-pieces 
of an ethnocentric age). Of course, the plentiful references in academic texts helps one 
expand beyond the original set of known texts and build up a mental picture of a network 
of books and articles and the environment in which they were written and read. Second, 
reading in neighbouring regions which, following the frequently-shifting overall 
argument held in view, seemed of potential importance. Some of this reading, such as the 
economics of Frank Knight, ultimately did not feature in the final product, but others 
became extremely important, such as the interest in the idea of progress sparked by 
Cowen and Shenton’s Doctrines of Development (1996). Third, reading from regions 
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further afield which held some personal interest but had, at the time, no clear link to the 
project. In a sense this was done in order to maintain some level of sanity – it is important 
to remember, during such a long process, that reading is something to be done for its own 
sake as well as for the purpose of the thesis. In the event, however, these far-off regions 
of the mental map have had a significant influence, none less so than the work of Ernst 
Cassirer, who was first encountered via his The Myth of the State (1946). These three 
aspects were largely pursued simultaneously, their relative importance at any given time 
being determined by what the provisional overall argument was and how solid it was felt 
to be. 
 
Thus the build-up of surrounding knowledge followed existing and emerging interests in 
various aspects of political economy (especially Ludwig von Mises' approach), 
philosophy (e.g. Ernst Cassirer's philosophy of symbolic forms), and history, each of 
which have contributed in their own way to what this thesis has become. History in 
particular, with a long-standing interest in the history of ideas in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, would prove valuable in my interpretation of development as a 
concept. Combined with my reading of post-war and modern development theory it led to 
the distinction between progress and development which forms the basis of the thesis, and 
a search for their differentiation. Ernst Cassirer will feature prominently later when we 
come to conceptualise the active individual. In hindsight, at least, it is possible to say that 
the search for a solution to the problems of development theory in the form of an 
'individual' was influenced in no small part by the work of Ludwig von Mises. His 
individualist ontological outlook framed that search, making certain possible avenues 
look more fruitful than others. For Mises as for Pascal the human world is one of 
uncertainty and freedom – of choice and action as opposed to social laws; and “all 
actions are performed by individuals.” (Mises, 1949[2007]: 42) This should not, as it so 
often has been, be taken to imply some kind of atomism. Mises regarded all questions of 
whether the part (individuals) was prior to the whole (society) as vain. They are 
correlative: one cannot exist without the other.  
 
As human beings we are necessarily involved in social processes. “As a thinking and 
acting being man emerges from his prehuman existence already as a social being” 
(Mises, 1949[2007]: 43). Everything we call uniquely human – reason, language, politics 
– would not exist without society. For Mises, however, the key point was that all these 
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social processes become operative and discernible only in the actions of individuals. 
Whatever the social process, it “took place in individuals. It consisted in changes in the 
behavior of individuals. There is no other substance in which it occurred than the 
individuals. There is no substratum of society other than the actions of individuals.” 
(Mises, 1949[2007]: 43) Collectives such as nations, states, classes, and churches have a 
real influence on the course of events, but they exist and are visible only in the meaning 
given to actions performed by individuals. Based on this ontological perspective, 
collectivist or communitarian approaches to development look at best secondary to the 
more important task of re-emphasising the centrality of the active individual – which is 
what this thesis tries to do. 
 
While not an efficient approach by any means Barzun's and Trilling's approach is, for the 
above reasons, a necessary precursor to more strategic forms of reading and makes a 
greater contribution than the latter to the final outcome. Once the whole has been 
apprehended in this way – according to the mode of perception called l'esprit de finesse – 
methodologies in the traditional sense show their value as guides for text selection and 
reading. It is the understanding gained using Barzun and Trilling's approach that allowed 
me to be progressively more targeted and strategic in my (re-)reading of development 
literature. Once a clear picture of the material has been built it is possible to look for that 
picture in one's further reading. Ideally this would not be necessary and the 'picture' 
would continue to evolve with further reading in the style of Barzun and Trilling. 
Pragmatically this cannot be so as there is clearly not enough time in a Ph.D. for even the 
most voracious reader to cover everything. Moreover, the final thesis is a definite text 
rather than an evolving one – at some point a settled argument must be reached, 
supporting evidence sought, and key texts selected. It is here that a more formal 
methodology may be useful. The key point is that it is chosen after the whole has been 
surveyed, the discoveries have been made, the arguments formulated, and even in part, as 
mentioned at the top of this section, after the thesis has been written.  
 
For this thesis, Quentin Skinner's approach, elaborated in a series of articles in the '60s 
and '70s (1966; 1969; 1974; 1975) and utilised most famously in his Machiavelli (1981), 
has been found useful. Skinner’s method arose out of a dissatisfaction with two leading 
approaches to the history of ideas, which he termed textualism and contextualism. As 
these terms imply, the former assumes the primacy of the text, the latter of the social 
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context. Both, he believed, produced certain 'mythologies.' For example, textualism leads 
to the mythology of prolepsis, which conflates the intentions of an author with the later 
significance of their work. That we now see e.g. Adam Smith as the father of economics 
ought not to imply that he deliberately set out to create a new discipline. When 
interpreting a text, some context must be called upon in order to provide specific 
meanings to words and concepts; by failing to take the social context into account, 
textualism implicitly replaces the contemporary context with our own. Contextualism, on 
the other hand, goes too far in the other direction, assuming that the context is a 
determining factor in the production of a work. What Skinner recommends in his 
Machiavelli (1981: 1-2) is “to begin by recovering the problems he evidently saw himself 
as confronting in The Prince and The Discourses and his other writings on political 
philosophy” via a broader understanding of the historical context. In this way the textual 
interpretation is contextualised without losing sight of the importance of the individual 
author. 
 
Two considerations prompted the decision to utilise Skinner’s approach when identifying 
key texts: the results of Barzun and Trilling’s cultural criticism approach to reading, as 
outlined above, and the individualist ontological outlook of Ludwig von Mises. The latter, 
championed by Mises in the opening chapters of his Human Action (1949[2007]), 
informed the general framework for that search. Mises, as we have seen, viewed all social 
phenomena from the perspective of acting individuals and their continuous efforts to 
respond to the imperfect and unpredictable real world. Thus the act of differentiation 
between progress and development is in this thesis assumed to be one pursued by 
individuals. Consequently the thesis identifies the oeuvre of development theory by 
looking at how development as an idea was distinguished from other ideas by particular 
authors. It approaches these authors as individuals rather than as members of collectives 
or abstractions, and therefore interprets, based on what they wrote, the particular 
intentions of these authors – what did they object to in previous ideas?; how did they 
understand their task as a knowledge-creator in relation to previous approaches?; how 
were they trying to achieve something different? It does not (just) look at what an author 
meant by what they said, but what they intended to achieve, as a knowledge-creator, by 
saying it; that is, how they understood themselves as an author. 
 
The former helps overcome a key weakness in Skinner’s method, namely, that there is no 
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reason to believe that any of its guiding principles are necessarily true. For example, he 
argues that in order to understand a text we must try to grasp “what sort of society the 
given author was writing for and trying to persuade” (1969: 40). In many cases this will 
be true, but it is not difficult to think of counter-examples of authors who saw themselves 
as writing not for their contemporary society but for posterity. Indeed, Skinner's own 
objection to the 'great books' approach to intellectual history was that these authors are 
generally not representative of their age. To give a second example, Skinner (1969: 50) 
writes that every statement is “the embodiment of a particular intention, on a particular 
occasion, addressed to the solution of a particular problem, and is thus specific to its 
situation that it can only be naive to try to transcend.” The first part is a call to treat texts 
as the work of human beings with their own intentions and individual existence, but the 
'thus' does not follow unless one can first establish a significant degree of difference. Up 
until that point, successful reading is predicated upon effecting precisely the 
'transcendence' that Skinner here regards as naive; to, as Barzun (1945[1981]: 215) put it, 
“look out upon the old familiar world with the author's unfamiliar eyes.” Skinner (1969: 
53) seems to admit as much in the final sentence of the same article when he says that the 
ability to distinguish between the necessary and the contingent is the key to “self-
awareness itself,” which would surely make it prior to the application of a methodology. 
 
Looking back on his original articles in the mid-seventies Skinner further acknowledged 
that “before we can hope to identify the context which helps to disclose the meaning of a 
given work, we must already have arrived at an interpretation which serves to suggest 
what contexts may most profitably be investigated as further aids to interpretation.” 
(Skinner, 1975: 227) Tarcov (1982) criticises Skinner for this, arguing that it 
demonstrates that the methodology fails to provide enough guidance for the textual 
interpretation that must be prior to the identification of the proper context. However, from 
our perspective, as has been argued in this section, methodology is not appropriate here 
anyway: the initial textual interpretation belongs to the realm of l'esprit de finesse, to be 
conducted along the lines proposed by Barzun and Trilling. Skinner's methodology thus 
functions as a harmonious addition to Barzun and Trilling's 'non-method.' In the present 
case, that initial reading produced a picture of development studies which, contrary to 
accounts of it as the Western way of thinking about social change (e.g. Rist, 1997), 
consistently set itself against the eighteenth and nineteenth century conceptualisation of 
social change as 'progress.' On the basis of this general idea, the consequences of which 
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will be a major concern of this thesis, Skinner's methodology could prove useful in 
guiding the selection of key texts and, in part, the re-reading of them.  
  
If, as Skinner suggests, understanding in the history of ideas comes from an 
understanding of the problems an author was confronting, then if one is looking for a 
clear picture of both problem and proposed alternative it would makes sense to pick texts 
written at times when the distinction between the current and a new way of doing things 
was keenly felt, and from authors who were particularly conscious in their dealings with 
both. For this reason Part I, which covers social change as ‘development,’ is loosely 
based on three key periods identified in the history of development theory. First, the 
differentiation of ‘development’ as a conceptualisation of social change from that of 
‘progress’ during the so-called static interlude in the mid-nineteenth century. Second, the 
return of ‘growth’ as a central concern of economics in the 1920s and 1930s. And third, 
the emergence of what we know as development theory in the post-war period. In each of 
these periods it was necessary for ‘development’ to justify its existence, which was done 
by contrasting it with a vision of what the world would be like without it. Herein lies the 
significance of these periods for the present thesis, for in them we see most clearly and 
explicitly the self-image of ‘development’ and the construction of its alternative within 
the Western tradition, ‘progress.’ 
 
The first two periods focus on specific individuals, all prominent British economists: John 
Stuart Mill, Alfred Marshall, and John Maynard Keynes. It goes without saying that these 
three men do not represent the entirety of political-economic thought. The prominence of 
Keynes seems relatively uncontroversial given his significant and well-documented 
contribution to economic thought in the post-war era that saw the emergence of 
development studies. As this thesis is primarily interested in his contributions to the 
philosophy of growth rather than the economics of it, the focus is on his earlier writings. 
While the technical economics of Keynes' General Theory (1936) was a response to the 
Great Depression, we find in his early work, as Joseph Schumpeter (1951[1997]: 268) 
noted, “the whole of the vision of things social and economic of which [the General 
Theory] is the technical complement.” Moreover, for the present thesis Keynes forms 
something of a pivot upon which the whole turns, as his eventual rejection of Marshallian 
orthodoxy brought to light (and passed on to his followers) certain problems within the 
concept of development that were obscured by assumptions held by Mill and Marshall 
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about the role of individual action in social change.  
 
Mill and Marshall are rarely given pride of place in works on the history of development 
theory despite their importance to the economic and political thought out of which 
development theory would grow. One exception to this is Cowen and Shenton's Doctrines 
of Development (1996), where Mill in particular features prominently. A key criticism of 
their work, which also finds the origins of development in a nineteenth-century distancing 
from progress, is that although their story begins as development emerges from progress 
they give scant attention to the latter or how the two differ. As this thesis attempts to 
remedy that it makes more sense to start with Mill and look at the people, ideas, and 
practices he differentiated himself from rather than at his own influences, as Cowen and 
Shenton do. Specifically, Mill is compared with Wilhelm von Humboldt because the 
ideological similarities between the two (a key line from Humboldt's Limits of State 
Action (1854) serves as the epigraph for Mill's On Liberty (1859[1977])) help highlight 
the differences between the concepts of progress and development.  
 
Cowen and Shenton themselves trace Mill's influences back to Auguste Comte and Saint-
Simon, and while that influence is certainly present, particularly in Mill's early writings, 
Comte and Saint-Simon represent too clean a break from social-change-as-progress for 
this thesis to begin with them. Their proposals are technocratic in the extreme and only 
with a methodology that renders one immune to subtlety could one find any real 
resonance in modern development studies beyond the basic idea, hardly unique to them, 
that legislation can reshape society. Mill, while innovative, was no revolutionary. He is 
extremely useful from the perspective of Skinner’s methodology because his conscious 
and deeply-felt dissatisfaction with the existing way of being was mixed with an equally 
conscious connection with the spirit behind it. Thus Mill and Marshall, who was seen by 
contemporaries as the spiritual successor to Mill, are useful to the aim of the opening 
sections, namely, to establish that there are important differences between them and the 
advocates of 'progress' (rather than to chronicle the processes by which these differences 
came about, which would require another dissertation). Once we get to the consequences 
of the move from development to progress the range of authors can be diversified 
somewhat, as is done in the sections on modernisation theory. Here too, however, there is, 
in accordance with the methodological approach, a focus on authors such as Daniel 
Lerner who consciously saw themselves as at the beginning of something new. 
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Breaking up these chronological periods, the work of Georg Simmel (1908[2000]) is used 
to frame the internal-external problem. Simmel is certainly not the only person to have 
thought about the problems of internal spirit and external forms. However, the response to 
this problem from countless philosophers and artists has been negation. Rousseau, Hegel, 
Marx, Marcuse – in all the ideal is for the alienation of the self caused by imposed 
conditions to reach its final conclusion in a total rejection of those conditions and hence 
the liberation of the self. Marx, of course, is one thinker prominent in the mid-nineteenth 
century who does often find himself in histories of development theory, and his ideas 
have trickled down to us in the form of, for example, dependency theory and world-
systems theory. Their concern with the centre-periphery relationship might profitably be 
compared and contrasted with the internal-external problem which is the focus of this 
thesis. However, it would be viewed in a different light than in what we might loosely call 
'mainstream' development theory. 
 
The specific way that the internal-external relationship is problematised in development 
theory is predicated on the dual assumption that on the one hand somewhere in the 
Western 'example' there is something that is part of a universal human heritage which it 
would be valuable to share with the rest of the world, and on the other that one cannot and 
ought not simply 'give' to a society the 'proper' outcome of social change. For the 
purposes of this thesis' argument the dual assumption of development theory will be taken 
for granted, and this moves approaches in the Marxist tradition sufficiently outside its 
scope that including him and them would have greatly added to the bulk of the finished 
product without a correspondingly high contribution to its value. The 'de-linking' solution 
offered by dependency is theory, for example, is not an option for mainstram 
development theory if it is to survive as a global project, and the relevance of Simmel lies 
in the fact that although to a significant degree he shares the common concerns it is not an 
option for him either. True growth, he knew, needs both internal and external aspects. 
Thus this is not a question of tracing influence from Simmel's way of thinking to 
development theory. What Simmel provides is a way of shedding light on an issue that is 
central to, and arises directly from, social change in today's world. Simmel's work helps 
highlight the tragedy of this situation, and hence the need to think more clearly about its 
origins and possible alternatives. 
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The chronological narrative will end with the modernisation era, meaning that a few more 
notable contributions to the history of development theory, such as neoliberalism or the 
more recent literature surrounding the MDGs and SDGs, will not come under active 
consideration. That is so because they lie beyond the scope of this part of the thesis, 
which has as its aim the evaluation of the idea of a '20th century, we develop it' approach 
to development – an idea which has loomed large over development theory's attempts to 
re-invent itself in the past couple of decades. It is the basis of that re-invention that is the 
concern of this thesis – whether the concept of development is a suitable foundation or if 
the concept of progress might provide an alternative starting point – and that concern has 
guided the choice of literature. A large section on neoliberalism was cut for this very 
reason, though the interested reader can find the thrust of the argument in Clark (2015). 
 
Finally, a brief note on terminology is necessary. The term ‘social change’ will be used 
throughout this thesis as a neutral reference to the phenomenon that ‘development’ and 
‘progress’ seek to explain and evaluate. The inescapable reality is that societies change, 
but this can be conceptualised in different was; hence the cumbersome terms ‘social-
change-as-development’ and ‘social-change-as-progress.’ Both are ways of 
conceptualising the nature and origins of ‘positive social change,’ which will also be used 
as a neutral term referring to neither development nor progress specifically but to social 
change that is considered, by some common standard, good. 
 
3. Chapter Outline 
This thesis will argue that conceptualising social change according to the concept of 
progress can help us move beyond development theory's past failures without having to 
give up on the normative confidence that gave life to the field and its practice. To that end 
it is divided into two parts, reflecting its critical and constructive aspects. The first part it 
is concerned with the conceptualisation of 'development' as a specific form of social 
change. Consistent with the methodology it is primarily concerned with periods of 
emergence, when development as a concept and then as a distinct theoretical field came 
into existence. It deals first with the differentiation from the concept of progress, using 
the work of J.S. Mill and Alfred Marshall to make the argument. It is argued that social-
change-as-development is concerned with a societal overcoming of the economic problem 
– scarcity. True individual development could only occur when the 'art of getting on' was 
replaced by the 'art of living.' Development occurs as society moves to the point where it 
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can leave the struggle for resources behind it and embark upon a new adventure with the 
art of living. Development is self-conscious – intentional and teleological – social change. 
Without the guidance development theory and practice, social change would be given 
over to the impulses that development theorists have associated with the art of getting on, 
including selfishness, individualism, materialism, and social Darwinism. These were 
aspects of social change as it has taken place in the West, and it was not desirable that the 
Third World should go through the same experience. Thus it is argued that the concept of 
development does not contain a vision of the West for other to imitate. Western history is 
as much a warning as a guide along the road to a developed world for all. The present 
condition of the West is not something to be followed: even in Rostow's theory of the 
stages of growth it is not the telos of social change.  
 
The theoretical implications of this method of conceptualising social change are explored 
in a section on the 'concept and tragedy of development,' which frames the issue using the 
German sociologist Georg Simmel's work on the concept and tragedy of culture 
(1908[2000]). Simmel argued that the process of genuine cultivation must always be a 
combination of forces coming from within and from without the individual, but that 
because these forces operated according to different logics they would gradually become 
more distinct and hence incapable of fulfilling that function. It is argued that through the 
concept of development social change is seen in this way, with the internal and external 
forces originally separate, because it is a self-conscious endeavour: it is teleological and 
intentional. A section on Keynes details how this implicit problem was passed on to post-
war development in explicit form due to the great economist’s removal of the active 
individual from the centre of social change.  
 
The rest of the first part presents a reading of modernisation theory as an attempt to 
reconcile the internal and external motive forces of social change, rather than a 
Eurocentric attempt to make 'them' like 'us.' It finds their failure in the fact that these 
forces must remain conceptually separate, with the consequence that the stuff of 
development, created according to an external motivation, do not raise the internal, the 
developing society, to its own 'higher' level of development. Recognition of this situation 
in practice leads to criticisms that existing approaches to development have attempted to 
impose an external model of development, the proposed solution being a new approach 
that will unite development process and developing people. Analysing development 
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theory in this way helps explain some aspects of the modernisation approach that are 
otherwise written off as disingenuous or paradoxical. It is argued that the modernisation 
theorists' attempts to incorporate developing people into the process of development were 
genuine, but that the teleological intent implicit in the concept of development itself 
prevented these ideals from gaining full expression in theory and policy. In trying to 
move us away from simplistic critiques of modernisation theorists as rationalisers of 
Western power, this part of the thesis attempts to alter our understanding of what it is in 
that approach that must be critically reconsidered if the field of development studies is to 
meaningfully move beyond past failures. 
 
The second part puts forward a re-assessment of the internal-external problem. It starts by 
considering two attempts from outside the mainstream to move beyond the tragedy of 
development: post-development and hybridity. On the former it argues that in order to 
achieve their goal of ending development as a field of study using a Foucauldian critique, 
post-development theorists had to exaggerate the strength and coherence of development 
and, as a corollary, the passivity of the developing world. Hence the return to dichotomies 
one finds in a lot of post-development literature. On the latter it argues that hybridity's 
conceptualisation of the problem using spatial metaphors is limiting: it pictures two 
discrete entities and prejudges their relationship. Based on these two critiques some 
requirements for a true alternative are elaborated. Section II.4 begins this thesis’ 
theorisation of the internal-external problem. It rejects the idea that the internal-external 
distinction should be considered the 'original' problem of social change, arguing that it 
appears so only according to social-change-as-development. Instead it uses primarily the 
work of German philosopher Ernst Cassirer to argue that the division of internal and 
external is something to be found rather than overcome. It is found on an individual level, 
with the 'active individual' acting with regards to society as Barzun's and Trilling's reader 
does with literature. Through Cassirer's understanding of the internal-external problem we 
can think of a social change that is neither self-conscious nor unconscious, teleological 
nor blind. It argues that by focussing on the active individual, effaced by Keynes, as the 
mediator of the inherited and the new, the internal and the external, the societal-level 
teleology that characterises the concept of development can be dropped without fear that 
social change would be blind. Rather, social change can be analysed as something that is 
individually teleological. Moreover, the future-orientation of development can be 
replaced by a present-orientation without fear of conservatism. The following section 
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argues that the concept of progress, because it is not teleological, can provide a 
foundation for this alternative way of thinking about social change. This case is made 
with reference to a range of eighteenth century theorists of progress such as Ferguson, 
Hutcheson, Condorcet, and von Humboldt.  
The policy consequences of this are explored in a section of education for progress, which 
elaborates on the type of individual theorists of progress had in mind when thinking about 
positive social change. It argues that the mark of educated individuals was that they could 
act as Cassirer's active recipient. This is contrasted with education for development as 
promoted by UNESCO, so that a key difference between them becomes clear: if 
development asks of education that it contribute to the construction of its envisioned 
future, progress asks that it contribute to the construction of an individually meaningful 
present. This again reinforces the distinction between development as self-conscious 
change and progress as conscious change. The final section of this part draws 
implications from the previous sections to address the place of ‘the West’ in development 
today. Is it possible to allow a ‘conscious’ approach to social change, as opposed to ‘self-
conscious,’ when such a powerful and prominent example of what it means to be 
developed already exists? Finally, the conclusion brings together the arguments made 
throughout the thesis, returning to the post-2015 agenda and making recommendations for 
an alternative way of thinking about the role of development theory. It is argued that 
development theory must retain its bold normativity while simultaneously recognising 
that it is no more than an auxiliary to the active individual's feat of creation. Rather than 
the present function of problem-solver and guide, an alternative conception of the role is 
put forward that would be consistent with the conception of active individuals described 
in Part II. The role is based on the art critic, whose function, while important, does not 
imply the passivity of its object of study. 
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Part I – Social Change as Development 
 
“The economist, like everyone else, must concern himself with the ultimate aims of man.” 
– Alfred Marshall (in Galbraith, 1958[1976]: vii) 
 
“I give you the toast of the Royal Economic Society, of economics and economists, 
who are the trustees not of civilisation, but of the possibility of civilisation.” 
– John Maynard Keynes (in Higgins, 1959: 3) 
 
I.1 – Introduction 
Wisdom, it is said, begins with a definition of terms. If true, it says much about the field 
development studies that 'development' itself has proved so difficult to pin down. 
Definitions of development are many and often contentious. To give a few examples. 
Economist Arthur Lewis (1955:10) used the term, along with 'growth' and 'progress' as an 
abbreviation of “Growth of output per head of the population.” Kofi Anan (UN 
Secretary-General, 2000) thought that "[a] developed country is one that allows all its 
citizens to enjoy a free and healthy life in a safe environment.” According to Harriss 
(2005: 17), development is concerned with “structural and institutional change, in 
contexts where countries are engaged in transformations towards an 'image of their own 
future' drawn from models usually provided by the experience of 'first comers.” Watts 
(1995: 49) associates it with “the unregulated desire for accumulation... [The] capacity 
to grow without end.” Gunnar Myrdal (1974: 729), the prominent modernisation theorist, 
argued that the only logically tenable definition of development is “the movement upward 
of the entire social system.” The task becomes even more daunting if we pass from 
general to more specific definitions: sustainable development, equitable development, 
human development, basic needs, pro-poor growth, feminist development, and so on. Not 
surprisingly, it has been asserted that there is no singular 'development,' and that any 
attempt to define such would either do great injustice to the diversity of approaches or be 
so broad as to be essentially meaningless. 
 
Yet if the term 'development theory' is to have any meaning at all, there must be 
something that unites it. The contours of development theory are reasonably clear from 
World War II onwards. Modernisation, dependency theory, neoliberalism, post-
development and so on are all identifiable as theories of development, related to each 
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other despite their diversity and distinct from other social sciences disciplines. Prior to 
World War II, however, the waters are muddier. Development studies clearly did not 
emerge ex novo; but what it emerged from is a matter of debate. Mainstream histories of 
the field will, to the extent that they look past the post-war period, often start with Adam 
Smith. The full title of his famous magnum opus, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes 
of the Wealth of Nations, certainly reflects the concern with economic growth generally 
associated with development studies. After him comes David Ricardo, the great 
systematiser of Smithian economics. Yet after the Ricardians there tends to be a gap 
(perhaps filled by Karl Marx) of around one hundred years until the tale resumes with the 
likes of John Maynard Keynes and Joseph Schumpeter. The period between the classical 
economics of Smith and Ricardo and the Keynesian revolution has been called the 'static 
interlude' (Meier, 1984: 125). While there were great advances in economics during this 
time – particularly in the realm of value theory and methodology – economists did not 
share the Smithian/Ricardian/Keynesian interest in the theory of growth. 
 
In this section we shall argue that this static interlude is in fact vital to a full 
understanding of development theory. Looking at the work of John Stuart Mill and Alfred 
Marshall, the two most prominent economists in the English-speaking world during this 
period, we shall argue that though the economics of growth may not have changed much, 
the philosophy of growth certainly did. We shall see that how social change was thought 
about at the beginning of this period, with the imprint of the concept of progress, is quite 
different from how it was by the end with the concept of development. The crux of the 
difference is the teleological nature of social-change-as-development. Where social 
change, according to the idea of progress, was in principle unlimited, development has an 
end in mind. It is hardly controversial to say that development is (or was) teleological, but 
we shall find in this thesis that the telos was never existing Western capitalist society; 
rather, it consisted in overcoming certain undesirable aspects of that social system which 
nevertheless needed to be temporarily harnessed. Thus in the concept of development 
social change becomes something that must to a significant degree be deliberately done 
by a society to itself. For this reason this section will argue that development may be 
defined as a 'self-conscious' understanding of social change, in the sense that if social 
change is to be positive society must become conscious of its own change. This is in stark 
contrast with the understanding of social change found in the concept of progress, which 
will be called 'conscious,' in the sense that it sees positive change as arising from the 
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deliberate actions of individuals to “fit [themselves] for a future of which they have no 
knowledge.” (Molinari, 1899[1904]: 95) The significance of this transition from progress 
to development is rarely recognised and shall be the over-riding concern of this half of the 
thesis. 
 
The argument is made as follows. The first three sections of Part I are concerned with the 
emergence of 'development' as a particular conceptualisation of social change. It starts by 
considering two prominent methods of identifying the pre-history of development theory: 
the first finds the pre-history of development theory in evolutionism and is represented by 
Gilbert Rist's History of Development (1997[2008]); the second finds it in the West's 
position of power over the non-Western world and is represented primarily by Edward 
Said's famous Orientalism (1978[2003]). The second section sets out what we shall be 
looking for when we try to identify the concept of development. It utilises Michel 
Foucault's idea of an 'initial field of differentiation,' where a new discourse finds a way of 
differentiating itself from other discourses – development from progress in the present 
case. That differentiation is followed in sections I.3 and I.4 through the work of J.S. Mill 
and Alfred Marshall respectively. The two sections that follow are concerned with the 
consequences of conceptualising social change as development, using the work of Georg 
Simmel to detail the internal-external problem – the attempt to reconcile the two 
contradictory yet equally valid aspects of development – and then arguing that this 
general problem, which was implicit in Mill and Marshall, became explicit in Keynes as 
he removed the rational individual from the centre of social change. With Keynes' belief 
that individuals were too caught up in the 'money motive' to be responsible for 
development Mill's 'barbarians' and Marshall's 'Residuum,' irrational elements of society, 
came to cover the whole of society. Thus in Keynes the internal and external forces are 
not just separate but also, ultimately, antagonistic. The remaining three sections present a 
reading of modernisation theory as an attempt to reconcile the internal and external 
motive forces of social change, rather than a Eurocentric attempt to make 'them' like 'us.' 
It finds their failures in the fact that these forces must remain conceptually separate, with 
the consequence that the products of development, created according to an external 
motivation, do not raise the internal, the developing society, to their own 'higher' level of 
development. It is in this understanding of the internal-external problem, and the 
implications of it, that must be critically reconsidered if development theory is to move 
beyond its past failures. 
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I.2 – Development Theory's Initial Field of Differentiation 
First, then, we shall consider methods of identifying the pre-history of development 
theory. We can find one way of mapping the contours of development theory in Gilbert 
Rist's History of Development (1997[2008]). Rist finds a largely unbroken line of 
development thinking reaching back through the Western tradition to the Greeks. 
Following Nisbet (1969), he argues that development thinking has been based on an 
analogy with the growth of a plant or living organism – an analogy that, unfortunately, 
has become confused with reality. Four features are implied when one thinks of 
development according to the growth analogy. First, directionality. This follows from 
Aristotle's theory of forms, in which the potential is contained, from the beginning, in the 
actual. Development thus becomes a process of perfecting or completing the organism. 
Second, continuity, as encapsulated in the phrase 'nature makes no leaps.' The appearance 
of a thing changes, but not its nature. Third, cumulativeness. Each new stage depends on 
the previous, and cannot come into being before its predecessor has finished. As with 
directionality, this implies that development is positive. Finally, irreversibility. It is not 
possible to regress into a previous stage. (1997[2008]: 27). This metaphor lies at “the 
heart of Western thought”, and implies the possibility of a natural history of humanity, in 
which “the 'development' of societies, knowledge and wealth corresponds to a 'natural' 
principle with its own source of dynamism, [and] which grounds the possibility of a 
grand narrative. It is on the basis of this idea … that a totalizing discourse can be 
constructed which reveals the continuity of a single process, from the origins down to our 
own times” (1997[2008]: 39). 
 
Our idea of development, according to Rist, comes in a 'straight line' from the 
Enlightenment idea of progress, which was merely “given the finishing touches in the 
nineteenth century, when the doctrine of social evolutionism firmly rooted in the popular 
imagination the supposed superiority of the West over other societies” (1997[2008]: 40). 
Rist has, of course, just done for the idea of development precisely what he condemns it 
for doing to human history: he has constructed a 'totalizing discourse' which 'reveals the 
continuity of a single process, from the origins down to our own times.' He does, 
however, see one break: “the abandonment of the notion of decline and decay” 
(1997[2008]: 43). In the 17th and 18th centuries the idea of a limit to growth, an optimum 
level from whence the only way was down, was dismissed as mere mysticism and 
superstition. There was, in principle, no end to mankind's progress. There certainly could 
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be periods of decline, but these were not inherent in social change. As Wilhelm von 
Humboldt (1792[1854]:15) put it – in keeping with the metaphor of growth – whereas the 
flower, once blossomed, fades and dies, “when, in man, the blossom fades away, it is only 
to give place to another still more exquisitely beautiful.” 
Rist does not recognise the significance of this change. The key to Rist's critique of the 
growth metaphor is its first aspect: directionality. The idea of development as an 
unfolding of an immanent potentiality is what supposedly gives the West its sense of 
superiority. It allows one to, in Foucault's (1972[1977]: 22) words, “discover, already at 
work in each beginning, a principle of coherence and the outline of a future unity”. The 
West is further along (and at any given point in time believes itself to have reached) the 
homogenising path universally and inevitably followed by all mankind. It is familiar with 
the path, and can therefore help others travel it. The path, however, is much less clear 
without the notion of directionality. If there is no ultimate perfection there is, on the basis 
of the growth metaphor alone, no basis on which to judge and rank the perfection of 
societies. Aristotle's theory of forms, Rist's origin of the growth metaphor, is certainly 
defined by directionality; but Darwin's theory of evolution, which Rist regards as a mere 
addition to it, no longer relies on it (Cantor, 2009: 29-32). In fact, despite his teleological, 
even religious, language, Darwin's theory is not an alternative account of how Aristotle's 
perfectly unfolded order comes into being or how the divine order could have come into 
being without the guiding hand of the Creator: it jettisons the idea of a perfect order 
completely. Darwinian evolution is defined by its imperfections as much as by its 
perfections; it is an account of the principles underlying the apparent disorder of the 
natural world. Thus its great contribution is to show how what would appear to be 
mistakes in the perfect order, such as vestigial organs, are in fact demonstrative of a 
deeper order – one that proceeds according to principles rather than a divine plan. 
'Perfection', to the extent that it still exists, becomes context-relative: the organism is 
'perfect' to the degree that it can thrive in its environment. If the concept of development 
comes to us from Aristotle's theory of forms via Darwinian evolution, this change must be 
accounted for. 
Another approach to identifying the canon of development theory – which does recognise 
the importance of the telos to the analysis of development – proceeds by uncovering the 
dichotomies that are said to underlie it. Development, argues Escobar (1995), creates and 
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recreates a division of the world into West and non-West, in which the West essentially 
'constructs' the non-West as a mirror image of itself – an 'Other' to the Western 'Self': “the 
'Third World' … is produced by the discourses and practices of development” (Escobar, 
1995:4; Said, 1978). It is represented “in terms of absences, delinquencies or alienness” 
(Harrison, 2010:2) which need to be brought up to Western (-defined) standards, thus 
justifying continued Western intervention (see e.g. Kothari, 1988; Rahnema and Bawtree, 
1997). This method is associated with, but certainly not limited to, the movement of post-
development. Works such as Said's Orientalism, Arturo Escobar's Encountering 
Development, and Immanuel Wallerstein's European Universalism (2006) find the origins 
of the development discourse in an unequal power relationship between the Western and 
the non-Western world which places the West in a position to define who is developed 
and who is underdeveloped and to produce knowledge supposedly intended to make 
'them' more like 'us'. In this approach, the history of development theory and practice lies 
in the 'knowledge' about the non-Western world created in, by, and for the West which 
had the effect – intentionally or not – of rationalising European colonial and imperial 
activities. The felt need to convert the American Indians to Catholicism or the nineteenth 
century's notion of imperialism as a civilising mission would be prominent examples. 
 
The dichotomous system of thought reached its apogee in the field of Orientalism, the 
study of 'the Orient', which arose in the 19th century. In his seminal study of the 
discipline, Edward Said, making use of Foucauldian concepts of discourse and power, 
argued that “Orientalism is an exercise in cultural strength” whose essence “is the 
ineradicable distinction between Western superiority and Eastern inferiority.” (Said, 
1978[2003]: 40, 42). The Orientalists created the Orient, ascribing to it, in all its plurality, 
an eternally fixed character that was in every way different from the West. Starting from 
the “division … of men into 'us' (Westerners) and 'they' (Orientals)”, the Orientalist's 
worked served to continually reinforce that division: every new idea about 'our' values, 
culture, and so forth, binds 'us' together and excludes the 'other' (1978[2003]:45, 227). 
Said (1978[2003]: 227) noted the “culturally sanctioned habit” - in the West - “of 
deploying large generalisations by which reality is divided into various collectives …, 
each category being not so much a neutral designation as an evaluative interpretation.” 
The binary distinction between 'us' and 'them' is presented as the observations of a neutral 
academic, but in fact implies the superiority of the West, which is always associated with 
the 'positive category'. The West represented the values, norms, and customs of 
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'modernity', which “was said to be by definition the incarnation of the true universal 
values” (Wallerstein, 2006:33). As non-Western civilisations – whatever their other 
merits – had not achieved, and seemed to be making no progress toward, the universal 
values of modernity, there must be something intrinsically wrong with those civilisations; 
something that has prevented them from achieving modernity. Only the West, as the 
bearer of universal truths, could step in to save them from themselves. And only by 
becoming like 'us', by stepping over to 'our' side of Orientalism's many dichotomies, 
could the non-Western nations become truly civilised. Thus Orientalism reveals itself as 
an “adversarial knowledge” built upon a “notion of difference that implies hostility, a 
frozen reified set of opposed essences” (Said, 1978[2003]:352) 
 
This division of the world into 'Self' and 'Other' is held to be inherent in traditional 
Western thought. Founded on what Adorno (1973) called the 'logic of identity', it is 
accused of being prone to the heroicisation of the universal and the marginalisation of the 
particular. This is because the logic of identity expresses “an urge to think things 
together, to reduce them to unity. To give a rational account is to find the universal, the 
one principle, the law, covering the phenomenon to be accounted for” (Young, 1990:98). 
Because of its attempts to reduce everything to universal first principles, there must be a 
“disavowal of the particular and a refusal of specificity.” (Mouffe, 1988:36). Young 
(1990:99) notes the unfortunate consequences of this particular 'regime of truth': 
 
“The irony of the logic of identity is that by seeking to reduce the differently similar 
to the same, it turns the merely different into the absolutely other. It inevitably generates 
dichotomy instead of unity, because the move to bring particulars under a universal 
category creates a distinction between inside and outside.” 
 
Thus Western thought “functions so as to set up and reinforce distinctions and 
dichotomies … that appear innocuous but actually function in such a way as to privilege 
one side of the distinction and relegate the other.” Distinctions such as man/woman, 
normal/deviant, developed/developing, good/bad, may appear innocent and objective, but 
in fact they “reinforce and justify a set of unequal power relations and often … 
downgrade the moral status of people who find themselves on the wrong side of the 
dichotomies.” (Roberts and Sutch, 2004:267, 268). Difference, approached in this 
manner, “congeals as the binary opposition a/not-a”, in which “the unity of the positive 
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category is achieved only at the expense of an expelled, unaccounted for chaotic realm of 
the accidental” (Young, 1990:99). Differences are thus expressed as mutually exclusive 
oppositions, eternally separated in the minds of those trapped in the dominant discourse 
of the West. 
 
One objection to this view is that dichotomies such as good/bad, man/woman, 
developed/underdeveloped, modern/traditional are not contradictory. Their form is clearly 
not a/not-a, as Young claims it to be. A/not-a would be modern/not-modern, rather than 
modern/traditional, developed/not-developed, rather than developed/undeveloped. The 
difference, particularly in the latter example, may be subtle but it is important. Of course, 
it is often said that what it means to be traditional is in effect the same as not-modern. It is 
a residue: the things that aren't modern are, by definition, traditional (Nederveen Pieterse, 
2001a: 21). However, in the Aristotelian law of a/not-a, not-a has no specified content. It 
is quite simply everything conceivable that is not 'a'. This is why there can be no middle-
ground between 'a' and 'not-a': there is nothing left to form that middle-ground. If 'a' is a 
cat, then 'not-a' is not given the characteristics of, for example, a dog. What it means to be 
a cat includes what it means to not be a dog, but they are not the same thing. Similarly, 
white/black is not the same as white/not-white even though white and black are opposites. 
Modern/traditional and developed/undeveloped are examples of contraries, rather than 
contradictions. They are two ends of a spectrum. As such, they will share some 
dichotomous aspects but the key point is that there is plenty of room between them for 
things that are neither modern nor traditional, developed nor undeveloped: 
 
“We have explained Contrary terms as those which express the widest possible difference 
among classes belonging to the same genus, e.g. 'white, black', 'convex, concave', 'love, 
hatred'. There is, of course, a mean between terms such as these. Objects possessed of 
any other variety of colour are neither white nor black.” (Joyce, 1908:74) 
 
“If something is, or has the property, A, it cannot, according to classical logic, not be, or 
not have the property, A, at the same time. But if something is, or has the property, A, that 
does not exclude the possibility that it might also be, or have the property, B, at the same 
time.” (Devaney, 1997:65) 
 
An identity is defined as much by what it is not as by what it is. What it means to be tall 
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and what it means to be not-short, or what it means to be masculine and what it means to 
be not-feminine, are two sides of the same coin; likewise with Western and non-Western. 
The Self needs an Other. However, as for Said and Escobar all knowledge created in the 
West serves to reinforce the Western identity, it is not clear from their analysis why a 
field called development studies should actually exist. Just as we need differences in 
height for words such as 'tall' and 'short' to make sense, so academic disciplines need to 
differentiate themselves in order to justify their existence – one prominent example being 
the separate fields of economics and political science, formerly subsumed under the title 
'political economy'. To carve out a field of its own, economics had to be 'about' something 
different from what concerned political scientists, and vice versa. 
 
In The Archaeology of Knowledge (1972[1977]), Michel Foucault was concerned with 
just this: how concepts we regard as natural – such as economics or politics – come into 
being; that is, how they become differentiated from other concepts. For Foucault, 
concepts such as economics are not based on something objectively definable. The 
discourse on madness, for example, is not based on the existence of an object called 
'madness'. Rather, the concept is defined by the collection of statements that are accepted 
as being about madness and those that are not. The question for Foucault is how and why 
certain statements emerge and are associated with the subject of madness, and others 
either do not emerge or are not accepted as part of the discourse. The conditions of 
existence, coexistence, maintenance, modification, and disappearance Foucault calls the 
“rules of formation” of a discourse (1972[1977]: 38). There are three inter-related aspects 
of the rules of formation: the “field of initial differentiation” where the discourse defines 
its object and differentiates itself from other discourses; the “authorities of delimination” 
who are regarded as having the authority to make truth statements about the object; and 
the “grids of specification”, according to which the various parts of the discourse are 
“divided, contested, related, regrouped, classified, derived from one another.” 
(1972[1977]: 41-2). As our concern here is with development theory as a distinct body of 
knowledge the relevant aspect is the first, where a new discourse “finds a way of limiting 
its domain, of defining what it is talking about, of giving it the status of an object – and 
therefore of making it manifest, nameable, and describable.” (1972[1977]: 41) How does 
development theory identify its domain? That is, what is it 'about'?  
 
Escobar's and Said's analyses of development studies are based on the idea that the object 
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of development theory is the Third World. Through development theory (or Orientalism, 
for Said) the West creates and defines the underdeveloped (or Oriental) world as an object 
upon which it can act. Yet development theorists are not so much concerned with the 
Third World as such, with the categories of 'modern' and 'traditional', 'developed' and 
'undeveloped'; rather, they are concerned with 'developing,' with social change. That is 
the object of development theory, what it is about. 'Development' as a phenomenon is a 
particular form of social change, and development theory is the body of knowledge that 
conceptualises and describes it. As we shall see throughout this thesis, when development 
theorists define their field they do so by differentiating it from alternative ways of 
conceptualising social change – this, not West-non-West, is the identity foremost in their 
minds. 
 
Though it may be a useful rhetorical device, it is clear to all development theorists that 
there are no developed countries – at least not yet. Everyone is in a process of 
development. Consequently, development theory is not (primarily) concerned with 
recreating the West in the non-Western world. As Daniel Lerner put it: “[t]here is no 
uniform Tomorrow just as there was no single Yesterday.” (1958[1966]: 74). Even Walt 
Rostow's famous stages of growth theory – a favourite target of this type of critique – 
does not end with his book's 'final' stage. It was not the stage of capitalist mass 
consumption – the stage in which the industrial West found itself – that was the ultimate 
aim. Development would find its fulfilment only in a later stage; for even in the 
contemporary West, “[t]he problem of choice and allocation – the problem of scarcity – 
has not yet been lifted...” (1960[1977]:81) The telos of social-change-as-development is 
not the universalisation of Western (capitalist) society. Rather, it consists in overcoming 
the problem of scarcity, of freeing mankind from the burdens of the struggle for mere 
existence. In this explicitly Anti-Communist Manifesto, Marx was conceded to be correct 
on one point: “the end of all this [development] is not compound interest forever; it is in 
the adventure of seeing what man can and will do when the pressure of scarcity is 
substantially lifted from him.” (1960[1977]: 166) This process of development, for 
Rostow as for other theorists, was seen as a common and cooperative human endeavour: 
 
“The creation of a setting of assured affluence and security for men and nations – and 
seeing what man will make of it – is the object of much striving by many hands for social 
an economic progress and for stable peace. But … the human community still has a long, 
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hard road ahead on which all it can summon in human dedication and endurance, talent 
and idealism – and resources – will be required for ultimate success.” (Rostow, 1971: 
360) 
 
The developed-undeveloped dichotomy doesn't convey this sense of cooperation, nor can 
it account for any movement beyond a simple Westernisation. Yet both are important 
parts of how development theory sees itself. To be sure, aspects of Western society were 
regarded as universally desirable. Many of them, such as democracy and human rights, 
still are. Yet as we shall see, it is far more interesting to consider the aspects of Western 
society that were, and still are, considered universally undesirable. With that in mind we 
can now turn to an analysis of development theory's initial field of differentiation, where 
it was distinguished from a rival conceptualisation of social change: the idea of progress. 
In the section to follow we shall demonstrate this differentiation through the work of John 
Stuart Mill, comparing him with Wilhelm von Humboldt whom we associate with the 
idea of progress. The section after that traces the further evolution of the concept of 
development in the work of Alfred Marshall. 
 
I.3 – Development's Differentiation from Progress I: John Stuart Mill 
As we saw above with Gilbert Rist's work, progress and development are, in the minds of 
many, essentially the same thing. However, in this section we shall see that this equation 
does not stand up to closer scrutiny. Moreover, we shall see throughout the thesis that the 
perceived differences between the concepts of development and of progress have 
remained a vital aspect of development theory long after the initial differentiation had 
been effected. For the moment, though, we shall be concerned with the emergence of the 
concept of development in the middle of the nineteenth century. Cowen and Shenton, in 
Doctrines of Development (1996), similarly found the origins of development thinking in 
this period, and have important distinction between the two. According to them, early 
development theory, such as that of Auguste Comte, “was based upon the idea that 
'development' may be used to ameliorate the disordered faults of progress. … 
[D]evelopment was the means toward which development might be ordered but it was not 
the idea of progress itself” (1996:7-8). Thus it was intentional development that was to 
combat the problems of immanent progress. Cowen and Shenton stress underdevelopment 
and disorder as inherent parts of the capitalist system, to which doctrines of development 
are “one possible means to construct the positive alternative” (1996: 56). Development 
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was to be achieved “through trusteeship” (60); that is, in the words of Passmore 
(1969:204), by the guidance of “sages … who, religious and scientific at once, are fit to 
guide mankind 'by the light of reason on the path to perfection'”. Indeed, Cowen and 
Shenton (1996: 4) argue that trusteeship is an inherent part of the idea of development, 
which is based on “an old utilitarian tautology. Because development, whatever definition 
is used, appears as both means and goal, the goal is most often unwittingly assumed to be 
present at the onset of the process of development itself.” The solution to this problem 
was the doctrine of trusteeship: “Those who took themselves to be developed could act to 
determine the process of development for those who were deemed to be less developed.” 
The implications of this idea for later theories of development should be quite clear. 
 
However, the concept of immanence, in the Marxist sense used by Cowen and Shenton, 
implies an economic determinism. It is the progress of capitalism, as an economic system, 
that inevitably creates problems, but that cannot be halted. The internal logic of 
capitalism is the sole motive force of change. The role of the state, of intention, of 
development policy, is therefore essentially reactive. It can only ameliorate the problems 
caused by capitalist progress. For all the talk of intentionality, then, Cowen and Shenton's 
account of the emergence of doctrines of development is reminiscent of Karl Polanyi's 
work the on the emergence of social policies in The Great Transformation (1944[2001]), 
in which every restriction placed on the market in the 19th century emerged spontaneously 
and inevitably, as a recognition of social need, rather than deliberate – intentional – 
choice governed by definite ideas. Thus for Cowen and Shenton (1996: 438): “Intentional 
development, we have argued, consists of the means to compensate for the destructive 
propensities of immanent change.” And: “Development emerged to ameliorate the 
perceived chaos caused by progress” (1995:29). But in that case it becomes rather 
difficult to distinguish development from progress. Adam Smith, whom Cowen and 
Shenton (1995:31) place under 'progress', famously wrote that “Little else is requisite to 
carry a state to the highest degree of opulence from the lowest barbarism, but peace, easy 
taxes, and a tolerable administration of justice.” Are these not intentional state policies, 
without which, Smith believed, chaos would result? He adds: “all the rest being brought 
about by the natural course of things” (1795[1982]:236). 'The rest' may be more broadly 
conceived than in most thinkers who followed him, but Smith's 'system of natural liberty' 
was no stateless society; and even if it was, it would not be an intention-less society.  
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While the reactive role implied in the immanence-intentionality distinction may arguably 
be the dominant function of government in a mature, predominantly market-based 
economy – or in the system of a predominantly pro-market thinker such as Adam Smith – 
it is clearly not the only one. Development economist Albert Hirschman (1958[1970]: 
202-5) likened the functions of government in a developing economy to a Charlie Chaplin 
film in which the iconic comedian, playing a glazier, has a friend throw stones through 
shop windows, whereupon he passes by and offers his services in repairing the damage. 
This demonstrates by analogy the two functions of government: unbalancing and 
balancing: “To be effective, [governments] also must create incentives and pressures for 
further action; and then they must stand ready to react to, and to alleviate, these 
pressures in a variety of areas” (1958[1970]: 202). The first, unbalancing, function is 
more than just a Smithian maintenance of law and order, creation of the right institutions, 
or provision of infrastructure. These, writes Hirschman (1958[1970]: 203), are 
insufficient, because they do not 
 
“...set up imbalances that cry out to be corrected. They are rather conceived as the laying 
down of what have often been called the 'prerequisites' for further development. As such 
they permit and invite, rather than compel, other activities to follow suit. We have argued 
that in underdeveloped countries purely permissive sequences may be ineffective in 
inducing growth; and that in some cases government may well have to take the first step 
in the compulsive sequences that may be indicated, for example through active leadership 
in industrialization.” 
 
Thus the supposed continuity of Western ideas of social change – explicit in Rist and 
implicit in Said – does not stand up to closer scrutiny. Certainly it is not possible to 
equate development with the idea of progress or to see the former as a simple extension of 
the latter, as Rist does. However, by themselves accepting the inevitability of immanent 
chaos Cowen and Shenton fail to appreciate the role of ideas about social change 
underlying progress versus development. In Cowen and Shenton progress appears as a 
natural phenomenon to which development theory and policy reacts, but it too is 
produced by ideas and must be understood as such – as another way of conceptualising 
social change. Indeed, it is in an explicit and conscious opposition to the concept of 
progress no less than its reality that development theory emerges. Cowen and Shenton's 
reluctance to analyse progress except as it was portrayed by development theorists – they 
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do not actually discuss any theorists associated with the idea – is a fundamental weakness 
of their otherwise well-researched and sophisticated work. To redress this imbalance, this 
thesis will, in addition to the brief consideration of the work of Wilhelm von Humboldt 
that follows, consider the idea of progress on its own terms in the second part. This was 
the alternative discourse from which development theory had to differentiate itself; a 
differentiation which occurred during the nineteenth century and, as we shall see, has 
continued throughout the history of development theory. 
 
In 1899 the Belgian political theorist Gustave de Molinari published a short book, The 
Society of Tomorrow (1899[1904]). It was, perhaps, the last great expression of what we 
call in this thesis the concept of progress. According to Molinari, the purpose of the 
progress of civilisation, of positive social change, can not be defined “more clearly than 
by saying that it is the enlargement of human powers to fit men for a future of which they 
have no knowledge” (1899[1904]: 95). This is the final sentence of the book. In his 
introduction to the 1904 English edition, Hodgson Pratt objects to ending an exploration 
of social change at that point. Pratt argued that leaving things so open-ended was 
unsatisfactory to those who, like him, were “in consternation at the existing state of 
society.” Molinari was part of a dying breed who represented a way of doing things that 
was now perceived to be too “haphazard and non-organised” (Pratt, in Molinari, 
1899[1904]: 11).  
 
The emergence of this new understanding of positive social change shall be traced in the 
remainder of this section and the next through the work of John Stuart Mill and Alfred 
Marshall. Both are giants of the Anglophone economic tradition, yet are rarely mentioned 
in conventional histories of development theory – by which is usually meant economic 
development. The influences of development economics are traced back to the supposed 
founder of the discipline, Adam Smith, and David Ricardo. Both were concerned with, to 
use the title of Smith's famous work, the nature and causes of the wealth of nations. After 
Ricardo, so the story goes, there was a period in which the problem of growth fell from 
the limelight. This so-called 'static interlude' ended with John Maynard Keynes, who was 
the direct influence on the post-war development economists. Keynes will also have a 
part to play in our story, but Mill and Marshall, who wrote during the static interlude, 
cannot be ignored. Economic theory may not have been greatly concerned with growth, 
but both thinkers were notable for their social philosophy. Contemporary reviewers of 
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Marshall's immensely influential Principles of Economics praised him for bringing ethics 
into a discipline that, apart from the work of Mill, seemed cold and uncaring. The Pall 
Mall Gazette's review for example, stated that: “It is a great thing to have a Professor at 
one of our old universities devoting the work of his life to recasting the science of 
Political Economy as the Science of Social Perfectibility.” (in Keynes, 1925a: 41). 
Keynes returned to the problem of growth precisely because the Smithian-Ricardian 
account was ill-suited to the social philosophy of his teacher. Thus what happened during 
the static interlude cannot be omitted from the oeuvre of development theory: that is 
precisely where the field was differentiated as a new way of conceptualising social 
change. 
 
To appreciate the change we can compare notions of self-development in the work of 
Wilhelm von Humboldt, representing the side progress, and John Stuart Mill, an early 
representative of development (Cowen and Shenton, 1995;1996). These two are of 
particular interest because, as Valls (1999) has argued, their apparent similarities mask 
deeper and more profound differences, which are revealed in the policy implications of 
their ideas. Self-development was central to the philosophies of both men. For Humboldt 
(1972[1854]:13) “[t]he true end of man … is the highest and most harmonious 
development of his powers to a complete and consistent whole.” Likewise for Mill, who 
revealed in his Autobiography how important Humboldt's The Limits of State Action had 
been as an inspiration for his famous defence of individuality in On Liberty. For both, the 
character of the developed individual is marked by “desires and impulses [that] are his 
own – are the expression of his own nature, as it has been developed and modified by his 
own culture” (Mill, 1848[1909]:267). As good individualists, both believed that the self-
development of each individual “from his inmost nature and for his own sake” 
(Humboldt, 1792[1854]:15) would result in a harmonious and diverse society. For it 
would seem that as one can only aim for one end at a time, “man is inevitably destined to 
a partial cultivation.” This fate can be avoided by combining one's activities with others, 
rather than aiming at disparate ends. Society can thus solve the problem “by the mutual 
cooperation of its different single members.” Through social union “each is enabled to 
participate in the rich collective resources of all the others” (Humboldt, 1792[1854]:13). 
Mill (1848[1909]:269) likewise stresses the invigorating effect of an individual's self-
development on the rest of society: “In proportion to the development of his individuality, 
each person becomes more valuable to himself, and is therefore capable of being more 
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valuable to others.” 
 
On the one hand, then, there are clear similarities between Humboldt and Mill in their 
views of the development of the individual and what this entails for society. On the other 
hand, there is a significant difference – a difference that marks the transition from the idea 
of progress to the doctrine of development. Once progress transcended the growth 
metaphor and became, in principle, unending, it necessarily becomes “a dynamic process, 
rather than a goal that can be specified in advance” (Valls, 1999: 255). If there is no end, 
no end can be specified. Hence Humboldt's analysis is not concerned with the content of 
self-development, but with the attitude individuals must take toward themselves and one 
another if it is to flourish – whatever the direction it takes. There are, on this view, but 
two prerequisites for self-development: freedom and a 'variety of conditions', which are 
provided by the free actions of others. Each individual requires the freedom to be able to 
provide their own, internal motive force toward development, and the external stimulus of 
other self-developing individuals. These conditions granted, “[d]evelopment can take 
place in any context” (Valls, 1999: 260). Positive state action is therefore not necessary 
for development, and in fact can only retard it. 
 
The ultimate direction of social change is not, as Mill implies, a 'further question' to be 
tacked on to the analysis of a Humboldt: it represents a fundamental alternation to the 
understanding of social change upon which that analysis was based. For Humboldt, as for 
other Enlightenment thinkers, progress was itself a good thing. It was the natural state of 
man, opposed not only to the state of stagnation but also to one of perfection. In Samuel 
Johnson's Rasselas, Prince of Abyssinia (1759[1889]: 7-8) the eponymous hero escapes 
the secluded valley he lives in and where all his desires are sated: “I am, like [the animals 
here], pained with want, but am not, like [them], satisfied with fulness. The intermediate 
hours are tedious and gloomy; I long again to be hungry that I may again quicken the 
attention.” He does not envy the felicity of the animals in this happy valley, “for it is not 
the felicity of man.” Joseph Addison (1710[1804]: 270) famously believed that even in 
heaven the soul “is still to shine for ever with new accessions of glory and brighten to all 
eternity … still adding virtue to virtue and knowledge to knowledge.” And as the 
mutualist anarchist P.J. Proudhon wrote (1853: 1.I): 
 
“Progress … is the affirmation of universal movement, consequently the negation of 
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every immutable form and formula, of every doctrine of eternity, permanence, 
impeccability, etc., applied to any being whatever; it is the negation of every permanent 
order, even that of the universe, and of every subject or object, empirical or 
transcendental, which does not change.” 
 
Being a liberal, Mill leant toward similar conclusions as Humboldt regarding the limits of 
state action. But like so many of his generation, confronted with the Industrial 
Revolution's 'satanic mills,' he no longer believed in the virtues of unlimited or immanent 
progress: he would “by no means join with those political economists who think no state 
of national existence desirable in which there is not a rapid increase of wealth” 
(1859[1977]:V.VIII). Indeed, he castigated his economic forebears for basing their 
analysis on the idea that the increase of wealth would be – and ought to be – unlimited. 
Unlike them, he was 'not charmed' with what he tellingly referred to as “the trampling, 
crushing, elbowing, and treading on each other's heels, which form the existing type of 
social life” (1848: IV: VI). But if progress is not unending it must have a terminus, it 
must be progress toward something, a more or less well-defined end. Mill, in contrast to 
Molinari, believed that “in contemplating any progressive movement, not in its nature 
unlimited, the mind is not satisfied with merely tracing the laws of the movement; it 
cannot but ask the further question, to what goal? Towards what ultimate point is society 
tending by its industrial progress? When the progress ceases, in what condition are we to 
expect that it will leave mankind?” (1848: IV:VI) Mill called his end-point the 'stationary 
state'. It is a term that crops up throughout his Principles, and refers to a state of 
economic life in which capital accumulation has ceased. Mill did not regard it as possible 
that this ultimate economic stagnation could be avoided; but it could be put off until 
mankind has reached a sufficient level of material wealth for everyone to be able to 
develop their mental faculties. At this point it would become not only an economic 
inevitability, but also a normatively desirable goal.  
 
Thus the present system, while not a “kind of social perfection which philanthropists to 
come will feel any very eager desire to assist in realizing,” is nevertheless a necessary 
stage, for while capitalist development may not be pretty, it is necessary as a means 
toward that end: “Competition may not be the best stimulus, but it is at present a 
necessary one, and no one can foresee a time when it will not be indispensable to 
progress” (1859[1977]: IV.VII) This unashamedly negative view of the competitive 
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process stems from a basic dualism that, as Cook (2009) argues, was widely accepted at 
the time: the distinction between the altruistic and selfish parts of human nature, which 
had replaced the classical distinction between the moral human self and the impulsive 
natural self (Babbitt, 1919: 130). Mill, in a passage that “left economics deservedly open 
to ridicule as false to the nature of man” (Rothbard, 1995[2006]: 280), argued that 
political economy ought to treat only of the individual as “a being who desires to possess 
wealth, and who is capable of judging of the comparative efficacy of means for obtaining 
that end. It predicts only such of the phenomena of the social state as take place in 
consequence of the pursuit of wealth.” (1844[1967]: V.38) Thus economics, for Mill, 
looks only to the selfish in man, abstracting entirely from the altruistic. While he 
acknowledged that no political economist “was ever so absurd as to suppose that 
mankind are really thus constituted,” (1844[1967]: V.38) he argued that for the sake of 
social change the impulses that drive Homo Economicus must be accepted for now, but 
for no longer than is necessary: 
 
“That the energies of mankind should be kept in employment by the struggle for riches, as 
they were formerly by the struggle of war, until the better minds succeed in educating the 
others into better things, is undoubtedly more desirable than that they should rust and 
stagnate. While minds are coarse they require coarse stimuli, and let them have them.” 
(1859[1977]:IV.VI) 
 
The last citation points to another important implication of the more value-laden idea of 
development as compared to progress. The open-endedness of Humboldtian self-
development kept its prerequisites to a minimum: freedom and a 'variety of conditions'. 
Given these prerequisites “[t]here is no pursuit whatever, nothing with which a man can 
concern himself, that may not give to human nature some worthy and determinate form, 
and furnish fair means for its ennoblement. The manner of its performance is the only 
thing to be considered” (1792[1854]:22). The poorest labourer no less than the richest 
aristocrat can ennoble the soul through their pursuits. Mill's more substantive concept of 
development, which has in mind the exercise of the 'higher' faculties, presupposes greater 
entry requirements. This immediately excludes all those who are too poor or uneducated 
to think of more than immediate and material concerns. In the stationary state, Mill is 
keen to emphasise, wealth may not grow, but there would be as much scope as ever for 
moral and social progress; as much room for improving the art of living. Indeed, with 
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minds no longer debased by the 'art of getting on' there would be a greater likelihood of 
improvements in that area. “Even the industrial arts might be as earnestly and as 
successfully cultivated, with this sole difference, that instead of serving no purpose but 
the increase of wealth, industrial improvements would produce their legitimate effect, 
that of abridging labour” (1859[1977]:IV.VI). It is only in the stationary state that 
everyone can develop the higher faculties. Below a certain level of wealth, where one is 
concerned only with 'getting on', there can be no self-development, and self-development 
being the highest end of man, the state and other actors may step in without the consent of 
the to-be-developed in order to elevate them to a sufficient standard. Having asserted that 
the object of his On Liberty is to expound the principle that “[o]ver himself, over his body 
and mind, the individual is sovereign”, Mill reminds the reader: 
 
“It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to say that this doctrine is meant to apply only to human 
beings in the maturity of their faculties. We are not speaking of children, or of young 
persons below the age which the law may fix as that of manhood or womanhood. Those 
who are still in a state to require being taken care of by others, must be protected against 
their own actions as well as against external injury. For the same reason, we may leave 
out of consideration those backward states of society in which the race itself may be 
considered as in its nonage. The early difficulties in the way of spontaneous progress are 
so great, that there is seldom any choice of means for overcoming them; and a ruler full 
of the spirit of improvement is warranted in the use of any expedients that will attain an 
end, perhaps otherwise unattainable. Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in 
dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement, and the means justified 
by actually effecting that end.” (1859[1977]:236) 
 
Thus rather than being 'merely' a project of ameliorating the problems caused by progress, 
as Cowen and Shenton implicitly portray it, the idea of development adds substantive 
content to that of progress: it adds a desired direction. More specifically, development 
was the means by which the 'economic problem' would be solved, freeing us all from the 
baser instincts that accompany the struggle for survival and allowing us to develop our 
higher faculties. The idea of development wants more from the individual or society 
under consideration than they could achieve for themselves. Because of this, it must place 
greater emphasis on the external motive forces of change: the developing society is no 
longer deemed capable of indigenously producing the desired results.   
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With Mill's deviation from the idea of progress, development thinking enters the 
mainstream mind. It has, however, not yet matured. Dutch sociologist Fred Polak (1973) 
suggested a double distinction in thinking about the future between essence-optimism or -
pessimism on the one hand, and influence-optimism or -pessimism on the other. “The 
essence categories refer to an unchangeable course of events; the influence categories 
refer to the supposed or rejected possibility of human intervention” (Polak, 1973:17). 
Conventional development thinking is optimistic on both counts. The future will be 
brighter, and we can make it so. By contrast, nineteenth-century liberalism, according to 
Polak, falls under essence-optimism, influence-pessimism: the course of history is 
essentially harmonious and positive, but operates according to laws, in this case that of 
self-interest, over which 'man' has little deliberate influence: “He is a sojourner in a 
world progressing steadily toward perfection.” (1973: 17). Mill is mentioned only in 
passing in Polak's work: his image of the future is perhaps not grand enough to be called 
utopian. Nevertheless, he represents a watershed moment in the history of liberal thought. 
With Mill, essence-optimism declines (though never reaching essence-pessimism) and 
influence-pessimism begins its transformation to influence-optimism. Development, as 
Pearson (1970: 6) would later put it, “unites … the belief in progress and the conviction 
that man can master his destiny.” Thus in the concept of development, social change is 
no longer considered unlimited, unguided, or good for its own sake. Social change is 
good, but only if society can harness its energies and direct its course towards the ultimate 
goal of ending the conditions upon which it rests. To do so, society itself must become 
aware of where it is heading: it must become self-conscious and future-oriented. 
 
I.4 – Development's Differentiation from Progress II: Alfred Marshall 
According to Jacob Viner (1941), Mill's spiritual heir was Alfred Marshall, and in this 
section it will be argued that he did indeed build upon the foundations of the concept of 
development laid by his illustrious predecessor. Like Mill, Marshall saw the solution of 
the economic problem as a prior condition to the exercise of man's higher faculties, which 
was the goal of social progress; he sympathised with socialist vision for mankind's future; 
he had misgivings over the nature, if not the material results, of competition; he saw 
political economy as, potentially, “the Science of Social Perfectibility” (Keynes, 1925a: 
44); and he believed that economics treats of the self-interested side of man, rather than 
the whole man. Accordingly, Marshall spoke of his 'mission' as a public intellectual in 
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words that could have been penned by Mill: 
 
“I read the Socialists: and found much with which anyone who has a heart at all must 
sympathise, and yet I found not one Socialist who has really grasped economic 
science. … The problem rose before me: How to get rid of such evils in society as arise 
for a lack of material wealth? … If [man] is used up in a hand to mouth struggle for 
existence he cannot develop as he should. … The work I have set before myself is this: – 
How to get rid of the evils of competition while retaining its advantages” (in Keynes, 
1925a: 16) 
 
Mill, as we saw above, had “reacted against his father's and Bentham's social philosophy 
as unduly cold and hard, and as lacking the moderating element obtainable from giving a 
larger role to 'feeling'” (Viner, 1941: 229) and Marshall continued this new direction. He 
came to economics via ethics and philosophy, viewing political economy as a subset of 
ethics, and consequently necessarily value-laden. More specifically, it was a normative 
concern for the poor that pushed Marshall toward economics: “I saw in a shop window a 
small oil painting [of a man's face with a strikingly gaunt and wistful expression, as of 
one 'down and out'] and bought it … I set it above the chimney-piece in my room in 
college and thenceforth called it my patron saint, and devoted myself to trying how to fit 
men like that for heaven.” (in Keynes, 1925a: 37-8). Poverty was the chief, if not the 
only, cause of the problems of the working classes (Marshall, 1890[1920]: I.I.3).  
 
The key to understanding Marshall's thoughts on how to actually achieve this appears in 
his highly influential Principles of Economics, first published in 1890, in which Marshall 
developed the lower-higher faculties dualism introduced by Mill into a more complete 
theory of wants. Already implicit in his earlier writings and speeches, it forms the basis of 
his thinking on social development. Marshall (1890[1920]: III) divides wants into three 
kinds: natural wants correspond, essentially, to basic biological needs: food, shelter, 
clothing, and so on. As civilisation progresses, people become concerned with the quality 
of goods, rather than just their quantity. These artificial wants arise more from the desire 
for social distinction that any actual need: “even in those grades in which everyone has 
[for example] house room sufficient for the higher activities of himself and his family, a 
yet further and almost unlimited increase is desired as a requisite for the exercise of 
many of the higher social activities” (1890[1920]: III.II.8). Finally, there are what 
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Marshall calls 'wants in relation to activities'. In this highest stage, instead of wants 
providing the impetus for new activity, activities are pursued for their own sake and in 
turn give rise to new wants. This final stage would be a “condition in which every man's 
energies will be fully developed – a condition in which man will work not less than they 
do now but more; only, to use a good old phrase, most of their work will be a work of 
love” (1873[1925]: 118; 1890[1920]: App.A). 'Fitting the poor to heaven' was therefore a 
question of solving the economic problem, which was for Marshall, as for Mill, “not an 
application of the hedonistic calculus, but a prior condition of the exercise of man's 
higher faculties” (1925a: 9). 
 
The final stage was inspired by his reading of the socialists, with whom he sympathised, 
according to Keynes, “in every way but intellectually.”(1925a: 50). It was his frequently 
stated belief that the error of the socialists was their implicit assumption that human 
nature would improve at sufficient speed for their 'Utopian experiments' to succeed 
(1925: 366; 1907[1925]: 341;1890[1925]: 284). Marshall, though he shared the 
conviction that the new type of being and the society they would call forth would be an 
improvement, argued that such a change would only come about gradually: “Projects for 
great and sudden changes are now, as ever, foredoomed to fail, and to cause reaction; we 
cannot move safely, if we move so fast that our new plans of life altogether outrun our 
instincts. It is true that human nature can be modified … But still it is a growth, and 
therefore gradual; and changes of our social organization must wait on it, and therefore 
they must be gradual too” (Marshall, 1890[1920]: App. A.85). Yet he also sought to 
distance himself from the classical economists, who, on the assumption that the desire for 
wealth was man's primary motivation, had thought that property rights and individual 
freedom would produce economic progress. Marshall criticises them for such narrow 
dogmatism. Free individual responsibility is indeed a prerequisite of progress, but 
property rights are not, insofar as they “lead to extreme inequalities of wealth.” 
(1890[1925]: 282). This opposition to economic inequality stems from the substantive 
conception of development in which some level of economic prosperity is necessary 
before development can occur without external assistance: “when wealth is very unevenly 
distributed, some have more of it than they can turn to any great account in promoting 
their own well-being; while many others lack the material conditions of a healthy, clean, 
vigorous and effective family life. That is to say that wealth is distributed in a manner less 
conducive to the well-being of mankind than it would be if the rich were somewhat less 
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rich and the poor somewhat less poor.” The problem is how to achieve a more desirable 
distribution of wealth “without danger to freedom and to social order; and without 
impairing the springs of initiative, enterprise and energy.” (1925: 366). Marshall 
believed that this could be done by keeping the social organization slightly in advance of 
human nature, thus “promoting the growth of our higher social nature by giving it some 
new and higher work to do, some practical ideal toward which to strive.” (1890[1920]: 
App.A.85-6) For Marshall, it was his work that moulded a man's character (1890[1920]: 
I.I.2) and hence that was where we must look for an improvement.  
 
Regarding this he had, early in his academic career, in 'The Future of the Working 
Classes', made a distinction between working class and gentlemanly occupations. A 
working class occupation is one in which “a man's daily task tends to keep his character 
rude and coarse”; a gentlemanly occupation, by contrast, “tends to give culture and 
refinement to his character.” (1873[1925]: 103) The working classes are “those vast 
masses of men who, after long hours of hard and unintellectual toil, are wont to return to 
their homes with bodies exhausted and minds dull and sluggish” (1873[1925]: 105). The 
labourer may, of course, be happy there is a healthy home to return to; but given his lack 
of education, a healthy home is unlikely. Instead, the exhausted worker seeks coarse 
pleasure in the public house: “men such as these value high wages mainly as affording 
the opportunity of using their bodies as furnaces for the conversion of alcohol into 
fumes” (1873[1925]: 107). Thus even if individuals such as these become objectively 
richer, they will not become better persons because the degrading and exhausting nature 
of their work prevents them from developing their higher faculties. They maintain their 
present squalid standard of living, but additional wealth gives little impetus to improve it 
further; that is, they fail to develop their character in such a way that the artificial wants 
that characterise modern, civilised individual arise in any great number. Marshall was, 
however, glad to see that the intermediate class – whose work exposes them to both 
degrading and elevating influences – were steadily striving upward. “They are steadily 
becoming gentlemen” (1873[1925]: 105). Hence for this group Marshall was hopeful that 
progress could be made by means of a basic moral principle to be adopted by all: “a man 
is bound to give his children an education better and more thorough than he himself has 
received.” (1873[1925]: 117)  
 
Gains in material prosperity since the Industrial Revolution had, Marshall thought, solved 
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the economic problem for a small part of society, allowing the fuller and further 
development of their character. This was what the middle and – with some help – 
working classes were striving toward: the model of the Victorian gentleman. A 
gentlemanly occupation tends to keep one away, almost entirely, from the 'lowering 
influences' which the lower classes, stilled mired in the 'art of getting on', are exposed to. 
Rather, it demands the use of one's mind, the maintenance of social intercourse with 
many people, the habit of anticipating the feelings of others, and the avoidance of causing 
offence (1873[1925]: 103-4). It opens one up to an appreciation of the finer things in life. 
Wealth is no longer a problem for the gentleman – their personal economic problem has 
been solved. The issue now is how they use their wealth, and here Marshall finds fault 
with the present conditions: “It is a common saying that we have more reasons to be 
proud of our ways of making wealth than of our ways of using it.” (1907[1925]: 324). 
Thus like Mill before him – and Saint-Simon before him – Marshall believed that once 
the problem of production of wealth had been solved, the focus of mankind must turn to 
the problem of its distribution. Marshall regarded this as of particular importance, as he 
did not believe that the current rate of progress would continue. “Great … as has been the 
rate of social progress of Britain during the last generation, we may not be contented 
with it. There is an urgent duty on us to make even more rapid advance during this age of 
economic grace, for it may run out before the end of the [twentieth] century.” (Marshall, 
1907[1925]: 326) Innovations – particularly in transport – and the expansion of peoples 
into hitherto unoccupied territories had temporarily suspended the law of diminishing 
returns from land. Consequently, real wages were able to rise regardless of population 
growth. This state of affairs could not last long in a finite world. Something would have 
to change; not in order to secure more growth but in order to make proper use of the 
bounty already provided. 
 
Marshall's answer is already implied in his theory of wants. There he identified 'artificial 
wants', which arise once the economic problem has been solved for a segment of society, 
as being primarily motivated by the desire for social distinction. This Marshall regarded 
as a great waste, calling it “a vast expenditure which contributes very little towards social 
progress, and which does not confer any large and solid benefits on the spenders beyond 
the honour, the position, and the influence which it buys from them in society,” 
(1907[1925]: 325) This is what Thorstein Veblen (1899[2007]) would refer to, in even 
more moralistic language, as 'conspicuous consumption'. Marshall was by no means 
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opposed to some having more influence or prestige than others in a society; indeed, he 
regarded the striving for social prestige as an invigorating and commendable part of 
human existence. Given the problems resulting from economic inequality, however, it 
would be preferable “if to have earned a moderate income gave as good a social position 
as a large one does now; if [a moderate income] … were a strong presumptive proof that 
a man had surpassed able rivals in the attempt to do a difficult thing well, then the hope 
of earning such an income would offer to all but the most sordid natures inducements 
almost as strong as they are now when there is equal hope of earning a large one.” 
(1890[1925]: 282) If society thus changed its standards of success a great deal of socially 
wasteful spending would cease, and the resources saved would be free to “open out to the 
masses of the people new possibilities of a higher life and of larger and more varied 
intellectual and artistic activities.” – and all without causing “any great distress to those 
from whom it was taken.” (1907[1925]: 325) Unfortunately, “[t]here is … no good 
ground for thinking that human nature is yet far enough improved away from its primitive 
barbarity, selfishness, and sloth, to be ready for any [rapid] movement in this direction” 
(1925: 366). A change in human nature would be needed for the level of development 
reached by the Victorian gentleman to be disseminated down to the lower strata of 
society. What we need, says Marshall, is 'economic chivalry'. Economic chivalry would 
be to laissez-faire capitalism what the chivalric code had been to medieval warfare: 
 
“Chivalry in business includes public spirit, as chivalry in war includes unselfish loyalty 
to the cause of prince … But is includes also a delight in doing noble and difficult things 
because they are noble and difficult … It includes a scorn for cheap victories, and a 
delight in succouring those who need a helping hand. It does not disdain the gains to be 
won on the way, bit it … esteems [them] mainly for the sake of the achievements to which 
they testify, and only in the second degree for the value at which they are appraised in the 
money of the market.” (1907[1925]: 330-1) 
 
In short, economic chivalry represents the first stirrings of the final stage of social 
development, of 'wants in relation to activities'. Inculcating this public-spirited economic 
behaviour was, Marshall thought, the only way for the entire society to flourish under 
private enterprise. Competition, under the present system, was “a monster grown of 
overwhelming strength” who, if resisted, would plunge society into poverty and anarchy. 
Only economic chivalry can tame the beast, and bend it to the socially desirable task of 
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“the removal of poverty” (1925: 361). Thus as did Mill, Marshall saw the economic 
system of the West as but a stepping stone toward a higher state, in which the monster 
that is material progress would no longer hold sway over mankind: 
 
“those improvements in method and in appliances, by which man's power over nature has 
been acquired in the past, are not likely to continue with even moderate vigour if free 
enterprise be stopped, before the human race has been brought up to a much higher 
general level of economic chivalry than has ever yet been attained. The world under free 
enterprise will fall far short of the finest ideals until economic chivalry is developed. But 
until it is developed, every great step in the direction of collectivism is a grave menace to 
the maintenance even of our present moderate rate of progress.” (1907[1925]: 342) 
 
Only once economic chivalry is common can the collectivists' schemes be put into 
practice without running the risk of violence; then, “some other civilisation than that 
which we can now conceive may take the place f that which now exists. It may, of course, 
be higher” (1907[1925]: 346). For Marshall, the classical economists' opposition to these 
schemes was not the outcome of disinterested economic analysis, but rather a product of 
the times. Marshall thought that they looked upon the state with such suspicion because 
the government of their time was peculiarly corrupt and inefficient. Matters had steadily 
improved since then – as J.S. Mill saw more clearly than most of his contemporaries: 
“Mill had seen a vast increase in the probity, the strength, the unselfishness, and the 
resources of Government during his life; and it seems that each succeeding decade had 
enlarged the scope of those interventions of Government for the promotion of general 
well-being.”  This improvement in the moral nature of government combines with 
technological progress to “enlarge the scope for the beneficial intervention of 
Government.” (1907[1925]: 335) The state is now more able to determine where it can do 
good, and has more power to translate its schemes into effective action. The people are 
more able to check abuses of power – not by the institutions of democracy but due to 
“general education and a general surplus of energy over that required for earning a 
living.” As a result, “we can now more safely venture on many public undertakings which 
a little while ago would have been technically unavailable, or which would have probably 
been perverted to the selfish and corrupt purposes of those who had the ear of 
government.” Thus Marshall rejected the old ideal of the night watchman state: “I cry 
'Laissez-faire: - Let the state be up and doing.'” (1907[1925]: 336) 
 57 
 
Marshall's social philosophy and policy, then, is concerned with getting everyone from 
one stage to the next. Although he believed that everyone would rationally want to do so, 
his great concern was that people would, due to their conditions, remain where they were: 
the working classes would spend any extra income on drink and gambling, the upper 
classes would spend waste their money on what Veblen would have called 'conspicuous 
consumption', and the middle classes would be pulled now in one direction, now in the 
other. They would have to be helped along the way toward Marshall ultimate aim of 
'development'. The classical economists were, to use Polak's (1973) terminology, 
influence-pessimistic in this regard. Mill rather less so, and Marshall less so than him. 
The theories of Ricardo and his followers contained, says Marshall, 'many truths', but he 
frequently criticises them for their narrow focus on England and its problems and their 
dogmatic adherence to free competition (1890[1920]: I.I.27-30; 1890[1925]: 257-8). 
Competition was for Marshall “beast grown of overwhelming strength”, a “huge 
untrained monster” that the Ricardians set free to “run its wayward course” (1925: 361; 
1890[1920]: I.I.27). A critical reaction had set in against this one-sidedness, which in its 
tendency to exaggerate the evils of free competition is itself no less one-sided. Marshall 
positioned himself – and the majority of economists – in a compromise position between 
these two extremes: the beast of competition must not be set free, but nor must it be put 
down: “more experience, more leisure, and greater material resources have enabled us 
to bring free enterprise somewhat under control, to diminish its power of doing evil and 
increase its power of doing good. … [I]f [competition] can be guided so as to work on 
our side, then even the removal of poverty will not be too great a task.” (1890[1920]: 
I.I.31; 1925: 361) Once people realised that the old model of unending growth was not in 
their interests they would, of their own rational volition, turn from the art of getting on to 
the art of living. 
 
Most people, that is. Like Mill, Marshall believed that the “early difficulties in the way of 
progress are … great” (Mill, 1848[1909]:236). Mill's backward states of society became 
in Marshall the 'Residuum': “people who are physically, mentally, or morally incapable 
of doing a good day's work with which to earn a good day's wage” (Marshall, 
1890[1920]: VI.XIII.58). And as with Mill's barbarians, for whom the liberal arguments 
of On Liberty were of no relevance, so too with Marshall's Residuum, who represented an 
'exceptional case' to whom the broadly pro-market argument of the Principles did not 
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apply. For the Residuum, Marshall called for compulsory education, in 'decent clothing'. 
Should the parents fail they would first be 'warned and advised' and then, as a last resort, 
“homes might be closed or regulated with some limitation of the freedom of the parents.” 
(1890[1920]: VI.XIII, n169): 
 
“The system of economic freedom is probably the best from both a moral and material 
point of view for those who are in fairly good health of mind and body. But the Residuum 
cannot turn it to good account: and if they are allowed to bring up children in their own 
pattern, then Anglo-Saxon freedom must work badly through them on the coming 
generation. It would be better for them and much better for the nation that they should 
come under a paternal discipline something like that which prevails in Germany.” 
(1890[1920]: VI.XIII.88) 
 
The Residuum were a class apart because unlike the working, middle, and upper classes 
in Marshall's analysis, the unguided actions of this lowest section of society were deemed 
incapable of producing satisfactory social change. Therefore, for this small group, 
development would have to be externally given. As the next section will argue, this 
conclusion is in fact inherent in the concept of development, as there is no particular 
reason to expect the developing to share the developer's evaluation of actual and future 
social change and hence no particular reason to expect them to move in the 'correct' 
direction.  
 
I.5 – The Concept and Tragedy of Development 
So far it has been argued that the object of development theory is social change, and that 
it therefore had to be distinguished from other methods of conceptualising social change – 
notably, the idea of progress. Though it would be something of an anachronism to call 
Mill and Marshall development theorists in the sense we understand that term today, we 
can see in their work the process by which development was differentiated from progress. 
To reiterate: Mill and Marshall do not (merely) reflect a shift from the idea of progress to 
development thinking; their works, influence, and ideas were a major factor contributing 
to that shift. Their ideas, moreover, did not emerge spontaneously in response to the 
objective problems of immanent capitalist social change; they emerged as a deliberate 
response to those existing ideas of what social change was and what it ought to be. It has 
been argued that what sets the idea of development apart from that of progress is not the 
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distinction between immanence and intentionality: they are clearly present in both. The 
difference lies in what their adherents envisaged as the location and aims of intentionality. 
What is manifested in the move from progress to development is a new orientation, from 
progress as an end in itself to development as a means toward an end. To be more 
specific, the goal of development is the creation of a world in which the conditions of 
social change have been overcome. Selfishness, materialism, and individualism must be 
temporarily harnessed and directed in socially rational directions so that they may 
eventually wither away. Positive social change will thus only occur when society 
becomes aware of and takes control of where it is heading. Once completed mankind will 
no longer be consumed by the degrading pursuit of wealth or the exhausting labouring for 
the next meal, leaving them free to develop their higher faculties. That is, humanity 
would be free from the 'art of getting on,' as Mill put it, and ready for a new adventure in 
the 'art of living'.  
 
To say that development theory and practice is teleological is hardly controversial. 
Development, particularly in the forms of modernisation and neo-liberalism, is seen as a 
way of remaking the non-Western world in the image of the West. But, as we shall see 
below, just as the non-West is not the object of development so the West is not its goal. 
The West, clearly, could not serve as a template for a society in which selfishness, 
materialism, and individualism are no longer present. Development accept that these 
aspects of social change are necessary for now, but the aim of social change is to 
overcome them. Thus while the dichotomy of West and non-West may be a useful one for 
policy-makers and laymen, it was never prominent in the minds of theorists of 
development. The Western and non-Western worlds are both developing and both will 
have to discard aspects of their culture previously dear to them if they are to continue 
along it. Development, in short, contains a vision for the West rather than as a vision of 
the West. 
 
One common criticism of the radical re-interpretations of development thinking that 
appeared in the late '80s and early '90s has been that they were unable to account for the 
diversity within development theory. They analysed the field as if it were uniformly pro-
Western and pro-capitalist. Although we do not believe it is either, a similar objection 
could be made of the above approach to identifying the origins of development theory. 
We have described the concept of 'development' as being a definable and coherent way of 
 60 
conceptualising social change, which has been differentiated from other 
conceptualisations. The first response to this concern is that we are not looking for a unity 
in the products of development theorising, which are indeed bewilderingly diverse. At the 
end of the process is the wrong place to look. What we seek instead is a formative 
principle of development theory. As German philosopher Ernst Cassirer 
(1923[1950]:113-4) put it in relation to the philosophy of culture: 
 
“If all culture is manifested in the creation of specific world-images, of specific symbolic 
forms, the aim of philosophy is not to go behind all these creations, but rather to 
understand and elucidate their basic formative principle. … If we approach spiritual life, 
not as the static contemplation of being, but as functions and energies of formation, we 
shall find certain common and typical principles of formation, diverse and dissimilar as 
the forms may be. If the philosophy of culture succeeds in apprehending and elucidating 
such basic principles, it will have fulfilled, in a new sense, its task of demonstrating the 
unity of the spirit as opposed to the multiplicity of its manifestations – for … the diversity 
of the products of the human spirit does not impair the unity of its productive process …” 
 
What Cassirer sought, then, was a basis for a philosophy of culture that would reflect the 
unity of the cultural forms, yet at the same time would not only reflect but account for 
their diversity. He sought a philosophical synthesis: “we seek not a unity of effects but a 
unity of action; not a unity of products but a unity of the creative process” (1944[1970]: 
70). Of course, this creative process does not end with the initial differentiation of 
development from progress. It is a distinction continually reinforced – often implicitly, 
but explicitly so when the existence of the field as a whole is under threat, as will be 
argued later. Thus the initial differentiation now acts as an external defence rather than an 
internal source of dynamism. It reproduces the distinctiveness of development theory as a 
discipline but cannot of itself account for the diversity within.  
 
In the final interview before his death, Michel Foucault (1983[1991]: 388-389) pondered 
the possibility of a history of thought, which would be “distinct from both the history of 
ideas – by which I mean the analysis of systems of representation – and from the history 
of mentalities – by which I mean analysis of attitudes and types of action … It seemed to 
me there was one element that was capable of describing the history of thought: this was 
what one would call the history of problems...” The social, political, and economic forces 
 61 
that were previously counted as determining factors are in the history of problems given 
the role of instigators. They do not spontaneously call for a solution: “They can exist and 
perform their action for a very long time, before there is effective problematization of 
thought.” And even when problematisation does occur, thought is not determined by the 
forces that instigated it: “it doesn't assume a unique form that is the direct result or the 
necessary expression of these difficulties...” Foucault goes on to describe the aim of a 
history of problems analysis of thought: 
 
“To one single set of difficulties, several responses can be made. And most of the time 
different responses are actually proposed. But what has to be understood is what makes 
them simultaneously possible: it is the point in which the simultaneity is rooted; it is the 
soil that can nourish them all in their diversity and sometimes in spite of their 
contradictions. … [T]he work of a history of thought would be to rediscover at the root of 
these diverse solutions a general form of problematization that has made these possible – 
even in their opposition...” 
 
In this short passage Foucault does not explain why problematisation occurs when it does, 
where it comes from, or on what basis; but by freeing thought from the determining 
influence of social, political, and economic forces he makes it a type of analysis more 
amenable to our approach. We look for a unity of development theory not in a 
comparison of the diverse set of approaches that exist within the discipline, but rather in 
their principles of formation – why an individual author sought to create a certain type of 
knowledge, and on what basis he sought to do so. This section will propose a 'tragedy of 
development' in the form of what shall be called the internal-external problem, which is 
the basic problem confronted by social-change-as-development. This problem has been 
hinted at above but can now be elaborated upon using German sociologist Georg 
Simmel's (1908[1997]) work on the 'concept and tragedy of culture.'  
 
For Simmel, all progressive growth must involve both internal and external forces. “We 
deny that the concept of culture applies to those cases where perfection is not felt to be 
the personal development of the psychological centre. Similarly, the concept does not 
hold where it appears only as such a personal development that requires no objective 
means and stages external to itself” (1908[1997]: 57). Self-development, or cultivation, is 
not just inner development (a seed growing into a wild tree) nor just external development 
 62 
(a tree trunk turned into ship's mast); rather, it is a combination of the two (a seed 
cultivated into orchard tree): “the fruit, despite the fact that it could not have come about 
without human effort, still ultimately springs from the tree's own motive force and only 
fulfils the possibilities which are sketched out in its tendencies, whereas the mast form is 
added to the trunk from an instrumental system quite alien to it and without any 
preformation in the tendencies of its own nature” (1908[1997]: 57). External constructs 
and constraints must be included within the individual self, rather than as hangers on: 
 
“[A]ll possible knowledge, virtuosities and refinements of a person cannot lead us to 
credit that person with genuine cultivation if they simply act like additions, as it were, 
that come from a sphere of values external to, and always remaining external to, their 
personality. In such a case, a person has aspects of cultivation, but they are not yet 
cultivated … But [on the other hand] cultivation in its purest and deepest sense does not 
exist where the psyche travels that path from itself to itself … exclusively under its own 
subjective powers ... The specific meaning of culture is thus fulfilled only where a person 
adds something external to that development … Individuals must include these constructs 
and constraints [art, morality, science, law, religion, economic goods, technology, social 
norms] within themselves, but they must really include them within the individual self, 
and not simply allow them to continue to exist as objective values.” (1908[1997]: 57-8) 
 
Or, as Humboldt (1792[1854]:22) put it: 
 
“Whatever man is inclined to, without the free exercise of his own choice, or whatever 
only implies instruction and guidance, does not enter into his very being, but still remains 
alien to his true nature, and is, indeed, effected by him, not so much with human agency, 
as with the mere exactness of mechanical routine.” 
 
Works of culture – laws, morals, economic goods, art – can be considered according to 
the values that are valid for themselves, and how they fit in to wider culture. They have a 
subjective, cultural value, and an objective value, which is its wider significance. A work 
can be perfect considered by its own standards, but not fit into one's development path. 
Conversely, a work below the level of what has been achieved artistically, intellectually, 
or technically, may fit in most efficaciously. A one-sided focus on the quality of the work 
considered in itself is therefore not enough: the objective side of culture may make us 
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better or wiser or happier, but may not actually develop us, only an objective side that 
pertains to us. The external-directed nourishment is cut off from our inner-directed 
meaning. We become better at something, but not more cultured. We possess a higher 
quality, but not a higher state of ourselves. 
 
According to Simmel, this unhappy state will be so unless the two aspects – internal and 
external – fit with one another. Unfortunately, the inner logics by which they develop do 
not necessarily coincide. This is the tragedy of culture, as Simmel calls it, or the tragedy 
of development for us. For Simmel, once the primary motifs of law, art, and morality 
have been created, their further growth is no longer in our hands. They are no more 
concerned with the demands of our individuality than are physical laws. The contents 
with which we organise the unity of the 'I' are given to us from outside, and they possess a 
form that do not necessarily coincide with the self. “The external world seizes hold of the 
self with these contents, in order to draw it into themselves, and because they form the 
contents according to their own demands, they do not permit them to become centred 
around the self” (1908[1997]: 67). Yet we still consider ourselves not only the centre 
around which the elements of life are ordered according to our personalities – we also feel 
a solidarity with those elements, which belong to another sphere and ordering principle. 
Our nature is caught between the self and an alien sphere of demands, and if the two 
spheres do not evolve in the same fashion, the bridge may be broken. The object becomes 
isolated and alienated vis-a-vis the creative subject through the division of labour, but 
Marx' concept of alienation with regards economic commodities just a special instance of 
a more general fate of our cultural contents. “These contents are subject to the paradox – 
and increasingly so as 'culture' develops – that they are indeed created by human subjects 
and are meant for human subjects, but follow an immanent developmental logic in the 
intermediate form of objectivity which they take on at either side of these instances and 
thereby become alienated from both their origin and their purpose” (1908[1997]: 70). 
Increasingly, cultural objects “deviate from the direction in which they could incorporate 
themselves into the personal development of human minds” (1908[1997]: 72). But the 
object continues to develop, and draws individuals into its orbit without returning to them 
and elevating them to its height. Where we try to follow it anyway, “the development 
runs into a cul-de-sac or a vacuity of our innermost and most genuine life” (1908[1997]: 
72). 
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Thus the division of labour divides the cultural content from its subject, leaving it with 
soulless objectivity, detached from the real cultural process. The objectified spirit 
becomes formless, and hence capable of infinite expansion into a mass of things claiming 
cultural value which awaken in us a desire to see them as such. The subject is 
increasingly overwhelmed and dominated. Thousands of superfluous things are created 
from which we are unable to free ourselves, which passively stimulate us rather than 
actively stimulating us toward our own creativity – it is “nothing more than the 
phenomena of the emancipation of the objectified spirit” which leads cultural contents 
according to its own developmental logic, diverting them from the goal of culture. 
Moreover, cultural products can expand indefinitely which further externalises the 
subject, as an individual's absorptive capacity is limited. It is not easy to simply ignore 
what cannot be assimilated, because its very existence arouses aspirations, and fills one 
with feelings of inadequacy and helplessness. Hence the typical problematic of modern 
man: “the feeling of being surrounded by an immense number of cultural elements, which 
are not meaningless, but not profoundly meaningful to the individual either; elements 
which have a certain crushing quality as a mass, because an individual cannot inwardly 
assimilate every individual thing, but cannot simply reject it either, since it belongs 
potentially, as it were, to the sphere of his or her cultural development” (1908[1997]: 
73). For Simmel, there is no way out of this tragedy. 
 
The tragedy of development proceeds in much the same way. The internal of 
development comprises those aspects of a society's inner being – its culture, its mores and 
customs, its religion, its preferences, its values, its economic structure, its institutions; in 
short, its metis (Scott, 1998: ch. 9) – that may help or hinder development. The external 
consists of all that comes from the outside – international economic structures, 
international institutions, governments, INGOs, missionaries, advisers, transnational 
corporations, and all those internal aspects of other societies that have influenced the 
society under consideration. The 'primary motifs' of development, its institutions, 
practices, and goals, are exogenous to the society to be developed, emerging and evolving 
according to demands and principles that do not necessarily coincide with that society. 
They are attached to the developing society but do not fit into it: – they “simply act like 
additions, as it were, that come from a sphere of values external to, and always remaining 
external to [it]” (Simmel, 1908[1997]: 57) – and hence the developing society cannot be 
lifted through them to their 'higher' level. At the same time, the developing society is 
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drawn to these motifs, as they are held up as the means by which one can achieve 
prosperity and modernity, to escape the inadequacy of 'underdevelopment'.  
 
One might argue that because the internal and external are both by their own powers 
insufficient they represent two extremes, between which we need only compromise. The 
problem with this response is the ambiguity in how we are to define the compromise 
position. One often hears that we should be 'practical' about such matters, but that is only 
a call to action and not a guide for how to act, and hence does not help us. In fact, as 
Dworkin (2011:261-4) argues, we cannot identify a middle-ground between two opposing 
perspectives “without first deciding which of [the] perspectives should govern … There is 
no third perspective – no perspective of 'reason' itself – from which the balance might be 
struck. We can't know what reason requires without first deciding from which perspective 
that question should be decided” (2011: 261-2). We can see this in action in Francis 
Fukuyama's State Building (2004[2005]). Fukuyama recognises the internal-external 
problem, and his solution to it is instructive. He notes the 'contradiction' in donor policy, 
where “outside donors want both to increase the local government's capacity to provide a 
particular service like irrigation, public health, or primary education, and to actually 
provide those services to the end users. … While many donors believe they can work 
toward both goals simultaneously, in practice the direct provision of services almost 
always undermines the local government's capacity to provide them once the aid program 
is terminated” (2004[2005]: 54).  
 
Internally, the developing state cannot provide the services Fukuyama desires, but if the 
services are provided for them they won't progress. The program, in Simmel's 
terminology, would act merely as an 'external construct' that does not lift the developing 
society to its higher level. On the other hand, people will lack the service that was to be 
provided until the uncertain time in the future when the government is capable of 
providing it. Fukuyama decides that the donor should help the state stand on its own two 
feet, rather than doing its work for it. He asserts that “the problem of capacity destruction 
cannot be fixed unless donors make a clear choice that capacity-building is their primary 
objective, rather than the services that the capacity is meant to provide” (2004[2005]: 
55). The well-intentioned efforts to provide services ought to be relegated in favour of the 
'tough love' of 'true capacity-building' (2004[2005]: 56).  
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This has the air of a quite practical compromise: Fukuyama is simply looking at the long 
run. But in fact his dilemma regarding the proper role of the external force was 
impossible to answer without first deciding which perspective should govern. Fukuyama 
chooses his perspective based on his overriding concern: the national security threat to the 
United States posed by failed states. On that basis does he define the role of the external 
donor. In fact, his concern for national security is so deep-seated that he stands by this 
role for developed states even after showing the immense, even insoluble, difficulties 
involved in state building in this manner. As this 'solution' demonstrates, when we seek 
the proper mix of internal and external elements, when we define their role in the process 
of development, we must, if we conceive the two as fundamentally antagonistic, start 
from one perspective and on that basis seek a compromise. As Dworkin points out, if 
there is contradiction rather than consistency in our basic concepts, the choice between 
them may reflect “unfiltered personal history like party affiliation … political 
ambition … emotions, preferences, tastes, and prejudices” (2011:108). Either way, a 
compromise must privilege one or the other position. 
 
In fact, the situation for development is even worse than Simmel thought it for the process 
of culture. Simmel held out little hope for a resolution of the tragedy of culture because 
the internal and external logics would naturally diverge from their harmonious origin. His 
concern was that having originated in individual creativity, cultural products would 
become gradually more distant, more external from us and our needs, until the tension 
becomes pure antithesis. However, as we have seen, it is a foundational principle of the 
idea of development that the two logics are inherently antagonistic, because a specific 
goal or an end has already been set for the internal by the external. Thus even the original 
act of creativity is externally given. On Simmel's road from harmony to tension to 
antithesis, development takes a head start. Yet it is nevertheless recognised that both are 
necessary components of development. Development theorists have always recognised 
this fact, and the search for a solution to the problem has been a constant one since their 
field's emergence after World War II. Modernisation theory was surely the most 
optimistic regarding the ability of external forces to elevate a 'backward' society, but as 
we shall see it was not believed that they could do so single-handedly: “Forces outside 
the economy can stimulate and facilitate the indigenous forces, but they can only 
complement sustained development; they cannot serve as a substitute for it” (Meier and 
Baldwin, 1957[1962]:335). A society cannot be 'developed' entirely from without, but on 
 67 
the other hand, a society that closes itself off – culturally, intellectually, economically – 
from others does itself great harm: the internal motive force can carry one only so far. 
The variety of situations a society can provide internally can only delay the inevitable 
stagnation. It is in the search for a compromise between the two that we find the 
formative principle of development: how do we find an acceptable middle-ground 
between two aspects of social change that are mutually antagonistic yet both, in their own 
way, valid and necessary? 
 
This question, the rest of Part I will argue, has been a constant problem for development 
theory since its post-war emergence. Sections I.7, I.8, and I.9 will look at modernisation 
theory and the post-war approach to education in this light. The next section, however, 
picks up the historical narrative with Alfred Marshall's star pupil, John Maynard Keynes. 
This is necessary because while the distinction between internal and external forces is 
apparent is Mill and Marshall it is not yet a problem. What obscured this conclusion was 
Mill's and Marshall's belief that rational individual action would lead those who were 
capable of it – everyone but Mill's barbarians and Marshall's Residuum – on the path of 
positive social change. We shall see how Keynes did not share his master's faith. 
 
I.6 – J.M. Keynes and the Rational Individual 
Alfred Marshall's influence on economic thought in the English-speaking world was akin 
to that of Adam Smith over a century prior, in that he seemed to make everything that had 
come before him obsolete. 'It's all in Marshall,' as the saying went (Rothbard, 1992[2010]: 
12-3).The importance of Marshall's deviations from classical political economy were 
recognised and welcomed upon the release of his Principles of Economics in 1890. He 
was praised by reviewers and scholars alike for bringing ethical and social concerns into 
the dismal science. Marshall was an important part of a movement away from 
competition, viewing it as alienating, exhausting, degrading, wasteful, and as creating 
unnecessary tensions in the social fabric. Given the previous section, Marshall's thoughts 
on this issue should be clear. Despite his concessions, however, Marshall and other 
mainstream economists still held on, albeit with declining fervour, to influence-
pessimistic laissez-faire (Viner, 1941: 225). It was, in end, Marshall's social philosophy – 
his concept of development – which made a greater impression on Keynes than his 
economics. Armed with this understanding of the social purpose of change, Keynes 
returned the field to the problem of growth. 
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Keynes' early economic writings are rather orthodox – it was, after all, all in Marshall – 
but he would eventually free himself from the confines of neoclassicism. For Marshall, 
we saw, social development was not an inevitable process: the basis of his policy 
recommendations was the concern that people would 'overshoot', rather than progressing 
to the next stage. Yet development ultimately remained a rational process, pursued by 
individuals because they perceived it to be in their best interests. Though he certainly 
deviated from laissez-faire, it was the increasingly chivalrous realm of private enterprise 
that would lead the way: “A government could print a good edition of Shakespeare's 
works, but it could not get them written” (1907[1925]: 339). There was, however, one 
section of society about whom Marshall was less optimistic: the Residuum. Like Mill's 
barbarians they were deemed too mired in what Mill would have called the art of getting 
on, too exhausted by the day's work, for their actions to contribute, unaided, to social-
change-as-development. With Keynes, this analysis of the Residuum is essentially 
expanded to cover the whole of society. As we shall see, he does this by removing the 
rational individual actor from its classical position as the driving force of development, 
thus emancipating development thinking from the strict confines of classical economics. 
In this, he reflected what Schivelbusch (2006: 45) has identified as “one of the main 
leitmotifs of the postliberal generation,” namely, “the idea of liberating the state from the 
businessmen, promoting it from the role of a mere night watchman working in the service 
of capital to one of a powerful director telling the moneymen what to do.” What 
development sought to accomplish – the eradication of scarcity in Marshall's narrow 
definition of the term – was now given new impetus, and economists were ready to take 
their place in government as, in Keynes' words, “the trustees not of civilisation, but of the 
possibility of civilisation.” (in Higgins, 1959: 3) In the act, a problem is brought to light 
that was only implicit in the concept of development as it emerged with Mill; a problem 
the attempted solutions of which are the basis for our understanding of the formative 
process of modern development theory. 
 
Following Mill and Marshall before him, what interested Keynes was the possibility of 
development leading to a stage in which mankind has solved “its economic problem.” In 
this he is optimistic, and he makes clear that capitalism, the distasteful means to his 
higher end, would not survive the coming of the new age. As he put it in a short essay on 
'The Economic Possibilities of Our Grandchildren' (1930): 
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“When the accumulation of wealth is no longer of high social importance, there will be 
great changes in the code of morals. We shall be able to rid ourselves of many of the 
pseudo-moral principles which have hag-ridden us for two hundred years, by which we 
have exalted some of the most distasteful of human qualities into the position of the 
highest virtues. We shall be able to afford to dare to assess the money-motive at its true 
value. The love of money as a possession -as distinguished from the love of money as a 
means to the enjoyments and realities of life -will be recognised for what it is, a 
somewhat disgusting morbidity, one of those semi-criminal, semi-pathological 
propensities which one hands over with a shudder to the specialists in mental disease. All 
kinds of social customs and economic practices, affecting the distribution of wealth and of 
economic rewards and penalties, which we now maintain at all costs, however distasteful 
and unjust they may be in themselves, because they are tremendously useful in promoting 
the accumulation of capital, we shall then be free, at last, to discard. … But beware! The 
time for all this is not yet. For at least another hundred years we must pretend to 
ourselves and to every one that fair is foul and foul is fair; for foul is useful and fair is 
not. Avarice and usury and precaution must be our gods for a little longer still. For only 
they can lead us out of the tunnel of economic necessity into daylight.”  
 
Keynes believed that the capacity to attain such a state was available but (and in this he 
follows Marshall) that this further development would occur only if men were content to 
play the game of economic competition for lower rewards than at present (1936:374). 
Unlike Marshall, however, he did not believe this likely to happen within a capitalist 
system, due to the predominance of the 'money motive.' The individual and his or her 
pursuit of self-interest – even that of Marshall's chivalrous economic man – was no longer 
the driving force of development; he was, in fact, more likely to retard it. The calculating 
nature of the homo economicus could see only economic value, and could therefore not be 
relied upon to care for matters of poverty relief or environmental protection: 
 
“We have to remain poor because it does not "pay" to be rich. We have to live in hovels, 
not because we cannot build palaces but because we cannot "afford" them. The same rule 
of self-destructive financial calculation governs every walk of life. We destroy the beauty 
of the countryside because the unappropriated splendors of nature have no economic 
value. We are capable of shutting off the sun and the stars because they do not pay a 
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dividend. London is one of the richest cities in the history of civilization, but it cannot 
"afford" the highest standards of achievement of which its own living citizens are 
capable, because they do not "pay." (1933: 760-761) 
 
There was still a place for businessmen as creators of the wealth needed to solve the 
economic problem; but they were not fit to enter the new society thus created. Keynes 
looked forward to his 'euthanasia' in no uncertain terms: “as a means he is tolerable; 
regarded as an end he is not satisfactory.” (1925b[1963]: 307) 
 
But why have people for so long held on to a system that “is not beautiful … is not just … 
is not virtuous”? (Keynes, 1933: 759) Benjamin Kidd (1894) had confronted this very 
problem, and in Keynes' answer he is comes closer to Kidd's brand of social evolutionism 
than he is to Marshall, with important consequences for later development theory. Kidd 
(1894: 68) argued that the conditions of development are, minor improvements 
notwithstanding, “incompatible with the welfare of a large proportion of the individuals 
comprising any species.” Not only is the production of progress difficult, involving 
constant rivalry and competition with one's fellows, it also inevitably results in the 
exclusion from the highest possibilities of life of most individuals in a society. Given that, 
for Kidd, individual rationality cannot look beyond its own immediate horizon, it would 
therefore be in the interests of almost everyone to put “an immediate stop to those 
onerous conditions from which progress resulted, and which pressed so severely on 
them.” (1894: 68) The interests in the masses lies in the programme of the socialists: in 
abolishing competition within their community, protecting the community from external 
competition, and maintaining by communal ownership a comfortable means of existence 
for all. This would be rational; development is profoundly irrational from the point of 
view of the individual (1894: 80-2). Yet development is in the interests of Society as a 
whole, an organism with longer life and broader interests than the individuals of an entire 
generation – and hence an organism whose interests, in the grand scheme of things, are to 
be given predominance. “[T]he interests of the social organism and of the individual are, 
and must remain, antagonistic, and as the former must always be predominant, there can 
never be found any sanction in individual reason for conduct in societies where the 
conditions of progress prevail.” (1894:86-7) For Kidd, then, individual reason can never 
justify the progress that society needs. This is the importance of religion: 
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“[T]he function of these [religious] beliefs in human evolution must be to provide a 
super-rational sanction for that large class of conduct in the individual, necessary to the 
maintenance of the development which is proceeding, but for which there can never be, in 
the nature of things, any rational, sanction.” (1894:108) 
 
This is quite different from Marshall's view of social change as individually rational and 
in the interests (albeit perhaps only the 'rightly understood' interests) of everyone. Yet 
Keynesian development, because the individual is conceptualised as dominated by the 
short-termist ‘money motive,’ is far closer to Kidd's. This represents the first of Keynes' 
innovations referred to above. In The Economic Consequences of the Peace (1920), 
Keynes argued that the progress made in the 19th century rested on a 'double bluff'. 
European society was so organised “as to secure the maximum accumulation of capital.” 
In that, it was certainly successful. Yet the masses, some improvements in their condition 
notwithstanding, had not reaped the benefits: “Society was so framed as to throw a great 
part of the increased income into the control of the class least likely to consume it” – the 
capitalists (1920: 11). Development could occur only because of an inequality of wealth 
in favour of the capitalists, who were most likely to reinvest their income but at the same 
time were not able to actually enjoy their extra income. Hence the need for a double bluff: 
the masses must accept the conditions of progress, despite the fact that they could enjoy 
very little of the cake they helped produce, and the capitalists, though they got plenty of 
cake, had to accept that they could consume only very little of it. From the point of view 
of the individuals involved, there could be no rational justification for such a state of 
affairs. And considering that, for Keynes (1926: 254), people are “often … too ignorant 
or too weak” to effectively pursue even their own ends, one could hardly expect them to 
work rationally toward the benefit of future generations. Hence the importance of a super-
rational justification for the survival of nineteenth century capitalism: 
 
“The duty of 'saving' became nine-tenths of virtue and the growth of the cake the object of 
true religion. There grew up around the non-consumption of the cake all those instincts of 
puritanism which in other ages has withdrawn itself from the world and has neglected the 
arts of production as well as those of enjoyment. And so the cake increased; but to what 
end was not clearly contemplated. … [T]he virtue of the cake was that it was never to be 
consumed, neither by you nor by your children after you.” (Keynes, 1920: 12) 
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As in Kidd, the 'bluff'' was carried out by an unconscious 'Society', working mysteriously 
upon its members: “In the unconscious recesses of its beings Society knew what it was 
about. … Society was working not for the small pleasures of today but for the future 
security and improvement of the race, --- in fact for progress” (Keynes, 1920: 12). Had 
the capitalists increased their consumption the deception would have been unmasked, and 
capitalism, the system it had supported, revealed for what it was: intolerable. 
 
With the rational individual effectively removed from development – being a process 
incapable of individual rational justification – capital formation as such becomes the true 
agent of development. The key lies in the Keynes' Marshallian conception of scarcity, and 
by extension the economic problem, as relating only to 'natural' wants – that is, “those 
needs which are absolute in the sense that we feel them whatever the situation of our 
fellow human beings may be,” as opposed to artificial wants: “those which are relative in 
the sense that we feel them only if their satisfaction lifts us above, makes us feel superior 
to, our fellows” (Keynes, 1930). The latter type of wants may be insatiable, but the former 
are not. As Salerno (1992) notes, it is the Marshallian conception of wants as limited and 
identifiable that creates the impression that wants could be finally satisfied with a 
hundred years or so additional capital accumulation (Keynes, 1930). The demand for 
capital is, on this assumption, limited and capable of reaching a point “where its marginal 
efficiency had fallen to a very low figure” - the 'low figure' being just enough to cover 
“their exhaustion by wastage and obsolescence together with some margin to cover risk 
and the exercise of skill and judgement.” (Keynes, 1936: 375) Thus Keynes harks back to 
Mill's concept of the stationary state, in which there would be no additional capital 
accumulation, and would therefore be free of the problems that follow it. If only our 
public policies were expressly aimed at it, predicts Keynes, we could achieve “an 
increase in the volume of capital until it ceases to be scarce … [which] would mean the 
euthanasia of the rentier, and, consequently, the euthanasia of the cumulative oppressive 
power of the capitalists to exploit the scarcity value of capital.” (1936: 376) Hence, 
according to Keynes, “the economic problem is not – if we look into the future – the 
permanent problem of the human race.” (1930) As it was for Mill and Marshall, the 
permanent resolution of the economic problem was for Keynes a normative issue, for 
only when freed from the degrading and exhausting struggle for food, shelter, and 
clothing would mankind be free to pursue more ennobling activities: 
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“A point may soon be reached, much sooner perhaps than we are all of us aware of, 
when these needs are satisfied in the sense that we prefer to devote our further energies to 
non-economic purposes.... [I]t will be those peoples, who can keep alive, and cultivate 
into a fuller perfection, the art of life itself and do not sell themselves for the means of 
life, who will be able to enjoy the abundance when it comes” (1930) 
 
Like Marshall, he applies this view to a threefold division of human history. Keynes 
(1925c[1963]) adopts the stages-of-development terminology of the American economist 
Joseph R. Commons (Marshall never named his stages), whom he praises for recognising 
“the nature of the economic transition amidst the early stages of which we are now 
living” (1925c[1963]: 335). Commons distinguished between an Era of Scarcity, which 
prevailed universally up to 16th century Europe when wealth started to accumulate. The 
industrial and democratic revolutions of the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries 
marked the end of the Era of Scarcity in Europe, ushering in the Era of Abundance whose 
distinctive philosophy was that of laissez-faire liberalism. This era, however, was starting 
to give way to the culminating Era of Stabilisation – in Commons' words, “the actual 
alternative to Marx's communism.” This represented, for Keynes, a “transition from 
economic anarchy to a regime which deliberately aims at controlling and directing 
economic forces in the interests of social justice and social stability.” (1925c[1963]: 335) 
The transition was not to be left to the 'people'. Though sympathetic to the socialist cause, 
he could not bring himself to join them in their exaltation of the “boorish proletariat” 
(1925b[1963]: 300): “I can be influenced by what seems to me to be Justice and good 
sense; but the Class war will find me on the side of the educated bourgeoisie” 
(1925c[1963]: 329). The problem with Soviet Russia was not the end, about which 
Keynes waxed lyrical, but the means: revolution. It is a mistake, he said, to consider 
revolution an inherent part of the New Order being created in Russia. A gradual transition 
was possible with new knowledge. It was the task of the New Liberals, in whose 
vanguard sat Keynes, to make this transition as smooth as possible. As mentioned, the 
key to this transformation was for Keynes not private economic enterprise, as in Marshall, 
but capital formation by any means. The laissez-faire economic system had, as had said in 
The Economic Consequences of the Peace, been geared toward this end; yet it was only 
able to effect it because of its elaborate double bluff. Now, however, the mask was 
slipping, revealing the monster behind: 
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“We used to believe that modern capitalism was capable, not merely of maintaining the 
existing standards of life, but of leading us gradually into an economic paradise where 
we should be comparatively free from economic cares. Now we doubt whether the 
business man us leading us to a destination far better than our present place.” (Keynes, 
1925b[1963]: 307) 
 
“There was nothing which it was not our duty to sacrifice to this Moloch and Mammon in 
one; for we faithfully believed that the worship of these monsters would overcome the evil 
of poverty and lead the next generation safely and comfortably, on the back of compound 
interest, into economic peace.... The decadent international but individualistic capitalism, 
in the hands of which we found ourselves after the war, is not a success. It is not 
intelligent, it is not beautiful, it is not just, it is not virtuous--and it doesn't deliver the 
goods. In short, we dislike it, and we are beginning to despise it.” (Keynes, 1933: 761) 
 
Keynes had lost faith in society's ability to carry itself, unaided and unimpeded, toward 
the ultimate goal that he, following Mill and Marshall, had set for it. Hence for the task he 
had set himself – easing the development of society toward the next stage - the old 
political economy was far too restrictive. His initial rejection of Marshallian orthodoxy 
was not based on a rejection of its fundamental truths, but rather on a changed 
“orientation of my mind …; and I share this change with many others. … I attribute my 
change of outlook to … my hopes and fears and preoccupations, along with those of many 
or most, I believe, of this generation throughout the world, being different from what they 
were” (Keynes, 1933: 755). The old truths may have been correct for its time, but new 
problems have arisen: “they have ceased to be applicable under modern conditions.” 
(1925c[1963]: 330). Keynes (1925a: 44) praises Marshall for proving that laissez-faire 
political economy was theoretically as well as practically flawed, but, held back by 'a 
bundle of obsolete habiliments' inherited from the nineteenth century, he had failed to 
recognise the full implications of his teachings. The watchwords of the British 
government remained “Negation, Restriction, Inactivity”: 
 
“Under their leadership we have been forced to button up our waistcoats and compress 
our lungs. Fears and doubts and hypochondriac precautions are keeping us muffled up 
indoors. … We need the breath of life. There is nothing to be afraid of. On the contrary. 
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The future holds in store for us more wealth and economic freedom and possibilities of 
personal life than the past ever offered. 
There is no reason why we should not feel ourselves free to be bold, to be open, to 
experiment, to take action, to try the possibilities of things.” (1929[1963]: 135) 
 
Hence the need for “new wisdom for a new age” (1925c[1963]: 337). Keynes was no 
utopian in the traditional sense of the word: he was sure that the economic problem was in 
the process of being solved and in the next stage of development it would be solved, but, 
like Marx, did not think much more could be said about the final stage. His own 
contribution to the 'new wisdom' – the technical economics and policy recommendations 
in The General Theory (1936) – sought to demonstrate how a world shorn of its belief in 
the virtues of capitalism and the truths of orthodox economics could get to that final, post-
scarcity stage. The nations of the world were steadily rejecting the assumption of the 
nineteenth-century free trader, who thought that “the whole world was, or would be, 
organized on a basis of private competitive capitalism and of the freedom of private 
contract inviolably protected by the sanctions of law – in various phases, of course, of 
complexity and development, but conforming to a uniform type which it would be the 
general object to perfect and certainly not to destroy.” (Keynes, 1933) Instead, they were 
embarking on their own political-economic experiments. “We do not know what will be 
the outcome. We are – all of us, I expect – about to make many mistakes. No one can tell 
which of the new systems will prove itself best” (Keynes, 1933: 759). 
 
By rejecting the classical doctrine of the harmony of interests, Keynes brought to light 
two implications hidden by that assumption yet nevertheless present in the concept of 
development in Mill and Marshall. Keynes rejected the idea that development was a 
process driven by rational individual action; instead, it was irrational and therefore in 
need of intentional direction. Thus with Keynes, the concept of development makes 
society conscious of its own change, of its direction and purpose: it is self-conscious 
change. Because of its open-ended and harmonious nature, adherents of the idea of 
progress believed that the internal motive forces of development could be harmonised 
with the external by the 'system of natural liberty', as both were the work of rational 
individuals. By contrast, in the idea of development, there is an inherent tension between 
the two: because of the prerequisites of its more substantive end, not everyone or every 
society is deemed capable of development: an external force must step in not just to 
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correct the faults of the internal, but also to guide it along its proper path – a path it would 
otherwise, according to its present tendencies, not have taken. The internal is irrationally 
working against the desires of the external. Thus it is not, as one might expect based on 
the post-modernist critique, the developing nation or people that are considered irrational, 
but society – Western or non-Western – itself. This internal-external divide is already 
implicit in the concept of development, as opposed to that of progress, because of the 
conception of the relationship between the forces motivating change that is entailed in the 
greater importance that must be given to the external motive force in the idea of 
development. In Mill and Marshall this was only made explicit in their analyses of the 
development of barbarians and the Residuum, respectively. Essentially, Keynes has taken 
Mill’s analysis of ‘barbarians’ and Marshall’s analysis of the Residuum, and expanded 
them to cover the whole of society. Now it was not just the Residuum through whom 
'Anglo-Saxon freedom must work badly.' Keynes saw no problem with this – he believed 
that the further development of mankind toward a post-scarcity age rested with the state, 
led by economists. Until then, the will of the people, who were trapped within the socially 
determined mind-set of the 'money motive,' could and indeed must be ignored. However, 
this concept of development would prove rather more problematic for those who founded 
the field of development studies in the post-war era. For, as we shall see in the final 
sections of Part I, they did so with the explicit intention of bringing the developing people 
back into the process of development. 
 
I.7 – Post-War Development I: Economic Modernisation 
Keynes himself had little to say on the fate of the poorer nations: his policy 
recommendations were designed to solve First World socio-economic problems. But the 
Second World War made clear that just as Western societies had begun to resolve 
domestic tensions with various social policies – now with the backing of economists – so 
too international society would have to secure peace by helping the poorer nations 
develop. Just as government had previously tried to halt the rise of domestic socialism by 
establishing social policies to keep the masses happy, so too must they keep they world 
from revolution and total war by aiding the poorer nations. As Semmel put it: 
 
“In time, it must prove possible to duplicate, on an international scale, the decision taken 
in the first quarter of the century within the advanced nations of the West. It must prove 
possible to satisfy the poorer nations of Asia and Africa so that their peoples will not be 
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persuaded to follow the path taken by the so-called 'have-not' nations of central Europe, 
during the 'thirties, a much more dangerous course in our day. Technological progress 
can provide the plenty required to resolve international tensions caused by too great 
disparities in wealth between nations as it already has significantly solved such tensions 
within the nations of the West.” (1960: 262) 
 
Sir Hans Singer, one of Keynes' first PhD students, was among the first of economists to 
be explicitly and primarily concerned with the problem of the economic development of 
the poorer nations. His “animating spirit,” according to Toye (2006: 830-831), was “the 
concern for equality and redistribution, the concern for social security and for a broad 
range of international institutions in the social field to act as guarantors of peace.” For 
Toye, this spirit distinguishes Singer from his mentor; but in approaching economics in 
general and social change in particular from an ethical perspective, Singer certainly 
followed in Keynes' footsteps. Of course, by Singer's time, economists had long donned 
the 'mantle of science' and proclaimed their value-neutrality. Statements as boldly value-
laden as we saw in Mill, Marshall, and Keynes would henceforth rarely be acceptable in 
scientific, academic circles. As development economist Alexander Gerschenkron 
(1952[1962]:5) put it: “we no longer announce to the world what inevitably will, or at 
least what ideally should happen. We have grown modest.” Consequently, few words 
were written in the economic modernisation literature on why economic growth was 
actually desirable. Yet the normative vision contained in the concept of development 
remained. 
 
In 1949, Singer's 'Economic Progress in Underdeveloped Countries,' set out the issues 
associated with the hitherto under-explored subject of Third World development. He 
distinguished between the fruits of development – better nutrition, social security, lower 
death rates, luxury consumption, a complex administrative system, and so on – and the 
seeds of development, which included capital accumulation and the spread of technology. 
The seeds of development – that is, the actual process of development – finds its meaning 
and justification only in its results, its fruits. The fruits being both the most easily 
identifiable and the only morally desirable aspect of the whole process, it is tempting to 
simply transplant them, divorced from the seeds. But that, Singer (1949: 4) warns, would 
be a mistake: 
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“Such things as medical improvements, low death rates, advanced social legislation, a 
complex machinery of planning, are the end results of economic development in the 
industrialised countries, and as such they not only fulfil a definite economic function, but 
are the things in which economic development finds its meaning and fulfilment. It is 
fatally easy to transplant them, not as end products but in isolation, divorced from the 
process which has created them in the industrialised countries. Treated in such fashion, 
these fruits of economic development have a way of putrefying and even checking 
development itself.” 
 
Notice that for Singer the accumulation of capital is part of the process of development, 
rather than an outcome. It is a stage each nation must go through before it can reach the 
true end of development. As it was for Keynes, capital accumulation is the force driving 
development. Hence it could assumed by Singer that the transfer of capital does not pose 
the same difficulties as the transfer of fruits of development. Quite the opposite, in fact: 
an influx of capital was precisely what the underdeveloped countries needed. Singer 
believed that in an international free market, nations producing primary goods would 
experience a steady decline in their terms of trade. On the international stage, “the 
working of capitalism would maintain the same unequal world division of labour as has 
previously been enforced by imperial might” (Toye, 2006: 829). The failure of the poorer 
nations to approach the levels of the industrialised nations was, therefore, not entirely due 
to “domestic weaknesses or handicaps implicit in the economic structure”. Consequently, 
the present state of things need not be accepted as inevitable. “There is little doubt that a 
sufficient stream of additional capital goods flowing into the underdeveloped countries … 
could … [transform] the economic picture in many of these countries” (Singer, 1949: 4). 
Unfortunately, notes Singer, the underdeveloped countries are impatient: they want to 
import the fruits of development without going through the painful processes that 
produced them in the West. The elaborate but premature projects they engage in are 
initially popular, but soon fail due to a lack of external economies. What is needed is “a 
long period of heavy and seemingly fruitless expenditure prior to the stage when further 
expenditure brings tangible results” (Singer, 1949: 6). Again, development is something 
to be endured. “What is required is a big initial effort to carry through the barren 
period” (Singer, 1949: 6). Without an initial 'big push', the developing country would 
remain trapped in one of the many viscous circles of poverty. For example: low 
production yields no investment surplus, which precludes capital accumulation, which is 
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the cause of low production. Hence Nurkse's (1953: 4) famous 'trite proposition': “a 
country is poor because it is poor.” With a healthy influx of capital, however, the 
developing countries would be able to move from stagnant viscous circles to upward 
virtuous spirals. 
 
Not everyone was happy with the big push strategy, and the debate in the economic 
development literature quickly settled down into two main camps: those who favoured 
balanced growth, and those who favoured unbalanced growth. The terms of the debate 
were very narrow, essentially revolving around the selection of industries to be 'pushed'. 
The balanced growth advocates favoured broad, economy-wide investment, whereas the 
unbalanced growth advocates wanted investment in leading sectors that would call for a 
response from other industries. The great champion of unbalanced growth was Albert 
Hirschman, whose 1958 work The Strategy of Economic Development was structured as 
an argument against his balanced growth adversaries (Krugman, 1994). He argued that 
the balanced growth doctrine was based on the idea of two still photographs of society; 
two points of equilibrium, one where the society was at present, one where it aimed to be 
in the future. A focus on these two points led, he thought, to a “certain impatience with 
the process” of moving from one to the other (1958:65). They looked for short-cuts – one 
big push. In fact, Hirshmann pointed out, “development is a lengthy process during which 
[disequilibrating] interaction … takes place … up and down and across the whole of an 
economy's input-output matrix, and for many decades.” Hence it was the task of 
development policy to maintain, rather than avoid, “tensions, disruptions, and 
disequilibrium.” (1958: 66) 
 
Hirschman also objected to the common idea of prerequisites of development. The 
literature had identified such factors as natural resources, capital, and entrepreneurship as 
direct prerequisites, along with a constantly growing list of indirect prerequisites – law, 
order, rationalisation of bureaucracy, certain values, and so on. All valuable insights, but, 
he argued, most of them are in fact already present in the underdeveloped countries “and 
only need suitable occasions to manifest themselves” (1958: 4). Thus the poor nations' 
“economic backwardness cannot be explained in terms of any outright absence or 
scarcity of this or that human type or factor of production.” The so-called prerequisites 
“are not so scarce or so difficult to realize, provided, however, that economic 
development itself first raises its head. This is of course only a positive way of stating the 
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well-known proposition that economic development is held back by a series of 
interlinking vicious circles … But this also means that once development has started, the 
circle is likely to become an upward spiral as all the prerequisites and conditions for 
development are brought into being … [A]ll the … 'prerequisites' climb unexpectedly on 
the bandwagon of economic development once it has started to roll” (1958:4-5 – 
emphasis in original). Seeing resources as latent rather than absent shifted Hirschman's 
focus to the dynamic and strategic aspects of development. Development became about 
calling forth potential rather than coordinating existing resources (1958: 6; Krishna and 
Perez, 2005).  
 
Hirschman's ideal pattern of development is similar to what historian Arnold Toynbee 
called 'challenge and response'. A society grows, according to Toynbee, when the 
successful meeting of a challenge brings it face-to-face with another challenge, previously 
hidden or non-existent, which it also overcomes. So too for Hischman – recall the 
discussion of the unbalancing and balancing functions of government above in section I.3. 
Rather than a broad investment strategy, Hirschman argued for targeted investment in 
what he called 'growing points' – sectors of the economy with many forward and 
backward linkages to other sectors which, if stimulated, would call forth investment in 
those sectors too. However, Alexander Gerschenkron, an advocate of balanced growth, 
had also used Toynbee's challenge-and-response pattern, arguing that only broad 
industrial investment create a challenge “sufficiently strong to overcome the existing 
obstacles and to liberate the forces that make for industrial progress.” (1952[1962]: 11) 
 
Balanced or unbalanced, for this task laissez-faire was considered singularly ill-suited. Its 
continuous stream of “development in small doses is apt to be very disappointing” 
(Singer, 1949: 6). Add to this the fact that economic conditions in the underdeveloped 
countries tend to be unfavourable toward the emergence of private entrepreneurs, and it 
follows that it “is always government that has to formulate the desire [to develop] and 
translate it into action.” Hence the need for political stability: “political instability is 
reflected in confused, contradictory, or abortive economic policies. Underdeveloped 
countries need stability of government far more than industrialised countries, where 
development has become automatic” (Singer, 1949: 9-10). Laissez-faire was also not 
considered an inspiring enough doctrine to allow for a radical break from the past; it 
could not provide the necessary super-rational sanction. “What is needed to remove 
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mountains of routine and prejudice,” wrote Gerschenkron (1952[1962]: 24-5), “is faith – 
faith, in the words of Saint-Simon, that the golden age lies not behind but ahead of 
mankind. … In a backward country the great and sudden industrialisation effort calls for 
a New Deal in emotions.” 
 
But what if the faith necessary for development to occur did not take hold throughout the 
whole country? Hirschman anticipated a potential criticism of his approach: that it would 
lead to what we have called the tragedy of development. There is, he admitted, a 
“tendency of growth to round itself out for a long time within some subgroup, region, or 
country while backwardness retains its hold elsewhere” (1958:184). What is more, the 
division that results from this is self-perpetuating and deteriorates over time: “The 
progressive sectors and regions of an underdeveloped economy are easily over-impressed 
with their own rate of development.” They tend to exaggerate their distinctiveness vis a 
vis the less developed areas. Having established that “their success was due to hard work 
and virtuous living, they must willy-nilly live up to their own story, or at the least will 
make their children do so.” Conversely, those left behind deride the progressive groups 
as crassly materialistic (Hirschman, 1958: 185). The Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal 
(1957; 1968; 1970) had likewise noticed that the “onslaught of modernisation from the 
outside … leads to a situation where modernism becomes sprinkled throughout a society 
in which many conditions have remained almost the same for centuries. As Jawaharal 
Nehru said of India: 'We have atomic energy and we also have cow dung'” (Myrdal, 
1970:57). The problem in such cases is that growth in one sector has not induced growth 
in other sectors. For both men, however, this did not constitute a case against unbalanced 
growth: growth was inherently unbalanced. It was, rather, a case against laissez-faire. 
These problems arose when growth occurred absent rational planning. Only a rational, 
intentional force could identify the 'correct' industries for targeted investment: 
“development will not come about by a 'natural' evolution, and this constitutes the case 
for planning” (1970: 183). 
 
The need for 'faith' stems from the perception that although development was in the long-
run interests of the people of the developing societies, they could not see that far ahead. 
Indeed, this type of development was not deemed capable of rational justification by 
those involved in the process. For while development was in the long-run collective 
interest, it was rarely in the immediate interests of those involved. Consequently, people 
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may reject pro-development reform. As Seers and Joy (1971:271) put it: “The 
irrationality of society is sustained by the rationality of its individual members.” The 
interests of people and development would be reconciled only after development had 
completed its task of solving the economic problem. This is why development, the means 
justified by this end, had to be as quick as possible. Even Hirschman, who criticised the 
impatience with the process of development in the work of his colleagues, only spoke of 
development lasting a matter of decades. But it never got that far; no one in this golden 
age of economic modernisation – from Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) to Hirschman (1958) – 
was able to find a way out of the tragedy of development. Big Push, balanced growth, and 
unbalanced growth, the great paradigms of this era, all had the same result when applied 
in the real world: a modern sector superimposed by an external force onto a traditional 
sector, which it failed to lift to modernist heights. Rational planning was supposed to 
make development quicker and easier than it had been in the West. Yet in practice it was 
found that development had become limited to small sectors of the economy – just as 
Hirschman and Myrdal had feared would happen absent planning. The economies of the 
developing nations seemed to have split into two sectors – one touched by modernisation 
and one not – which did not interact with one another and developed according to their 
own pattern. 
 
From this outcome stems the perception of modernisation theory as one that out of 
Eurocentric arrogance believed that development could simply be given to another 
society. For Mehmet (1995[1999]: 66) the theories of development that emerged from 
Keynesian premises in the post-war era were “no more than a distorted projection of non-
European 'irrationality', the reverse side of the rational behaviour assumption.” Yet, on 
the other hand, he also has to admit that the economic modernisation approaches were 
solutions originally designed to solve European problems. If so, European rationality and 
non-European irrationality can hardly have been a formative dichotomy in this school of 
thought. As we have seen, in the Keynesian conception of development, rational 
motivation was indeed externally given to an irrational internal, but external and internal 
were not developed and developing societies. The post-war theorists did not believe that 
pro-development attitudes were synonymous with those existing in the West, nor that 
they needed to be adopted wholesale by the developing countries. Development theory 
could convey to the developing nations what had worked in the West, and even develop 
general policy recommendations based on their findings, but it was ultimately supposed 
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to be the developing nation itself that decided which to adopt and which to reject. They 
did not believe that development could occur absent Western aid, but neither did they 
believe it could happen without the input and commitment of the developing people 
themselves. For example, the first section in Meier and Baldwin's (1957[1962]) chapter 
on 'General Requirements for Development' deals with indigenous forces. They argue that 
a 'major requirement' of successful development 
 
“is that the development process be established on an indigenous base within the society 
of the poor country. … Forces outside the economy can stimulate and facilitate the 
indigenous forces, but they can only complement sustained development; they cannot 
serve as a substitute for it. … If the process is to become cumulative and long-lasting, the 
development forces must be fundamentally based within the developing country.” 
(1957[1962]: 334-5) 
 
Statements such as these from modernisation theorists, as well as those claiming concern 
for the poor of this world as an overriding motivation, are easy to dismiss as having a 
“disingenuous quality” (Gendzier, 1985:179), as being mere rationalisations for a pro-
Western foreign policy – particularly if one is committed to the idea that modernist 
development saw the developing nations as nothing more than passive recipients of the 
West's rational agency. But accepting them at face value results in no paradox, no 
contradiction between theory and practice. The post-war theorists saw development 
through the lens of Keynes' dichotomy, in which society as a whole is the irrational 
element. Stripped of rational intention, society clearly could not be left to its own devices. 
Indeed, to do so would be profoundly immoral. The modernisation literature is full of 
strictures against letting development take its course in a natural evolution. Rosenstein-
Rodan (1943: 204), in the founding text of modernisation theory, noted that the “social 
conscience” could no longer accept the miseries that accompanied development in the 
“darwinist nineteenth century.” Most theorists set themselves explicitly against the free 
trade liberalism of that era which, in the modern world, “would maintain the same 
unequal world division of labour as has previously been enforced by imperial might” 
(Toye, 2006: 829). 
 
It was this conviction that the 'natural evolution' of the international economy under free 
trade would perpetuate inequality internationally that led them to advocate technocratic 
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planning (e.g. Singer, 1949; Myrdal, 1957). The nineteenth century prescription of 
allowing the market to take care of development seemed impossibly harsh, and the notion 
that the developing nations might be able to withstand international market forces without 
aid seemed fanciful. Displaying little insight into the future of development studies, 
Thomas Balogh (1966[1974]: 130) wrote that both of these ideas “denies this possibility 
[of development aid] and decries the motives of deliberately helping the poor and weak 
on their way. … Let the market take over, say Chicago and the LSE. Let the 
underdeveloped governments plan, say the radicals of the Left, and lift themselves up by 
their own bootstraps. Fortunately, such views have met with little success.” Although 
there were some, such as P.T. Bauer, who were conceded to genuinely believe that a 
return to the liberal economic policies of the nineteenth century would benefit Third 
World development, such an attitude was more often considered a mark of an uncaring 
stance regarding the fate of the poorer nations (Rostow, 1984: 245-7). The economic 
modernisation theorists looked back on the nineteenth century through Keynes' eyes: it 
was spontaneous, unguided, Darwinian. Twentieth century development could be none of 
those things. 
 
However, by the concept of development itself, the post-war theorists were led to 
precisely that disregard of the human element that they found so distasteful in laissez-
faire. In the previous section it was argued that by removing the rational individual from 
the centre of development theory, Keynes had done for society as a whole what Mill and 
Marshall had done for what they thought of as the lowest sections of society; that is, he 
had denied that society itself could be the motive force of development. Instead, if society 
was to make progressive movement it would have to be guided by an external force. In 
doing so, Keynes created a paradox that was transmitted to post-war development theory: 
development, if it is to be worthy of the positive connotations of that term, must be about 
people; yet the people themselves are not considered capable of producing development 
worthy of the name. If development is to proceed correctly – that is, according to the 
needs of the developing people – the developing people must remain remote from the 
process of development. Only once development had completed its task of solving the 
economic problem could the interests of people and process become realigned. Until then 
it was acceptable to use practices that would otherwise be considered distasteful: “to 
desire [people’s] freedom is scarcely to treat them as means in the Kantian sense.” (Dahl 
and Lindblom, 1953[1992]: 523). 
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This is, of course, entirely consistent with what we have been saying about the concept of 
development: that it is an unfortunately necessary yet fortunately temporary stage on the 
way to an era in which the Marshallian conception of scarcity no longer applies. More 
often than not this was an assumption, made explicit only when provoked. John Kenneth 
Galbraith, in the third edition of his The Affluent Society (1958[1976]: xxiv) recalls the 
reaction from economists concerned with poverty to his assertion that production for 
economic growth was no longer necessary: “How can Galbraith be so callous when a 
named percentage of our people have a disposable income of less than the necessary 
minimum? When everyone has that minimum, it will be time to worry about the problems 
of social balance.” Three years before the publication of Galbraith's work, the prominent 
development economist Sir Arthur Lewis (1955:434) had expressed precisely that 
sentiment, in an appendix on the desirability of economic growth: 
 
“Whether [the poorer nations] will have the courage, and the necessary internal and 
external support, to raise the necessary resources may be doubted. And it is also doubtful 
whether in any case aspirations will not continue to outdistance production. But those 
who believe that it would be wrong to speed up production because of the effects on 
social relations, or on moral order, usually forget both that these are already rapidly 
changing, an also that the results of frustrated aspirations may be even more dangerous 
to existing patterns than speeding up production would be.” 
 
This was the difference between the modernisation theorists and their New Left critics, 
who were wont to portray development as a mindless pursuit of endless growth. W.W. 
Rostow (1971: 356-360) noted that the New Left scholars such as Herbert Marcuse 
seemed to believe that the economic conditions needed to unleash the freedom of the 
individual had already been achieved. Like Galbraith, they seemed to believe that the 
economic problem of scarcity could now be solved not with more production but with 
redistribution. Rostow disagreed not with the principle behind their arguments but with 
this assessment of current economic reality:  
 
“The creation of a setting of assured affluence and security for men and nations – and 
seeing what man will make of it – is the object of much striving by many hands for social 
an economic progress and for stable peace. But … the human community still has a long, 
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hard road ahead on which all it can summon in human dedication and endurance, talent 
and idealism – and resources – will be required for ultimate success.”  (1971: 360) 
 
We should, therefore, not share Mehmet's surprise that “Rostow, the prophet of 
capitalism, far from advocating reliance on market forces, ended up legitimizing state 
intervention in Third World development, based on planning and foreign aid” 
(1995[1999]: 72). Rostow, like Mill, Marshall, and Keynes before him and contemporary 
development theorists with him, was the prophet not of capitalism but of its fall, and the 
coming of a post-capitalist age. Rostow is best known for his stages-of-growth model of 
development (1960[1977]), which is regarded as the prime example of linear, Eurocentric 
development thinking. Indeed it is. Yet it was not the stage of capitalist mass 
consumption – the stage in which the industrial West found itself – that was the ultimate 
aim. Development would find its fulfilment only in a later stage; for in the contemporary 
West, “[t]he problem of choice and allocation – the problem of scarcity – has not yet 
been lifted...” (1960[1977]:81). In this famous Anti-Communist Manifesto, Marx was 
conceded to be correct on one point: “the end of all this [development] is not compound 
interest forever; it is in the adventure of seeing what man can and will do when the 
pressure of scarcity is substantially lifted from him” (1960[1977]: 166). The normative 
perspective, then, remained as an underlying assumption: the social conscience, as 
mentioned, could no longer ignore the miseries deemed acceptable or inevitable in 
Rosenstein-Rodan's (1943: 204) “Darwinist nineteenth century.” Overcoming the 
economic problem was still seen as a necessary condition for the attainment of more 
worthy goals, but it was necessary that something be done about it; society would not find 
that noble end of its own accord (Dahl and Lindblom, 1953[1992]: 519). 
 
It is often said that the economic modernisation theorists were optimistic, and naively so. 
They were – not in the sense that they believed development would be easy and painless, 
but in the sense that they thought that, if rationally planned, it could be quick enough that 
the difficulties and pains would be temporary. In the event, development had become 
what Singer had argued it could not, if it was to work, ever be: an external force placing 
modern things in a society to which they had no connection. The solution to this situation, 
as proposed by a group of thinkers we shall refer to as political modernisation theorists, 
was precisely the alternative the economic modernisation theorists had believed they were 
offering to the 'Darwinist nineteenth century': bring the people back in to development. 
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What the economists failed to recognise, argued Daniel Lerner, was that “[e]ither 
individuals and their environments modernize together or modernization leads elsewhere 
than intended” (Lerner, 1958[1966]: 78). In the next section we shall how Daniel Lerner 
and the political modernisation school attempted to ensure that modernisation did proceed 
as intended. We shall see that although Lerner approaches modernisation with the 
intention of making the developing people themselves more active, using the concept of 
development as a starting point meant that in fact they could be little more than reactive 
to a social change that remained beyond their control. 
 
I.8 – Post-War Development II: Political Modernisation 
The political modernisation school has been an easy target for criticism. It is generally 
their type of analysis that critics generally have in mind when they describe development, 
as Brohman (1995: 125) does, as a mere celebration of the achievements of the United 
States. Irene Gendzier, for example, states simply: “That theorists of Political 
Development were committed to the interpretation of Third World change in a manner 
compatible with the expansion of capitalism is beyond controversy” (1985: 12). 
Gendzier's thesis is that the modernisation theorists' elitist interpretations of political 
change holds “the key to the nature of Political Development theories and the more 
general orientation to political analysis to which they gave rise” (1985: 12). Their 
theories, she says, arose from the attempt to reconcile two principles they regarded as 
universally desirable and necessary: capitalist development and democratic change. She 
continues from the sentence quoted above: “That many … were committed to the 
proposition that capitalism and democracy were historically linked in Western experience 
is also beyond question.” (1985: 12) Unfortunately, she argues, the two are incompatible, 
as capitalist development creates the very class differentiation and tension that democracy 
asserts ought not to exist. Gendzier argues that they gave prominence to capitalist 
development, allowing that to take its course in the present while the coming of 
participatory politics was delayed. Hence the new title in later reprints of her work: 
Development Against Democracy. 
 
“Caught between their support for a form of socio-political change that conformed to 
their interest and supported their world view and the recognition that it generated 
precisely the instability that they feared, theorists of Political Development responded by 
relying on the elitist, pluralist, equilibrium model of political change that most effectively 
 88 
satisfied their concerns.” (Gendzier, 1985: 13) 
 
This explains the oft-noted authoritarian bias and aversion to change found in 
modernisation theory (Huntington, 1971; Kesselman, 1973; Leys, 1985). Gendzier finds 
an analogy for their “blatant fear of political participation” in the origins of liberal 
political theory: Locke's “justificatory theory” for capitalist society. (1985: 160; 158). 
According to MacPherson's (1962) reading of his work, Locke had tried to find a 
justification for the new bourgeois order in terms of a system of morality derived for a 
pre-bourgeois order. Yet he was unable to “surmount an inconsistency inherent in market 
society. A market society generates class differentiation in effective rights and rationality, 
yet requires for its justification a postulate of equal rights and rationality.” (1962: 264) 
The analogy goes further: Locke, again according to Macpherson, had made unlimited 
accumulation rational. Accordingly, the labouring classes, who failed to live up to this 
standard, could not lead a fully rational life. Similarly, the political development theorists 
reduced political differences to personality types, enabling them to view dissidents and 
those outside the established political system as not fully rational and hence not to be 
trusted with political participation. The elites were both the source of power and “the 
rock on which the process of state formation was believed to depend” (Gendzier, 1985: 
178). From them came the initiative. Gendzier has to acknowledge that theorists of 
political development did not believe that the masses should adopt an attitude of slavish 
devotion and trust, but dismisses such statements as “disingenuous” given the overall 
nature of their theories (1985: 179). 
 
However, the elitist theory of democracy, the supposed solution to the problem of 
reconciling capitalist inequality and democratic equality, came before the development 
contradiction ever arose. It had been the mainstream view of democracy for half a 
century. Hence there was no contradiction between capitalism and democracy, because 
democracy was already interpreted in a way that fit. Walter Lippmann, for example, in his 
influential Public Opinion (1922), had exposed the 'democratic fallacy' of being 
concerned with the origins of government to the exclusion of the process of government. 
He accused democrats of focussing on one part of the individual – the desire for self-
government. Human dignity, however, involved more than that: 
 
“But if, instead of hanging human dignity on the one assumption about self-government, 
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you insist that man's dignity requires a standard of living in which his capacities are 
properly exercised, the whole problem changes. The criterion which you apply to 
government are whether it is producing a certain minimum amount of health, of decent 
housing, of material necessities, of education, of freedom, of pleasures, of beauty, not 
simply whether at the sacrifice of all these things, it vibrates to the self-centered opinions 
that happen to be floating around in men's minds. In the degree to which these criteria 
can be made exact and objective, political decision, which is inevitably the decision of 
comparatively few people, is actually brought into relation with the interests of men” 
(1922: 313-4) 
 
This early statement of what would become known as the Lippmann-Almond consensus, 
which asserts the volatility, irrationality, and hence irrelevance of public opinion, was far 
more influential on the political development literature – of which Almond, of course, 
was part – than any notion of perfect democratic equality. It may be argued that this 
would lead to contradictions in practice, but that is not Gendzier argument. Her thesis is 
that the contradiction between capitalist inequality and democratic equality influenced 
political development theory. Yet in the minds of those who developed those theories 
there was no contradiction. What was a problem – and recognised as a problem necessary 
to be overcome by actual development theorists – was the fact that though these irrational 
individuals could not be trusted to bring about development, development was still 
ultimately about them. In this, they confronted precisely the same problem as the 
economic modernisation theorists. In The Passing of Traditional Society, Daniel Lerner 
asserted that the need for a political development stemmed from the lack of concern for 
developing people apparent in economic development: 
 
“The problem with this cogent technical solution [i.e. quickly raising incomes through 
economic development] is people. They don't do what, on any rational course of 
behaviour, they should do. They want more consumption, but they don't worry about 
saving and think little about productive investment. … We now recognise that 
modernization can succeed only in the measure that it meets its second paramount 
difficulty – its 'people problems.'” (1958[1966]: vii) 
 
As we have seen, the economic modernisation theorists believed that the interests of 
people and development could only be reconciled after the process had been completed, 
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because the process itself could have no rational sanction from the individuals involved. 
There would likely be some instability, but less so as the nation grew wealthier. This 
assumption came under heavy criticism in the late fifties and early sixties (e.g. Olson, 
1963). It was now argued that while a fully developed society would be a stable society, a 
poor society was also stable; it was the process of getting from one to the other that was 
“a highly destabilizing process.” (Huntington, 1968: 49). Indeed, the process could be so 
destabilising that development may be halted altogether. Hence the question that the 
political development theorists all sought to address: how can the “societies-in-a-hurry 
hope to achieve stability while achieving mobility?” (Lerner, 1958[1966]: 68) 
 
Kesselman (1973: 142) argues that in answering this question they came to regard order 
as “the highest political good” rather than as “a prerequisite for achieving the highest 
political good.” This is clearly untrue. If it were true, there would be no reason for them 
to advocate that the already-stable poor nations embark upon the destabilising process of 
development in the first place. In fact, the poorer nations were heading to the same 
ultimate goal as the West: the vision of a world in which Marshall’s natural wants – or 
basic needs – were universally satisfied. Cyril Black (1966: 84), for example, put it as 
follows: “The end of this process is not easy to foresee, but as automation reduces the 
labor force required to sustain economic growth it is not unlikely that a substantial 
proportion of the work force of an integrated society will be guaranteed an income 
regardless of whether or not they work.” In speaking of an ‘integrated society’ as part of 
the end of development, Black harks back to Semmel’s (1960: 262) words quoted above, 
that “[i]n time, it must prove possible to duplicate, on an international scale, the decision 
taken in the first quarter of the century within the advanced nations of the West” – the 
decision, that is, taken by political elites to enact social policies to benefit the masses. 
Development was to achieve on a world scale what the Western nations had been trying 
to do domestically.  
 
Contra Gendzier (1985), it was certainly not a Lockean brand of individualistic capitalism 
that was to lead the way in this. Following Keynes and the economic modernisation 
theorists, capitalism was to be temporarily harnessed and tamed by the ‘trustees of the 
possibility of civilisation,’ and guided toward socially desirable ends before being cast 
aside. Left unguided, wrote David Apter, “capitalism … becomes the repugnant purveyor 
of anti-humanism.” It is “at best a gambler’s environment. … It is a private system of 
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forced savings and concentrated development strategies in which the immediate social 
impact is less relevant than the creation of deployable capital funds. Under these 
circumstances, ‘valued’ patterns of life of a more ‘traditional’ character (i.e. that are not 
functional … for development) are themselves seen as obstacles to be swept away…” 
(1971: 201; 197). The idea of progress, which served as a justification for capitalism, was 
dismissed as an unwarranted universalization. Cyril Black (1966: 7) described it as “a 
projection for the whole world of a conception of change that was believed, erroneously, 
to be true of the societies of Western Europe.” Thus, like other “serious students of 
society” (Black, 1966: 27), they looked forward to a world free of poverty and war within 
the foreseeable future, but they recognised better than the economic modernisation 
theorists how difficult a road it would be. According to Kesselman (1973: 150), the 
political development theorists ignored “the destabilizing (and occasionally devastating) 
effects of American power on other nations.” Their predecessors had arguably done so, 
believing that the great problem would be how to kick-start development in societies that 
had changed little over the past few centuries; but for the political development theorists 
it was the excessive influence of outside (i.e. Western) forces that was the fundamental 
concern: “modernizing societies exist in a world environment that in spite of outside aid 
and multilateral alliances is essentially hostile” (Apter, 1971: 46; cf. Black, 1966: 98-9; 
Huntington, 1968: 46). Apter continues: 
 
“The adaptive strains produced by the combination of internal and external inputs create 
political problems that can never be adequately resolved by centralized planning, 
because the modernizing society has little control over the externally induced pressures of 
industrialization. Development may occur, but the relationship between allocation and 
equity may be upset and may produce a threat to order.” (1971: 47)  
 
This recognition of the need to reconcile internal and external forces – which economic 
planning had failed to do – was present in the work that is often considered to mark the 
beginning of the ‘golden decade’ of political development: Danier Lerner’s The Passing 
of Traditional Society (1958[1966]). Lerner saw that the hitherto dominant economistic 
approach to development, with its technocratic planning, had not been able to avoid what 
we have called the tragedy of development. He recognises the economistic approach for 
what it had become: an external, paternalistic force, distant from the needs of the 
developing people. In words that could have been written by Georg Simmel, Lerner 
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expressed his belief that political modernisation was to change that: 
 
“[This] book seeks to explain why and show how individuals and their institutions 
modernize together. … [S]ocial change operates through persons and places. Either 
individuals and their environments modernize together or modernization leads elsewhere 
than intended. If new institutions of political, economic, cultural behaviour are to change 
in compatible ways, their inner coherence must be provided by the personality matrix 
which governs individual behaviour.” (1958[1966]: 78) 
 
This implies that if the developing people are to be a part of the process of development, 
Western models could not serve as a blueprint for the modernising societies, as that 
would represent a form of institutional change not necessarily compatible with the 
‘personality matrix’ of the developing people. This was a conclusion that Lerner came to, 
and one that most political development theorists explicitly followed him in. He argued 
that due to the tendency of the elites in developing countries to gain their education in the 
West, there was a disconnect in developing societies between ‘Moderns’ and 
‘Traditionals.’ The elites returned to their country armed with Western ideas that did not 
resonate with the masses; consequently, the institutions these ideas helped build would 
not last. Despite the title of his book, Lerner did not believe that development was a 
process of the Traditionals gradually coming to accept the ideals and institutions of the 
Westernised elites. He takes issue with those who suggest it might be so, asserting that 
“[t]here is no uniform Tomorrow just as there was no single Yesterday” (1958[1966]: 
74). For society and its institutions to 'change in compatible ways' the gulf between 
modern and traditional would have to be bridged. This could be achieved neither by the 
Traditionals, nor the Westernised Moderns. To Lerner, both were ‘relatively static,’ and 
neither could produce social change that would be compatible with the ‘personality 
matrix’ of the other. The Moderns were trying to provide the developing society with an 
impulse that was completely external to it, while the Traditionals clung on to their 
society's old ways. The future lay with a class Lerner named the ‘Transitionals,’ “the 
men-in-motion,” who seek new channels of their own design that the already-modern 
elites fail to provide for them. They are the middle class that unites top and bottom, 
interpreting and adapting foreign models and influences in a way that is acceptable to 
their own preconceptions and relevant to the challenges faced by their own society 
(1958[1966]: 101; 410). 
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Lerner finds a small-scale example of this process in the Chief and the Grocer of the rural 
Turkish village of Balgat. The Chief of the village embodies the Ottoman imperial virtues 
of loyalty, obedience, and courage. A life spent in his village and in the army has given 
him no cause to question these values. The Grocer, by contrast, “lives in a different 
world, an expansive world, populated more actively with imaginings and fantasies – 
hungering for what is unfamiliar” (1958[1966]: 23). The Grocer has dreams beyond the 
village, of a bigger shop in the city, a nicer house, a better clothing. The Grocer's 
aspirations – and in particular is open expression of his aspirations – offended the 
traditional sensibilities of the rest of his village; his opinions marked him off as 
“heterodox and probably infidel” (1958[1966]: 23). For Lerner, it is the Grocer's ability – 
and willingness – to imagine himself in different, unfamiliar surroundings, and to imagine 
how things might change in Balgat that sets him apart from the other villagers. Unlike 
them, he has been to Ankara. The Chief, too, visits Ankara on occasion, but comes back 
with his belief in traditional values reinforced. The Grocer can see the same sights, the 
same modern films, and find in them something to aspire to. It is the Grocer's 'empathetic' 
character that is the mark of the Transitional, “Needed then is a massive growth in 
imaginativeness [among the Traditionals] about alternatives to their present lifeways” 
(1958[1966]: 411). Upon his own visit to Balgat, four years after the original interviews 
were conducted, Lerner finds that this new imaginativeness has emerged, stimulated by 
the example of the now-deceased Grocer, of whom the villagers now say: 
 
“Ah, he was the cleverest of us all. We did not know it then, but he saw better than all 
what lay in the path ahead. We have none like this among us now. He was a prophet.” (in 
1958[1966]: 41) 
 
This seems like a reasonable solution to the tragedy of development. Lerner saw that 
neither externally-given Western models nor uninfluenced indigenous models could by 
their own powers result in coherent and sustainable modernisation. Therefore, a 
compromise position is needed, which is where the Transitionals come in. Due to their 
place in society – between modernity and tradition – they could add to modern ideas the 
unique flavour of their circumstances, in the act becoming source of inspiration for the 
Traditionals, and tempering the Westernism of the Moderns. “What they subsequently 
accept, adapt, or reject [from the Western experience of development] is a matter which 
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each man will, in due course, decide for himself.” (1958[1966]: 411). The problem with 
Lerner's response is, as was noted above, the ambiguity in how we are to define the 
compromise position. We have already seen that it is the peculiar and constant feature of 
the concept of development, as opposed to that of progress, that the internal and external 
motive forces are seen as divided. Yet how do we find an acceptable middle-ground 
between two items that are mutually antagonistic yet both, in their own way, valid and 
necessary? One often hears that we should be 'practical' about such matters, but that is 
only a call to action not a guide on how to act, and hence does not help us. In fact, as 
Dworkin (2011:261-4) argues, we cannot identify a middle-ground between two 
perspectives “without first deciding which of [the] perspectives should govern … There is 
no third perspective – no perspective of 'reason' itself – from which the balance might be 
struck. We can't know what reason requires without first deciding from which perspective 
that question should be decided.” (2011: 261-2) When we seek the proper mix of internal 
and external forces, when we define their role in the process of development, we must, if 
we conceive the two as fundamentally antagonistic, start from one perspective and on that 
basis seek a compromise. Development's understanding of positive social change as a 
'self-conscious' process colours the attempt to reconcile the internal and external. 
 
What Lerner saw himself as doing is precisely what the economic modernisation theorists 
had seen their own task: he was trying to bring the developing people back into 
development. We have seen how they failed in that task due to the implication in the 
concept of development itself that development be externally motivated. Lerner runs into 
the same problem. He is able to bring the developing people back into the analysis, but 
not actively into the process. If we look a little closer, Lerner's Transitionals are not the 
ones motivating development; they are only representative of it. They represent the 
enquiring spirit of modernity, the curiosity and imagination from which arise “the human 
skills needed for social growth and economic development” (1958[1966]: 411). One 
could imagine von Humboldt, or any other believer in the idea of progress, writing the 
same: this inventive, entrepreneurial, constantly striving view of life they praised above 
all others. Yet while for Humboldt an individual with this attitude was the driving force of 
progress, for Lerner it simply helps individuals to adapt to changes that are – and must 
necessarily be – beyond their control. Where Humboldt's spirit of modernity was active 
and creative, Lerner's is reactive and adaptive. It is not for the Transitionals to create “the 
institutional capacity to provide this new style of life,” nor even are they trusted to 
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produce the goods and services they now desire as the difficulties involved “seem almost 
insurmountable within the framework of classical market economics” (1958[1966]: 412; 
259). Development itself must be given to them; they need only accept it. 
 
All this is rather implicit in Lerner, but the political modernisation theorists would 
develop a more explicit authoritarian bias and preference for elites over social movements 
that has drawn frequent and severe criticism (e.g. O'Brien, 1972; Kesselman, 1973; 
Gendzier, 1985). Like Lerner, later political development theorists – including Edward 
Shils, David Apter, Cyril Black, Karl Deutsch, Samuel Huntington – thought it necessary 
that developing societies be protected from excessive external (i.e. Western) influence. 
Lerner’s argument that development required that the developing society must decide for 
itself which parts of the example set by other nations to ‘accept, adapt, or reject’ was still 
explicitly present. Thus Shils defined modernization as a “progressive sharing by the 
public in an understanding of modern life in such a way that, no longer passive agents 
acted upon by outside forces, they can utilise their potentialities and their creativity” (in 
Apter, 1965: 22-3). Similarly, Black (1966: 50) argued that “outside forces [of 
development] are so powerful that modernization is sometimes thought of primarily as 
acculturation – the adoption of the cultural traits of another society.” Yet modernising 
societies, he argues, should also be considered in terms of the domestic process of 
change, by which the traditional institutions of the society are evolving. Development 
must be the outcome of the interplay between the two: 
 
“The stimulus of foreign models is an intense and vitalizing force in the later-
modernizing societies. Yet unless the leaders of these societies have the wisdom to 
distinguish between the generally applicable functions of modernity and the institutional 
forms derived from alien traditions, the influence of foreign models is likely to divert them 
from empirical experimentation and to interfere with a more discriminating consideration 
of the adaptability to modern functions of the native traditional heritage of ideas and 
institutions.” (Black, 1966: 97-8) 
 
Notice, however, that the function of interpreting modern ideas, attributed by Lerner to 
the Transitionals, has now become the task of the ‘leaders.’ The problem was that the 
developing people, seeing what the Western nations had to offer in terms of material 
prosperity, not only accepted the conditions of development, but wanted even more than 
 96 
could be provided. The economic modernisation theorists had seen this issue too, but had 
believed that with good planning production would be able to keep up with this demand 
spurt. The political development theorists were not so sure: “[Developing] people have 
learned to want more than they can get. As a result, the 'revolution of rising expectations' 
we celebrated so confidently fifteen years ago has, in many places, become a 'revolution 
of rising frustrations.' Modernization, it now appears, is harder than one supposed” 
(Lerner, 1958[1966]: vii).  
 
This rather throws a spanner in the works of Lerner’s model of development – Lerner 
didn’t recognise it, but others did. The Transitionals themselves seem too enamoured with 
Westernism to point the way forward. They have become impatient, and want to do in 
years what took the West centuries. They therefore seek to impose modern institutions 
where the correct ‘personality matrix’ has not appeared. “Wanted are modern institutions, 
but not modern ideologies, modern power but not modern purposes, modern wealth but 
not modern wisdom, modern commodities but not modern cant. It is not clear, however, 
that modern ways and words can be so easily and so totally sundered” (Lerner, 
1958[1966]: 48). Lerner tries to associate this type of attitude with the Moderns, but for 
the political development theorists who followed him it was clear that this internal 
Eurocentrism was a more widespread mentality: “The ‘demonstration effect’ which the 
early modernizers have on the later modernizers first intensifies aspirations and then 
exacerbates frustrations” (Huntington, 1968: 46; c.f. Deutsch, 1970[1974]: 550). 
Consequently, it was necessary that the developing society be protected from its own 
Eurocentrism – and specifically the Eurocentrism of the middle classes, with whom 
Lerner had identified the Transitionals. For, according to Black (1966: 161), “[t]he 
institutional pattern of any one society cannot serve as a model for others except in a 
general sense. Each society must to a considerable extent work out its own solutions.” It 
was not the task of the elites to speed up or slow down a process of development that was 
leading them inexorably toward a mirror-image of the modern West; their importance lay 
in “the strong imprint that they stamp on the manner in which change takes place.” 
(Black, 1966: 157) Leaders were to interpret foreign models, ideas, and expectations 
where in the masses they would lead to a revolution of rising frustrations. It is the people 
who expect their society to become like the West, and become frustrated when it does 
not. It is the political leaders who had to interpret the Western models and adapt them to 
fit their own society. 
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This idea was firmly entrenched by the time Samuel Huntington released his famous 
Political Order in Changing Societies (1968) – the last great work of the golden decade 
of political modernisation and the primary target of Kesselman’s (1973) critique of 
modernisation theory’s apparent preoccupation with order and authority. According to 
Huntington, US development policy has focused too much on the income gap, to the 
detriment of what he calls the ‘political gap’: “The rates of social mobilization and the 
expansion of political participation are high; the rates of political organization and 
institutionalization are low. The result is instability and disorder” (1968: 5). Poor 
societies, he argues, are relatively stable, but once economic development starts and the 
‘demonstration effect’ comes into play, aspirations rise faster than the society’s capacity 
to meet them. Lerner, we saw, hoped that the Transitionals could mediate, but for 
Huntington this task belongs to the political elites, as the middle classes are the ones 
whose aspirations have become excessively Westernised. He states that the two functions 
of a political system in modernising societies are, first, to “promote social and economic 
reform by state action,” and second, “to assimilate successfully into the system the social 
forces produced by modernization” (1968: 140). A single- or dominant-party system, he 
argues, is best equipped for this task.  
 
Thus the theorists who followed Lerner ended up making explicit the authoritarianism 
implicit in his work: the developing people are not considered capable of actually 
producing development, only of adapting to its demands. However, the very reason that, 
to Lerner’s thinking, the Transitionals would be able to overcome what we have called 
the tragedy of development was that he was originally not asking them to dictate a plan 
for the country, but simply to provide inspiration for others in how to adapt modern ideas 
to fit their needs. “What they subsequently accept, adapt, or reject [from the Western 
example] is a matter which each man will, in due course, decide for himself” (Lerner, 
1958[1966]: 411). This is why they were able to mediate between the top and the bottom 
of the developing society, to find a way to reconcile modern influences and traditional 
lifeways. Once the Transitionals come into power, however, their role in development 
ceases to be one of inspiring the Traditionals and tempering the Moderns by setting an 
example, instead becoming one of compulsion, which makes them indistinguishable from 
the Modern elites imposing ideas and institutions that do not fit the ‘personality matrix’ of 
the developing people. They can no longer provide the link between top and bottom, 
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because they are at the top. The internal and external forces of development, though they 
were recognised as being in need of reconciliation, remain separate and antagonistic. 
I.9 – Education as a Bridge Between Tradition and Modernity 
The failure of development theorists to conceptualise a truly active role for the people of 
developing society was, it has been argued, due to the concept of development itself. We 
cannot concur with the assessment of scholars such as Gendzier (1985), Mehmet (1995), 
or Nederveen Pieterse (2001a) that attempts to do so were at best half-hearted, at worst 
dishonest, with the ultimate intention of modernisation theory being the global diffusion 
of American capitalist power. Rather, the concern for the welfare of the developing world 
and the belief that development policy was necessary to secure that welfare were genuine 
and informed attempts to alter development theory and practice. However, it has been 
argued that because social-change-as-development must be evaluated and motivated by a 
force external to the developing society – because internal forces cannot be trusted to 
move in the correct direction – the developing society itself can at best be made more 
adaptable to the demands of development. Alternatively, or additionally, the external 
force can be adapted so that it is more recognisable to the developing society. Ultimately, 
though, these forces must remain conceptually separate, with the consequence that the 
'stuff' of development, created according to an external motivation, does not raise the 
internal, the developing society, to its own 'higher' level of development. As Simmel 
(1908[1997]: 57) put it, they “simply act like additions, as it were, that come from a 
sphere of values external to, and always remaining external to [it]”  
 
Recognition of this situation in practice leads to criticisms that existing approaches to 
development have failed, the proposed solution being a new approach that will unite 
development process and developing people. The problem, however, as it flows from the 
concept of development, remains. In the previous section we saw how this occurred in the 
response of political modernisation theorists to the failures of economic modernisation. 
We can find the same process at work in more directly policy-relevant areas. In this final 
section we shall look at the relationship between education and development. We shall 
see familiar critiques – that existing schooling was too distant from the lifeways of the 
people of the developing society to be relevant – familiar consequences – that the schools 
failed to make people truly 'modern' – familiar solutions – a reorientation of schools to 
make the more responsive to the needs and lives of the people – and a familiar outcome – 
a reacquisition of the characteristics for which the old system was criticised. 
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John Dewey (1937: 235-238), whose work was the great inspiration for education policy 
in this era, discussed three possible choices regarding education and social change. One 
can deliberately maintain an existing order, as with Plato; one can ignore the school's role 
in social change resulting in them acting “so as to perpetuate the present confusion and 
possibly increase it”; or one can make a scientific prognosis of social forces and plan 
schooling accordingly. Dewey advised the third course of action, and his advice was 
followed by educationists and officials working in development. The intended purpose of 
schools in the developing nations was to act as “mediators of the culture, the intersection 
point between the traditional and the modern” (Hanson and Brembeck, 1966: 310). They 
were to prepare the child for a role in the modernisation process. Consequently, the nature 
of education in these societies had to change: “Formerly an instrument for promoting 
social stability and continuity, it increasingly had to serve as an instrument for promoting 
and controlling change, for creating discontinuities. Previously an instrument for 
communicating the values and skills possessed by the adult members of a culture, it now 
had to transmit new national values and new economic and other skills which most adults 
might well not possess.” (Thompson, 1981: 27-28). There were three basic purposes for 
education to fulfil in support of development: education for economic growth, education 
for national unity and political development, and education for personal and social 
development (Hanson, 1964[1966]: 35-40).  
 
Before 1945, education for economic growth had been limited by the principle that a 
colony should have no services that could not be paid for by its own resources. This 
changed with the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940 which accepted the 
need to deliberately promote the rapid development of the colonies. Though WWII was 
well under way, ministers were urged by the Act “not [to] let slip the experienced skill of 
our guiding hand”1. UNESCO's push for universal education and the general feeling of 
optimism in the development community meant that post-war policy was almost entirely 
geared toward increasing enrolment figures and the number of schools and education 
materials. UNESCO justified the rapid expansion of free and compulsory education with 
reference to the UN's Declaration on Human Rights – which includes a right to education 
– but also to the potential economic return. This claim was backed up by studies of 
 
1  HC Deb 21 May 1940 vol 361 cc 41-125 
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education and economic growth in the US, the USSR, and Japan (e.g. Harbison and 
Myers, 1964). A series of conferences in Karachi, Santiago, Tokyo, and Addis Ababa 
were to set the stage for national plans to link education and economic growth. “The 
Conference [in Addis Ababa, 1961] notes that education cannot make its fullest 
contribution to economic development unless it is particularly geared to needs of 
economic development ... Education more than pays for itself, but only if it is of the right 
kind and is mixed quantitatively in the right proportions. … For this reason, education 
needs to be planned continuously in relation to economic development” (UNESCO, 
1961). 
 
The first national plan to consciously attempt to integrate education into the general 
development plan was Nigeria's. It was guided by the Ashby Commission's 1961 report, 
Investment in Education. Written for Nigeria, the report was imitated in many other 
developing countries (Hanson, 1964[1966]: 35). Twenty years after its publication its 
principles of education as an investment, integrated development planning, and education 
according to manpower needs had become “almost unquestioned orthodoxy” (Thompson, 
1981: 82). The essence of the report was “an orientation toward the future: an 
orientation toward the type of Nigeria one might envisage with the passing of two 
decades. The Commission recognized that only when the vision of the goal is clear can 
sound programmes of action be planned” (Hanson, 1964[1966]: 35). In background 
papers to the Addis Ababa conference, Harbison and Lewis had both argued that 
economic development required above all the skills associated with secondary education. 
Following this advice, the Ashby Commission recommended a programme of education 
designed to achieve a revolutionary increase in the production of young people capable of 
filling managerial, technical, and administrative roles. The focus of the conference and 
the Ashby Commission's report was on secondary education, although universal primary 
education remained a target. 
 
The post-war world was one of decolonisation, and as well as economic growth many of 
the new nations needed to foster a sense of national unity if the nation was to make a 
cooperative effort for development. Many of the new national leaders had been brought 
together from diverse background by the colonial education system, and were initially 
confident that common schooling would bring their new nation together in similar fashion 
(see Davidson, 1993). The form of Nigeria's education system was designed with 
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precisely this in mind. Every secondary school, for example, was expected to take in 
pupils from other areas. The content of education was likewise geared toward national 
unity. The virtues of co-operation, selfless service to the nation, and respect for the 
legitimate political authorities were high on the agenda. The Zambian government's 
Syllabuses on Political Education in Zambia noted that while “[t]he Party, being the only 
mass movement in the country, has demonstrated beyond doubt the support it enjoys from 
the people of Zambia [, this] should not be taken for granted as such support, if not 
backed by political education on a wide scale, can very easily fade away overnight.” (in 
Thompson, 1981: 71) 
 
Development was also an international project and education would have to transmit the 
skills and values suitable to life as a citizen of the world. This was an important part of 
UNESCO's work. An early report, reviewing the organisation's first six years of work, 
argued that “an alphabet of hygiene, of technology and of citizenship has to be taught to 
illiterates along with an alphabet of reading and writing. Fundamental education is an 
all-round training, combining the main branches of instruction needed for the moulding 
of human beings, that is to say, responsible individuals and citizens alive to their duties 
towards their country and the human family” (UNESCO, 1951: 4). Young people would 
be taught to understand the nature of international forces and the institutions designed to 
control them and to advance peace and prosperity. They would have to be concerned with 
inequality and oppression wherever they existed, and demand that their government take 
steps to combat them. Unforeseen difficulties in the developing nations, not least the 
social and political tensions stimulated by the modernisation process, limited the 
implementation of this internationalist perspective. The newly independent nations would 
have to ensure national solidarity before they would be prepared to turn to the 
international level. UNESCO would return to this task later. Meanwhile, education for 
personal and social development would seek to transform familial and tribal loyalties into 
loyalties and responsibilities to wider social groups; it would promote a scientific view of 
the natural and social world; and it would tackle more specific problems associated with 
development such as adapting to rural-urban migration. 
 
Thus the inculcation of correct values via the school was seen as the way to turn mere 
growth into development. “In nations which have newly gained their independence it is 
important … that any advance in economic productivity be accompanied by a 
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development of those political skills and knowledges and those democratic and human 
ideals which will enable the people to assure not only the just distribution of the goods 
the economy produces but the widest availability of other social and human advantages 
which a modern economy makes possible.” (Hanson, 1964[1966]: 37) It is the task of 
education to inculcate those values that will be supportive of development's vision of the 
future. In the West this was enough, as economic growth was assumed to happen 
essentially automatically. In Africa it required, for the time being, more deliberate 
planning and so education also required a more explicit economic role. This economic 
role, however, was to produce administrators and managers – that is, people able to carry 
out development plans made elsewhere. 
 
Here too, reality did not live up to the plan. A major concern to Western observers was 
the proportion of school leavers who were unemployed. In Western Nigeria, for example, 
it was estimated in the early '60s that 650,000 of 800,000 school leavers were without 
work. This was closely related a theme current in the development literature at the time, 
namely, the revolution of rising frustrations. The theory went that closer contact with the 
West and their own first steps on the road to prosperity and democracy had whetted the 
appetite of people in the developing nations, who were starting to demand more than their 
economy was capable of providing. The expansion of education was now perceived to 
have contributed to these frustrations, as many school leavers had developed a disdain for 
the manual work done by their parents and sought managerial and administrative work in 
the cities. Those who were incapable of being absorbed by the modern sector remained in 
the city, unemployed and a growing source of social unrest.  
 
“The school leaver expects a higher standard of living than his farmer  
father, a better house, pure water and easy access to medical and other public services. 
He is willing to drive a tractor or a lathe, but can hardly be expected to respect the back-
breaking energies with meagre output yields, which are forced upon his father through 
lack of modern equipment. In other words, the boy whom the primary schools turn out is 
ready for an economy in which technological revolution is occurring rapidly, in 
agriculture as well as in urban occupations. So, when the primary schools turn out large 
numbers who are expected to accommodate themselves to a three-acres-and-a-hoe 
civilization, what can be expected but frustration and exasperation?” (UNESCO, 1961: 
11) 
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These problems led many to question how relevant the education system was to African 
society. This is one instance of the general problem faced by development theorists: how 
reconcile development process and developing people. The assumption underlying most 
criticisms of education in developing nations was that the schools, designed by 
Westerners, were attempting to transmit to the child an alien culture. This had served to 
uproot young people from their traditional environment while failing to secure for them a 
life in the modern sector. Siaka Stevens, president of Sierra Leone, noted in 1974 that 
“[t]he most serious danger which confronts us today as a people is the danger of losing 
our hold on our traditional past and heritage while we have not yet fully grasped the 
cultures and traditions presented to us. … Most of us are 'displaced persons' from the 
educational and cultural point of view.” Similarly, the participants at the 1961 Addis 
Ababa conference expressed concern that development as it existed was producing people 
“suspended between two worlds.” The solution was then to reform the education system 
so that it would be less Eurocentric and more relevant to the particular society's values 
and culture: 
 
“The leaders of education speaking of their countries’ needs, have stressed a second 
major aspect - the desire to accelerate the reorientation of the education patterns and 
systems to the economic and social needs of their individual areas. They wish to give 
proper stress in education at all levels and by all possible means to their own culture. As 
the students of Africa are exposed to the scientific and cultural aspects of the outside 
world, they need to be thoroughly grounded in a firm knowledge of their own cultural 
heritage. The education for the future citizen of Africa must be a modern African 
education.” (UNESCO, 1961: 3) 
These sentiments were not new. Contrary to the critics, education in the developing 
nations (and previously in the colonies) had long been designed on such lines. As far back 
as 1847 it had been argued by the Education Committee of the Privy Council that colonial 
education should include rural and agricultural studies, rather than simply imitating 
Britain's traditional liberal education. The recommendation was put into practice e.g. in 
Sierra Leone and the Gold Coast in the early 1880s. After WWI it was increasingly 
believed that the indigenous cultures in the colonies were valuable in themselves, and 
deserving of protection from Eurocentric influences. The concerns were precisely the 
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same as in the post-war years: young people caught between traditional and modern 
society, deserting their villages to fulfil their aspirations with white-collar jobs in the 
cities. The traditional societies they were leaving behind were fragile and in grave danger 
of being completely destroyed.  
 
The education system was identified as both cause and solution to this problem. In what 
would become a constant refrain of would-be education reformers, the existing system 
was said to be producing self-interested, materialistic individuals with no respect for the 
proper authorities, who, lacking any grounding in their own culture, blindly copied 
Western ways. “It was argued that the healthy modernisation of these societies required 
opportunities for them to evolve without losing their own identity, and that a reformed 
school and education system might serve to cement and strengthen those aspects of 
traditional societies which would enable them to adapt to change and to come to terms 
with the modern world through stable, integrated community progress” (Thompson, 
1981: 35). Thus in the Phelps-Stokes Fund's influential policy reports on education in 
Africa it was argued that “[t]he wholesale transfer of the educational conventions of 
Europe and America to the peoples of Africa has certainly not been an act of wisdom,” 
with its failures “traceable in part to the lack of educational adaptation to Native life.” 
The authors noted that complaints had been made by “[African] chiefs who have 
observed that their youth were stranged from their own people and no longer willing to 
cooperate in the life of their Native communities.” (1922: ch.2)  
 
The reports consequently defined three aims for education: “to render the individual 
more efficient in his or her condition of life”; “to promote the advancement of the 
community as a whole” (by, among other things, “the inculcation of true ideals of 
citizenship and service”); and, “the raising up of capable, trustworthy, public-spirited 
leaders of the people belonging to their own race” (in Thompson, 1981: 36). The idea 
was that education would act as a bridge between tradition and modernity. Modern values 
and knowledge would be taught in terms of tradition, by using the vernacular language, 
for example. Having been educated in modern ways in a manner that could be related to 
their own society, children thus educated would be able to return to that society, now 
capable of aiding in its further development. 
 
Governments throughout the developing world have tried to use education to reconcile 
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the modernisation effort with the preservation of traditional society and values. The 
question immediately becomes: who decides which aspects of traditional culture are 
worthy of preservation?  Certainly it could not “be left to the whims and caprices of 
individual choice” as it was put in Nigeria's Second National Development Plan, 1970-74 
(cited in Ekundare, 1971: 155). It was not for the individual to decide which of their 
traditions they value enough to preserve, in what form they should be preserved, and 
which might be left to slip away. The people were portrayed as either irrationally clinging 
to their development-inhibiting traditions or as so enamoured with Western ways that 
they were willing to discard their heritage entirely. The educated urban minority was 
regarded as self-seeking and materialistic, and disruptive of attempts to promote 
community development. The consequence of the need for education to be part of the 
nation's development plan – that is, its role in the promotion of a specific image of 
modernity – was that the type and amount of education on offer would have to be decided 
by those with the responsibility of determining the form the nation's development should 
take. Channelling Dewey, the former prime minister of Jamaica Michael Manley declared 
that education would always have some political purpose; it would be best if this function 
was planned by the proper authorities rather than left to chance. Because the concept of 
development has given 'modernity' a specific form, the 'traditional' is what currently is 
and the 'modern' is what must come into being. When attempting to reconcile tradition 
and modernity, therefore, only those aspects of tradition can be maintained that either do 
not impede or are directly conducive to attaining development. But equally, only those 
aspects of Western society that were conducive to development should be adopted. The 
adoption of Western ways by African youths was considered so deplorable not simply 
because they were abandoning their traditional heritage, but more specifically because 
they were abandoning that heritage in favour of those aspects of the West that, according 
to the concept of development, were not supposed to make it to 'modernity' – namely, 
values that were associated with self-seeking, materialistic individualism.   
 
Not surprisingly given this development-orientation, the schools soon reacquired the 
modern bias for which they had been criticised. While Hanson and Brembeck, (1966: 
309-310) argued that schools were seen as the “intersection point between the traditional 
and the modern” this is not to be seen as a synthesis of the two but rather as a stepping 
stone from one to the other: “schools in the developing countries represent the modern 
elements in the societies. They tend to teach modern rather than traditional values, and 
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teachers tend to represent 'city' rather than 'rural' modes of behaviour.” Schooling was 
made more 'relevant' to the indigenous culture, but in practice this was in order to make 
modernity seem more acceptable, as not so great a leap from the traditional world. Thus 
as we saw with the political modernisation theorists' attempts to incorporate an active 
developing people into the theory of development, education policy could ultimately not 
be about creating truly active participants but rather about creating people who would be 
more able to adapt to the demands of a development process that was necessarily beyond 
them. Section II.7 will return to education policy, looking at the approach pursued by 
UNESCO today and finding that it too, although it attempts to create active citizens, in 
fact produces reactive citizens. It will also explore how education conceptualised 
according to the idea of progress might form truly active individuals. 
 
I.10 – Conclusion 
We can see, at the end of Part I, why development defies definition. Sustainable 
development, equitable development, human development, economic growth: there are as 
many definitions of development as there are ends toward which society might be 
directed. The first half of this thesis has sought to identify something that gives the idea 
of development its distinctive contours but in no two approaches takes exactly the same 
shape. We found a more substantive conception of social change in which development is 
not desired as an end in itself, as it was in the idea of progress, but as a temporary and 
often unpleasant means to a higher end. The aim of development was to free people from 
the economic problem; a prerequisite in pursuit of their true end: the development of the 
higher faculties. The idea of development was originally a vision not of the West for 
others to follow but for the West. At its beginning is Mill's insistence that true individual 
self-development must involve the use of one's higher faculties. Running through 
development thinking is the Marshallian conception of scarcity as applicable only to 
'natural' wants, and his vision of a society in which those wants would be satiated, and 
mankind as a whole would be free to pursue true self-development. Keynes made more 
explicit the short-sightedness and corruption of those who had not yet reached this exalted 
stage, and emphasised the need for Society to wrest development from the hands of 
irrational forces within and without. When Keynes argued that rational individual action 
was in fact socially irrational, the tenuous link between progress and development was 
cut. 
 
 107 
The post-war development theorists whom we encountered in the second half of Part I 
had, as Gerschenkron (1952[1962]: 6) put it, grown modest. They no longer sought to 
“announce to the world what inevitably should, or at least what ideally should, happen.” 
But they inherited this vision of development. They looked back on the 19th century and 
its idea of progress with utter disdain, believing as they did that if the corresponding 
policies were enacted, the present inequality between rich and poor nations would only 
widen. What was needed, they believed, was a worldwide effort to achieve what the 
Western nations had been trying to do domestically. Having grown modest, however, 
they were well aware that the developed nations could not simply impose alien 
institutions and policies. If development was to occur, the developing people would have 
to be brought back into the process of development – a process from which they had been 
excluded, the modernisation theorists believed, by the old understanding of progress. 
From the Keynesian perspective, from the perspective of the concept of development, the 
concept of progress left social change and with it people to the mercy of unguided, 
uncontrollable (market) forces. The likes of Wilhelm von Humboldt certainly would not 
have seen things that way – and, for the most part, neither would Mill and Marshall. Quite 
the opposite: for them, true development could only be driven by rational individual 
action. Where Mill and Marshall depart from Humboldt is in their treatment of 
'barbarians' and the Residuum. Due to their more substantive conception of social change, 
neither deemed these lowest groups capable of that rational action by which the rest of 
society was able to produce development. It is this type of analysis, however, that forms 
the basis of development thinking. We argued in the section on Keynes that by removing 
the rational individual from its role as instigator of social change – that is, by 
disassociating the individually rational from the socially rational – Keynes in effect 
applied the analysis of the Residuum to the whole of society. Society could not, by its 
own unguided efforts, produce development outcomes. 
 
It was argued that this culminates in what we called call, after Georg Simmel's essay on 
'The concept and tragedy of culture', the tragedy of development. For Simmel, all 
progressive growth must involve forces that emerge both from within and without the 
individual. Self-development, or cultivation, is not just inner development (a seed 
growing into a wild tree) nor just external development (a tree trunk turned into ship's 
mast); rather, it is a combination of the two (a seed cultivated into orchard tree): The two 
aspects – internal and external – must fit with one another. However, in development 
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theory, the internal and external logics are separated by Keynes' removal of the rational 
individual from development. While both progress and development involve internal and 
external motive forces, it is the peculiar feature of development thinking that the two are 
in some sense seen as originally divided. Hence there is a need to integrate them 
somehow, to fit these opposing forces into a single mould. For Mill and Marshall, 
presupposing a society largely consisting of rational individuals, this reconciliation could 
in principle happen automatically, or at least with only a little prodding. For Keynes, who 
had little confidence in the progressive power of individuals, 'society' would have to 
become aware of its own social change if that change was to be positive. Development is 
self-conscious social change. 
 
Following the evolution of development theory into the post-war era, we argued that 
thinking in terms of the concept of development leads to a contradiction when one is 
called upon to put people first in development: development, if it is to be worthy of the 
positive connotations of that term, must be about people; yet the people themselves are 
not considered capable of producing social change worthy of the name development. 
Thus if social change is to proceed correctly – that is, according to the needs of the 
developing people – the developing people must remain remote from the process of 
development. The attempt to fit the developing people into a process of development that 
by its own assumptions excludes them, can be seen as the formative principle of 
development theory as it emerged in the post-war era. We have also seen how this 
theoretical struggle was similarly present in a major policy area: education. There too, 
one can see that practitioners recognised the inability of an existing external force – the 
modern institutional school, focused on development – to produce a modern, developed 
society. As was the case with the political modernisation school, we saw how genuine 
attempts to solve this problem, which here involved adjusting the school to local needs, 
ultimately reacquired the characteristics for which the new approach had criticised the 
old.  
 
Thus the problems of development do not lie in its ethnocentrism – even in modernisation 
theory, surely the most pro-Western of approaches – and moving the field beyond its past 
failures must involve more than remedying this aspect. In order to re-think the internal-
external problem it must be possible to avoid the dichotomy present in development 
thinking which says that social change is either deliberate (self-conscious) or unguided 
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(unconscious). In the next half of the thesis it will be argued that escaping the tragedy of 
development must involve reclaiming the active individual removed by Keynes. It will be 
argued that by doing so it is possible to think of positive social change as something that 
happens 'consciously,' and in the act look at the internal-external problem in a new light. 
The basis for this will be the concept of progress, from which development was initially 
differentiated. 
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Part II – Social Change as Progress 
 
“And so I hold it is no treason 
To advance this simple reason 
For the sorry lack of progress we decry. 
It is this: instead of working 
On himself, each man is shirking 
And trying to reform some other guy.” 
– Author unknown, 
cited in Read (1980: 52) 
 
“Obey time; do everything what the day calls for; do not be obstinate in keeping up what 
is collapsing, or too hasty in establishing what seems to announce itself. Remain faithful 
to justice, which belongs to all ages; respect liberty, which prepares every sort of good; 
let many things develop without you, and leave to the past its own defence, to the future 
its own accomplishment.”  
– Benjamin Constant (1815[1988]: 157) 
 
 
II.1 – Introduction 
So far in this thesis we have been looking at the conceptualisation of social change, 
particularly as it concerns the relationship between the internal and external aspects of 
change. Both are necessary for genuine growth, and, as mentioned in the Introduction, 
this thesis takes for granted that at least part of the external will consist in something 
already achieved or aspired to in the West. The great problem confronted by development 
theorists has been to reconcile the internal and external motive forces. In Part I it was 
argued that the concept of development, because it understands positive social change as 
something that happens self-consciously – in the sense that it posits that 'society' must 
take charge of its own growth – separates the two. The motifs of development come from 
the outside, formulate with reference to an end that does not fit the internal spirit. These 
motifs can be attached to a developing society but struggle to contribute, in the way 
intended, to its 'development.' While the modern institutional school, for example, did not 
fully fit African societies it was incorporated into those societies, interpreted and used in 
a way that conformed to the lifeways of the people involved, but it did not produce the 
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desired form of change. Development has its ways of trying to solve this problem – this is 
what mainstream development theory as it emerged in the post-war era is about. 
Development policies can be made more rational and efficient; the developing society 
itself can be made more adaptable to the demands of development; development policies 
can attempt to better approximate the developing society. But there remains the 
disconnect between how social change ought to proceed, according to development, and 
how it would proceed without the input and guidance of development policy. Thus the 
external products of development come to take on the appearance of an imposition with 
no genuine connection to the developing society. Development theory, with its focus on 
liberation, empowerment, and taking control of one's destiny, cannot abide this situation, 
leading to renewed attempts to bring 'the people' of the developing society back in to 
development. Development's raison d'etre as people-focused social change means it 
cannot ignore the problem, but its substantive conception of the social makes the problem 
ever-present. 
 
Part I will have hopefully contributed to a re-assessment of development theory away 
from caricatures portraying post-war development theory as an arrogant and blindly 
optimistic 'big tradition.' That interpretation sought not to absolve the post-war 
modernisation theory of its sins, but rather to alter our understanding of what it is in that 
approach that must be critically reconsidered if the field is to meaningfully move 'beyond 
the impasse.' The problem with the concept of development as a way of conceptualising 
social change is that while it does not ignore the importance of the motive forces internal 
to developing people (though it often stands accused of this), it cannot truly reconcile the 
internal and external because it cannot trust the developing people to move toward the 
end it has in mind. There is always an external object that seems more objectively perfect, 
from the higher vantage point of the developed, than any alternative visible to the 
developing. What an alternative to the concept of development would need (at least) is to 
be able account for how the internal and external forces, conceptually separated in 
development, can be reconciled – not reconciled after the fact, as development theories 
try to do, but from the beginning. This second part of the thesis attempts to contribute to 
this by putting forward a re-assessment of the internal-external problem. It rejects the idea 
that this should be considered the 'original' problem of social change, arguing that it 
appears so only according to social-change-as-development. Instead it uses primarily the 
work of German philosopher Ernst Cassirer (1923; 1932; 1942; 1944; 1946) to argue that 
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the division of internal and external is something to be found rather than overcome. In so 
doing it tries to move us beyond the dichotomies set up by development theory, 
particularly that between self-conscious (intentional, teleological) and unconscious 
(unintentional, blind) social change, pointing instead to a 'conscious' social change based 
on the re-assessment of the internal-external problem and arguing that the concept of 
progress, from which development was initially differentiated, can provide a basis for this 
understanding of social change. 
 
The argument proceeds as follows. The first section will use Part I to detail the alternative 
to development from the perspective of the concept of development itself, demonstrating 
that its 'self-conscious' social change is contrasted with an 'unconscious' alternative. 
Sections II.3 and II.4 consider and reject two attempts to rethink development – post-
development, which gives primacy to the internal, and the recent literature on hybridity, 
which seeks a middle-ground. Section II.5 argues that what is in fact needed is to reclaim 
the active individual removed by Keynes. It argues that by focussing on the individual as 
the mediator of the internal and the external, the societal-level teleology that characterises 
the concept of development can be dropped without fear that social change would be 
blind. Rather, social change can be analysed as something that is individually 
teleological. Moreover, the future-orientation of development can be replaced by a 
present-orientation without fear of conservatism. The next section argues that the concept 
of progress can form a theoretical foundation for this understanding of social change, 
making this case with reference to eighteenth century theorists of progress such as 
Ferguson, Hutcheson, Condorcet, and Humboldt. Section II.7 applies this to education 
policy, contrasting the future-orientation of modern education for development with the 
present-orientation of the proposed education for progress. In so doing it elaborates on the 
function of the active individual. The final section explores and addresses some of the 
implications as well as potential difficulties and critiques that would accompany applying 
this type of education in the modern world. 
 
II.2 – The Alternative to Development 
In the first half of the thesis we saw how alongside the debates within development 
studies – about the problem of the disassociation of people and process – there was a 
continued reinforcement of the distinctive identity of social-change-as-development. 
While there was no longer a prominent alternative to development such as the idea of 
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progress had represented, the basis upon which the two were initially differentiated was 
still how development studies justified its existence. Now contrasted with the perceived 
selfishness, materialism, and Darwinism of classical liberalism in general and the 
nineteenth century's experience with social change in particular, modernisation theorists 
were concerned at the appearance of these characteristics as developing nations sought to 
adopt Western ways. They believed it necessary to protect the developing world from this 
internal Eurocentrism, lest they experience the same slow, halting, and painful 
development of the West. Thus development theory saw itself as the guide and guardian 
of a cooperative endeavour of striving toward a developed world for all – a striving that 
both the popularly-called developed and underdeveloped countries are part of. By 
contrast, the alternative form of social change has been ascribed at least four key 
characteristics since Mill and Marshall distinguished their approach from the idea of 
progress. They are the opposite of those given to social-change-as-development: the 
Other is selfish/materialistic, Darwinian, Eurocentric, and conservative/cynical. This is 
the 'unconscious' social change that is set up by development theorists as the alternative to 
the 'self-conscious' social change promised by development. The present section will 
utilise the analysis of Part I to enunciate these characteristics in greater detail.  
 
The primary and overriding characteristic of the conceptualisation of social change from 
which development is attempting to distinguish itself from is its selfish and materialistic 
impulses. In all four periods in which this process of 'othering' was dominant, the then 
existing form of social was presented by development theorists as being solely motivated 
by selfishness and materialism. In Alfred Marshall this is evident in how he contrasts 
nineteenth century capitalism with his ideal of economic chivalry, which is to the existing 
competitive system what the chivalric code was to medieval warfare: 
 
“Chivalry in business includes public spirit, as chivalry in war includes unselfish loyalty 
to the cause of a prince, or of country, or of crusade. But it includes also a delight in 
doing noble and difficult things because they are noble and difficult. … It includes a 
scorn for cheap victories, and a delight in succoring those who need a helping hand. It 
does not disdain the gains to be won on the way, but it … esteems [them] mainly for the 
sake of the achievements to which they testify, and only in the second degree for the value 
at which they are appraised in the money of the market.” (1907[1925]: 330-1) 
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Competitive capitalism had carried civilisation as far as it could, but the individualistic 
and self-interested impulses it had unleashed and legitimised and which formed the basis 
of its success now prevented the emergence of a higher civilisation. The “sordid natures” 
of the money-obsessed nineteenth century businessman would have to be overcome, so 
that they would learn to play the game for lower stakes. Then, the profits spent on the 
vanity of the businessman - “which contributes very little towards social progress” - 
could be spent on the masses: 
 
“[T]here is a general agreement among thoughtful people … that if society could award 
the same honour, position, and influence by methods less bland and less wasteful; and if 
it could at the same time maintain all that stimulus which the free enterprise of the 
strongest business man derives from present conditions, then the resources thus set free 
would open out to the mass of the people new possibilities of a higher life, and of larger 
and more varied intellectual and artistic activities.” (1907[1925]: 325) 
 
Only if this economic chivalry could be taught to the populace could England “flourish 
under private enterprise.” Then and only then could “some other civilization than that 
which we can now conceive … take the place of that which now exists. It may, of course, 
be higher.” (1907[1925]: 346) Marshall recognises that his higher civilisation, in which 
the evils but not the prosperity of Western capitalism have been overcome, bears some 
resemblance to the future society envisaged by the collectivists of his day. But he makes 
clear that human nature is currently too corrupted by the existing system for any 
revolutionary change in the social order to succeed: “There is unfortunately no good 
ground for thinking that human nature is yet far enough from its primitive barbarity, 
selfishness, and sloth to be ready for any [rapid] movement in this direction...” (1925: 
366). A gradual improvement in human nature would be required to reach Marshall's 
ideal society. Marshall believed that there was greater potential for unselfish service than 
many realised, and it was “the supreme aim of the economist … to discover how this 
latent social asset can be developed most quickly, and turned to account most wisely.” 
(1920: I.I.23) 
 
Like Marshall, Keynes saw selfishness and materialism at the heart of social change as it 
existed. He argued that the ruling passion in the individualistic, capitalist society in which 
he lived was the 'money motive', which he described as a 'somewhat disgusting morbidity' 
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and a 'semi-criminal, semi-pathological propensity' which should be handed over to 'the 
specialists in mental disease.' He agreed with Marshall that the 'game' of capitalism ought 
to be played for lower stakes than at present – that true social progress would require 
society to overcome all that condoned and encouraged self-seeking activity (1936[1960]: 
374). Keynes described the moral problems of present society as: love of money; the 
dominance of the money motive; individual economic security as the highest good; the 
'hoarding instinct' as the means of providing for one's family. He saw in Soviet Russia the 
“first confused stirrings” of a non-supernatural social religion which would finally 
condemn these immoralities, a social experiment which “tries to construct a framework 
of society in which pecuniary motives as influencing action shall have a changed relative 
importance, in which social approbations shall be differently distributed, and where 
behaviour which was previously normal and respectable ceases to be either one or the 
other.” (1925b[1963]: 305, 302). 
 
In the post-war era too we find that the argument for 'development' rests in part on a 
portrayal of social change as otherwise being based on selfishness and materialism. David 
Apter, for example, warned that an unplanned social change effected by private 
entrepreneurs would result in mounting “social dysfunctionalities”. This is because 
people would be concerned with their own interests rather than the wider social 
consequences of their activities. It would be “at best a gambler's environment in which 
planning for the game takes second place to the overall consideration of winning.” (1971: 
197) According to Arthur Lewis, who was one the few modernisation theorists to write an 
explicitly normative justification of economic growth, counted increased 'economism' and 
'individualism' among the costs of growth, arguing that both would have to be limited if 
the desired benefits were to materialise (1955: Appendix). More recently, a UNESCO 
report on citizenship education argued that a deliberate inculcation of civic virtues was 
necessary because existing society is characterised by “a lack of cohesive spiritual and 
social values, and unrestricted acquisitiveness …; this ruling social passion is tied to a 
peculiar conception of 'freedom,' one shaped by highly individualist perceptions and 
impulses around crass indifference and materialism.” (Howe and Marshall, 1999: 11) 
 
The second characteristic of the threatening Other is a societal-level consequence of the 
selfish individual-level motivations guiding social change: it is presented as Darwinian, in 
the sense that the weak are left to the mercy of the strong who are set free to act on these 
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selfish and materialistic impulses. John Stuart Mill, for example, referred to the liberalism 
of his father as 'cold and uncaring' and characterised the society it had brought into being 
as one of “trampling, crushing, elbowing, and treading on each other's heels” (1848: IV: 
VI). Marshall (1925: 361) accused the Ricardian economists of a 'narrow dogmatism' 
when it came to free competition, and argued that they had created a society in which 
competition had become a 'huge untrained monster' that they had set free to 'run its 
wayward course'. This “old-fashioned individualism and laissez-faire” was again 
characterised as a system of “economic anarchy” (Keynes, 1925c[1963]: 329, 335). 
Keynes identified the uncertainty and lack of direction inherent in the present system as 
the source of the problem, and proposed instead the economic activity ought to be guided 
by considerations of social justice rather than individual whim, which would only 
perpetuate the present inequalities. For this the world needed a “new wisdom for a new 
age” (1925c[1963]: 337) which he provided in his General Theory (1936[1960]). 
 
The new wisdom was necessary because the old way had served to benefit the rich 
without providing them with an incentive to help the poor out of their vicious circle of 
poverty. Clearly it would not do for those who saw themselves as helping the poorer 
nations out of their present economic misery.  The approach of the “darwinist nineteenth 
century” was no longer acceptable (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943: 204). Post-war 
development theorists were particularly suspicious of the operation of the international 
economic system, where the economic anarchy that was being overcome within Western 
societies still reigned. Some had argued in the post-war era that the task of US foreign 
policy ought to be to recreate the world of nineteenth century Europe. But most 
modernisation theorists set themselves explicitly against the free trade liberalism of that 
era. It was believed that “the working of capitalism would maintain the same unequal 
world division of labour as has previously been enforced by imperial might” (Toye, 2006: 
829). Walt Rostow, reflecting on the motives of those who denied this, concluded that 
most simply did not care about the future of poorer nations (Rostow, 1984: 245-7). David 
Apter saw the international system a “hit and miss, private and public pattern of 
manipulative and exploitative aid” which, despite the best efforts of multilateral agencies, 
rendered it “essentially hostile” (1971: 204n, 46). He described it as “the repugnant 
purveyor of anti-humanism” (1971: 201). It was not 'development,' for, as Thomas 
Balogh (1966[1974]: 130) put it, its defenders “decried the motives of deliberately 
helping the poor” and would leave them to their fate as the plaything of powerful market 
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forces. True development policies would have to protect the poor from the selfish and 
materialistic impulses that still existed.  
 
A third characteristic of the threatening Other is that it is Eurocentric. It is presented as 
being derived in theory from the Western experience and imposed in practice as a 
template for the non-Western world to follow. Alfred Marshall (1890[1925]: 257-8), for 
example, accused the Ricardian economists' support for free trade of being based on an 
unwarranted universalisation of the English experience. And post-war development 
theorists argued that people like P.T. Bauer were promoting “a projection for the whole 
world of a conception of change that was believed, erroneously, to be true of the societies 
of Western Europe” (Black, 1966:7). Today, we are quite used to hearing that the old 
approaches to and theories of development – from colonialism to post-war modernisation 
to neoliberalism – were Eurocentric. Yet the unquestioned acceptance of this account 
obscures the fact that those development theorists saw themselves as providing a bulwark 
against Eurocentrism. Thus Daniel Lerner wrote his The Passing of Traditional Society 
(1958[1966]) in opposition to existing methods of development which he believed sought 
to impose Western models on non-Western societies. Despite the title of his book, Lerner 
did not believe that development was a process of the Traditionals gradually coming to 
accept the ideals and institutions of the modern, Westernised elites, asserting that “[t]here 
is no uniform Tomorrow just as there was no single Yesterday” (1958[1966]: 74). For 
society and its institutions to change in compatible ways the gulf between modern and 
traditional would have to be bridged.  This could be achieved neither by the Traditionals, 
nor the Westernised Moderns. To Lerner, both were ‘relatively static,’ and neither could 
produce social change that would be compatible with the ‘personality matrix’ of the other. 
The Moderns were trying to provide the developing society with an impulse that was 
completely external to it, while the Traditionals clung on to their society's old ways. The 
future lay with a class Lerner named the ‘Transitionals,’ who seek new channels of their 
own design that the already-modern elites fail to provide for them. They are the middle 
class that unites top and bottom, interpreting and adapting foreign models and influences 
in a way that is acceptable to their own preconceptions and relevant to the challenges 
faced by their own society (1958[1966]: 101; 410).  
 
Later theorists took a similar view: that the Western experience was useful in a very 
broad sense, but that developing countries must decide for themselves which parts to 
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adopt, adapt, and reject. They must “have the wisdom to distinguish between the 
generally applicable functions of modernity and the institutional forms derived from alien 
traditions...” (Black, 1966:97). The modernisation theorists were far more clear and in far 
greater agreement about which aspects of the West ought to be rejected than which ought 
to be adapted or adopted by the developing nations. The latter were largely at the 
discretion of the particular developing nation; the former were threatening to social-
change-as-development wherever it occurred. To be rejected were of course the values 
and practices associated with social change that was not development – represented again 
by selfishness and materialism. Throughout the modernisation literature these are 
presented as constant dangers of the development process; they could be kept in check 
with the help of the knowledge created by development theorists. Modernisation theorists 
argued that this threatening Other would, if it wasn't for the protection afforded by the 
development industry, sweep away all valued patterns of life that were not conducive to 
growth. Development theorists and practitioners have always seen it as part of their task 
to protect indigenous peoples and cultures from destruction by the pernicious influence of 
Western ways of life. As we saw above, one of the costs of economic growth identified 
by Arthur Lewis (1955: Appendix) was an increase in 'economism' and individualism. If 
these were set free, as they would be without proper development policies, a country's 
'valued patterns of life' would be threatened from within, by an internal Eurocentrism. 
These individualistic Western values led young people to abandon their fragile traditional 
villages and cultures to seek white-collar jobs in the cities. This educated urban minority 
was regarded as self-seeking and materialistic, and disruptive of attempts to promote 
community and national development. Disconnected from their traditions, these displaced 
persons could not hope to be the engine of true development. 
 
Finally, the alternative to development is conservative of the existing system, with all its 
inequalities and miseries, and cynical of the possibility of promoting change. Alfred 
Marshall criticised the Ricardian economists for unduly limiting the role of the state. 
Under them, laissez-faire was “twisted to mean: - Let government keep up its police, but 
in other matters fold its hands and go to sleep” (1907[1925]: 334). According to Marshall 
(1907[1925]: 335) it was John Stuart Mill who had first challenged this: “Mill had seen a 
vast increase in the probity, the strength, the unselfishness, and the resources of 
Government during his life; and it seems that each succeeding decade had enlarged the 
scope of those interventions of Government for the promotion of general well-being.” The 
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state was now more able to determine where it could do good, and had the resources and 
public-spiritedness to put its schemes effectively into practice for the common good. 
“Thus we can now safely venture on many public undertakings which a little while ago 
would have been technically unworkable or which would have probably been perverted 
by the selfish and corrupt purposes of those who had the ear of government.” The selfish 
world created by the Ricardian economists was – due to its own success – being 
overcome, such that society could now deliberately work towards a common good. “So I 
cry 'Laissez-faire: - Let the State be up and doing.'” (1907[1925]: 336)  
 
Yet for to Keynes, the watchwords of the British government in his day remained 
“Negation, Restriction, Inactivity. … Under their leadership we have been forced to 
button up our waistcoats and compress our lungs. Fears and doubts and hypochondriac 
precautions are keeping us muffled up indoors” (1929[1963]: 125). Keynes' new wisdom 
required a more optimistic outlook: “There is no reason why we should not feel ourselves 
free to be bold, to be open, to experiment, to take action, to try the possibilities of things. 
And over against us, standing in the path there is nothing but a few old gentlemen tightly 
buttoned-up in their frock coats, who only need to be treated with a little friendly 
disrespect and bowled over like ninepins” (1929[1963]: 125). Modernisation theorists 
similarly argued that the old way was too “slow [and] halting” and “unlikely to be 
satisfying” (Pearson, 1970: 7; Singer, 1949). Like Marshall and Keynes they presented 
themselves as occupying a middle-ground between the unguided social change envisaged 
by liberal economists such as P.T. Bauer, and the revolutionary social change advocated 
by socialists. The former would maintain the status quo, the latter would not produce 
lasting, stable change. Thus according to Rostow: “The central task of an effective 
political leader consists in narrowing the gap between the status quo and the theoretical 
optimum dynamic political equilibrium position, without destroying the leader's 
underlying basis of political support or the constitutional system itself...” (1971: 25). 
 
In conclusion, development theory defines itself in opposition to an alternative form of 
social change to which it ascribes threatening and undesirable characteristics: selfishness, 
materialism, individualism, Eurocentrism, social Darwinism, cynicism. This form of 
social change is presented as what would exist without the protection of the development 
industry. As Rostow claimed with respect to the development industry's work on the 
international scene: “in an inherently divisive, world, with ample capacity to generate 
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international violence, institutionalized development aid has been perhaps the strongest 
tempering force, quietly at work, giving some operational meaning to the notion of a 
human community with serious elements of common interest” (1984: 258). Development 
is of course a form of social change that is the opposite of these things. It is motivated by 
altruism, not selfishness; community spirit, not individualism; normative values, not crass 
materialism; concern for the poor, not social Darwinism; it respects traditional cultures, 
rather than simply imposing Western ways; and it is optimistic, not cynical. In short, it 
helps people rather than leaving them to their fate. Development is society becoming 
aware of it its own change and taking control of its destiny. How can its alternative be 
anything other than unconscious: haphazard and directionless? The next three sections 
will consider alternatives from outside the development paradigm. First, a prominent 
alternative to development in post-development; then, hybridity, an emerging approach. 
Finally in section II.5 it will be argued that with the help of the active individual we can 
find an alternative to the self-conscious social change of development not in  
'unconsciousness' but in a 'conscious' understanding of social change. 
 
II.3 – Beyond the Tragedy of Development I: Post-Development 
According to Kothari and Minogue (2002: 7), post-development differs from 
conventional critiques of development in that it focuses on the basic concepts underlying 
the development discourse: “Our starting point, which diverges from that of those who 
analyze the failure of development in terms of factors external to the ideas/concepts of 
development, is that the problems of development theory and practice are firmly located 
within the dominant, almost universal ideologies that have long been shaped and 
continue to inform development theory, policy, and practice.” Development promotes a 
vision of reality that purports to be universal but is in fact peculiar to the West. The 
peoples of the Third World must reclaim their own histories and lifeways by removing 
the dead hand of development theory and practice. By doing so they would cease to be 
the object of development theory and become instead the subjects of their own story. 
However, the reader will recall from previous sections of this thesis that modernisation 
theorists considered the adaptation of general theories and experiences of development to 
particular contexts vital if people and their institutions were to modernise together. In this 
section it will be argued that by not fully appreciating this post-development fails to move 
us beyond development. The source of this failure will be found not in the content of the 
critique but in the rhetorical strategy used to effect the desired change. By portraying 
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Western knowledge as a rigid form imposed upon a relatively passive Third World, the 
post-development critique does disservice both to the modernisation theorists and to the 
Third World itself. Indeed, in the critiques of the most influential post-development 
theorists the Third World appears more passive and more helpless than ever, and the 
dichotomies they found at the heart of mainstream development more rigidly divided. 
 
The focus in Edward Said's influential Orientalism (1978[1995]), for example, is on how 
the discourse of Orientalism is produced and imposed rather than how it is received or 
interpreted or adapted in the Orient itself. Said, we saw above, criticised Orientalism for 
being exterior to its object – the Orient. The Orientalist is always “outside the Orient, 
both as an existential and moral fact” (1978[1995]: 21). This exteriority allows 
Orientalists to view their object as an object, as a thing to be observed, analysed, 
categorised, and judged. According to Said, this type of knowledge is governed by the 
assumption that the Orient cannot represent itself. In the act of knowledge production, 
Orientalism created an Orient that was “silent, available to Europe for the realization of 
projects that involved but were never responsible to the native inhabitants, and unable to 
resist the projects, images, or mere descriptions devised for it” (1978[1995]: 94). The 
aim was to create an Orient where “'we' might inscribe our own future there and impose 
our own forms of life for those lesser people to follow” (1978[1995]: xiii). In critiques 
such as Said's, the production of a discourse under conditions of unequal power seems to 
imply the complete passivity of the weaker party. Mohanty called this the 'colonialist 
move,' which “entails specific constructions of the colonial/Third World subject 
in/through discourse in ways that allow the exercise of power over it” (in Escobar, 1996: 
9). The discourse of development is constructed in the West with no influence from 
outside it, either in theory or in practice. Orientalism, argued Said, merely seeks to 
confirm the prejudices of the reader rather than overturn old prejudices, such that in 
hundreds of years of Orientalist discourse it is “Western ignorance that becomes more 
refined and complete, not some body of positive Western knowledge which increases in 
size and accuracy”2 (1978[1995]: 62-65). Empirical data thus plays a very small role in 
the production of the discourse: the discourse merely refers to and reproduces itself.  
 
 
2  Incidentally, the source Said uses to back up this remarkable claim actually affirms the complete 
opposite. R.W. Southern's Western Views of Islam (1962) concludes: “Was there any progress [in Christian 
knowledge of Islam]? I must express my conviction that there was.” 
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However, that one can produce knowledge in a way that makes the domination and 
manipulation of the object possible does not imply that one actually ought to dominate 
and manipulate, nor does it imply that the knowledge must be interpreted as making 
domination and manipulation possible. Yet for Said the two are necessarily inseparable: 
Orientalism does not merely express a will to dominate the Orient, it is that will. The 
knowledge that constructs the Orient as silent and passive is thus intertwined with 
imperialistic practices which both act on Orientalist knowledge and confirm it. In Said, 
the Orient is no more capable of resisting or adapting Western practices in the Orient 
itself than it is of resisting or adapting the knowledge produced far away in the West. 
Thus he writes that since Napoleon the Orient “has been made and remade countless 
times by power acting through an expedient form of knowledge to assert that this is the 
Orient's nature, and we must deal with it accordingly” (1978[1995]: 65). The non-
Western world is silent and helpless in the theory they critique, but in the critique it also 
becomes silent and helpless in practice. This seems odd from a critique that wanted to 
question the West's view of itself as the source of agency. Scholars such as Said and 
Escobar uncover dichotomies and power relations underlying the development discourse, 
but they remain eternal and fixed. Instead of destroying or moving beyond development's 
dichotomies, they switch the sides associated with good and bad – a process Hicks (2004) 
has termed 'reversing Thrasymachus' after the Greek philosopher who asserted that might 
makes right. On Hicks' analysis, that assertion simply becomes 'might makes wrong': the 
West remains the sole source of agency, but its role is maleficent rather than beneficent. 
The post-development critique mirrors its object. This, we would argue, was a deliberate 
strategy adapted from Foucault. 
 
For Foucault the passive Third World of the post-development critique would not be a 
power relationship in the way he understands the term. “If one or the other were 
completely at the disposition of the other and became his thing, an object on which he can 
exercise an infinite and unlimited violence, there would not be relations of power. In 
order to exercise a relation of power, there must be on both sides at least a certain form 
of liberty” (Foucault, 1987: 123). Power relations are human relations, and although the 
aim is to influence the behaviour of the other their key feature is that they are 
“changeable, reversible, and unstable.” For both subjects there is the possibility of 
altering the relationship, and neither has the ability to unconditionally direct the 
behaviour of the other. However, “[I]t seems to me that we must distinguish the 
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relationships of power as strategic games between liberties – strategic games that result 
in the fact that some people try to determine the conduct of others – and the states of 
domination, which are what we ordinarily call power.” These states of domination are 
power relations in which power has become solidified on one side in such a way that the 
relationship is “perpetually asymmetrical.” It is the task of philosophy to prevent this 
hardening of power relations (Foucault, 1987: 130, 123). 
 
Foucault once said the he had “never written anything but fictions.” (1980: 193) The 
standard interpretation of this is that Foucault dramatises a world that he believes is in 
fact infiltrated with solidified power relations and bio-power. However, Johnson (1997) 
and Hoy (1986) have both argued that Foucault was actually following a “rhetorical 
strategy of exaggeration aimed at establishing a critical perspective from which he 
assesses modern social and political arrangements” (Johnson, 1997: 574). For them, 
Foucault's fictions are deliberate misrepresentations, depicting a world fully permeated by 
the states of domination he would have us struggle against. In reading his genealogies, 
says Foucault (1979: 139), “we must seek not a meaning, but a precaution.” His fictions 
are dystopias, serving as a warning of what is to come if we do not recognise certain 
types of power relations for what they are. Writes Hoy (1986: 14): “Foucault paints the 
picture of a totally normalized society not because he believes our present society is one, 
but because he hopes we will find the picture threatening. He could hope for this effect on 
us only if we have not been completely normalized.” Thus by exaggerating the extent to 
which our society is characterised by states of domination rather than fluid relationships 
of power, Foucault's critique attempts to alert the reader to the processes of solidification. 
It is only when power relations become states of domination that they become 
normatively undesirable. No power relationship itself, however, is inherently undesirable; 
that would imbue the relationship with the type of fixed essence that Foucault believes do 
not exist. Nor is the problem an inequality of power. Rather, the issue is an inequality of 
power that is fixed on one side of the relationship. So long as the balance of power 
remains fluid, the relationship can be reciprocal. Thus on the teacher-student relationship 
he says: 
 
“I don’t see where evil is in the practice of someone who, in a given game of truth, 
knowing more than another, tells him what he must do, teaches him, transmits knowledge 
to him, communicates skills to him. The problem is rather to know how you are to avoid 
 124 
in these practices – where power cannot not play and where it is not evil in itself – the 
effects of domination which will make a child subject to the arbitrary and useless 
authority of a teacher, or put a student under the power of an abusively authoritarian 
professor, and so forth.” (1987: 129) 
 
Similarly for concepts such as madness. Foucault does not claim that madness does not 
exist, or that the existence of the concept reveals the power of the not-mad over the mad: 
“It was a question of knowing how madness, under the various definitions that we could 
give it, could be at a certain moment, integrated in an institutional field which considered 
it a mental illness, occupying a certain place alongside other illnesses” (1987: 128). 
Madness has been linked to institutions and practices of power, but it is not the same as 
them. Revealing the power relations underlying a certain conceptualisation of madness 
does not, for Foucault, undermine the validity or efficacy of psychiatry. Rather, it shows 
us how a particular definition of the borders of madness came into being and how it is 
maintained. Consistent with the Foucauldian strategy, post-development does not deal 
with its object of critique on its own terms. It does not say in any detail that 
modernisation or neoliberalism were incorrect as theories. Writes Escobar: “The aim … is 
not to decide whether the early development economists were right or wrong, but to 
develop a historical, epistemological, and cultural awareness of the conditions under 
which they made their choices” (1996: 58). For Foucault, this style of critique would 
attempt to undermine the processes by which a certain definition of a concept comes to be 
regarded as 'natural,' or by which a power relationship solidifies.  
 
The use Said and Escobar had in mind for Foucault's critical strategy, however, is subtly 
different: for them, the very existence of developmental concepts is evidence of the power 
of the West over the non-West (e.g. Escobar, 1996: 8-9) and consequently they wanted to 
abolish the development discourse. Where Foucault wanted us to question the definitions 
we regard as natural and fixed, the aim of post-development was to have us question the 
definitions of development concepts but as a direct consequence of that questioning to 
reject certain definitions from the bounds of acceptable discourse. More specifically, the 
definitions of Western capitalist society were not permitted to enter the future 
conversation that would shape the post-developmental world.  
 
This explains why post-development returned to the dichotomies it claimed to have 
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uncovered in the mainstream development discourse. For a Foucauldian analysis on its 
own would not imply anything about the validity, normative desirability, or chances of 
success of development theory and practice. It would provide no grounds for rejecting the 
development discourse – unless one could show that it involved a state of domination, 
that is, a fixed and therefore normatively undesirable power relationship. Rather than 
Foucault's cautionary tale of power relations solidifying into states of domination, post-
development's critique would have to claim to represent the reality of a world actually 
infiltrated with states of domination. Portraying the development discourse as a state of 
domination requires antagonistic, incommensurable, monolithic entities. Thus the 
relationship between West and non-West would have to be fixed and rigid rather than 
changeable and fluid – it had to be inextricably linked with imperialism, racism, and so 
on. It had to be shown to be constant over time – the longer the better. Its origins had to 
be in an expression of Western power over the non-Western world, regardless of how it 
was conceived by the actual individuals involved. Western modernity could ultimately 
not be seen as one culture among many. It was portrayed instead as a culture inherently 
prone to the destruction of other cultures. Western capitalist society is, in Serge 
Latouche's (1989[1996]: ch.2) phrasing, an anti-culture.  
 
Moreover, the development discourse itself could not just be something that has become 
linked with power in colonialism and racism and domination – implying that it could be 
de-linked – but something that is those things. They would have to be irreversibly built in 
to the development discourse. The development discourse could not just been seen as one 
discourse among many on the subject of social change. It had to be portrayed as an 
inherently imperialistic discourse that actively delegitimised other ways of thinking. Thus 
Escobar (1996: 5): “Reality … had been colonized by the development discourse, and 
those who were dissatisfied with this state of affairs had to struggle for bits and pieces of 
freedom within it, in the hope that in the process a different reality could be constructed.” 
Just as Western culture is an anti-culture, so the development discourse is a conversation-
stopping anti-discourse. 
 
In this way the strategy of exaggeration, which was for Foucault just that – a strategy – 
becomes in post-development a constituent part of the critique, without which it could not 
hope to achieve its aim of bringing an end to the development discourse. This required 
portraying development as being part of a power relationship that was inherently and 
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significantly biased toward the dominant side. The power of the West over the Third 
World, through the development discourse, was thus exaggerated to the point that all 
agency is removed from the latter. The relationship itself is given, fixed, eternal. It cannot 
be modified, only destroyed. 
 
It was argued in Part I that modernisation theorists did not see themselves as engaged in a 
one way street, with development knowledge being created in the West and implemented 
elsewhere by Western practitioners. Rather, it was explicitly recognised that any insights 
regarding the development process derived from the Western experience or created using 
Western categories would have to be adapted to particular contexts elsewhere. Moreover, 
it was the job of leaders in the developing nations to enact this process of adopting, 
adapting, or rejecting these insights. This is vitally important to the self-perception of 
development theorists, yet it is completely obscured in the post-development critique. The 
supreme power of the development discourse over the minds of individual theorists and 
practitioners means that, in the post-development critique, their identities and interests are 
finally reduced to those of one of the two monolithic universal categories that post-
development finds at the heart of the problem s of the development discourse: West and 
Third World. Where Foucault had said that a discourse becomes linked with institutions 
and practices of power, post-development, we saw, elides the two. What knowledge is 
created and how knowledge is used become conflated. Because the focus is a power 
relationship, post-development's critique is most interested in what power does with 
knowledge. Though it aims to analyse the relations between institutions, knowledge, 
socio-economic processes, technologies etc., there is often a failure to distinguish 
adequately between them. Everything is condensed into a single unit. The analysis of this 
unit is diverted toward the end user – power – and the individual elements are 
retrospectively judged based on this perception.  
 
Starting and ending with the West-Rest dichotomy in this way strengthens it, as Said 
(1978[1995]: 46) himself pointed out in his critique of the working of the Orientalist 
discourse: “When one uses categories like Oriental and Western as both the starting 
points and the end points of analysis, research, public policy (as the categories were used 
by Balfour and Cromer), the result is usually to polarize the distinction – the Orient 
becomes more Oriental, the Westerner more Western – and limit the human encounter 
between cultures, traditions, and societies.” The oppositional nature of the post-
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development strategy led them to approach those associated with post-war development 
in particular in a manner that Foucault may have described as polemical. For the 
polemicist, “the person he confronts [in a discourse] is not a partner in the search for the 
truth, but an adversary an enemy who is wrong, who is harmful and whose very existence 
constitutes a threat. For him, the game does not consist of recognizing this person as a 
subject having the right to speak, but of abolishing him, as interlocutor, from any possible 
dialogue; and his final objective will be, not to come as close as possible to a difficult 
truth, but to bring about the triumph of the just cause he has been manifestly upholding 
from the beginning” (Foucault, 1984[1991]: 382). In post-development the development 
theorist cannot speak, having no intentions or motivations of their own, except as 
determined by the interests of the West in its relation with the developing world. 
 
Although this rhetorical and reductionist side of post-development has been criticised, the 
criticism tends to be that it reduces all the various approaches to development theory and 
practice to the power of West over non-West. Interpreting approaches such as sustainable 
development and pro-poor growth based on the analysis modernisation theory and 
neoliberalism results, it is argued, in an unfair appraisal of the former: post-development 
did not appreciate the diversity of the development discourse. On the interpretation of this 
thesis this reduction to Western power is also a distortion of modernisation theory, yet the 
post-development critique is the basis upon which that much maligned approach is 
rejected. Post-development's insights that the modernisation approach homogenised the 
Third World, that it regarded development as inevitable, that the West was the telos of 
development – all of which we would reject – are now part of the consensus interpretation 
of post-war development theory and policy.  
 
Thus according to Nederveen Pieterse (2001a: 8-22), modern development theory has 
been fundamentally homogenising and generalizing. “Those who declare themselves 
furthest advanced along its course claim privileged knowledge of the direction of change. 
Developmentalism is the truth from the point of view of the centre of power”. (2001a: 18) 
He writes: “The central thesis of developmentalism is that social change occurs 
according to a pre-established pattern, the logic and direction of which is known.” The 
theory is teleological – the destination is modernity, which is a universalisation of 
Western values and ways of life. “Modernization meant the adoption of 'Western' 
political institutions” or more precisely, those of “the American and French Revolutions, 
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updated in American discourse such that the United States emerges as the culmination of 
the 'the West'.” Modernisation theory, moreover, was about American power: “What 
Victorian anthropology was to the British Empire, modernization is to United States 
hegemony – its justification, rationale and agenda.” Development, in the post-war years, 
was the “ideologization” of the West's – or America's – own path of development. That 
modernisation theory was fundamentally ideological – in the Marxist sense of a 
rationalisation of certain structures and interests – is largely taken for granted. “Grand 
theories have typically been fashioned in the West and therefore articulate Western 
political interests and follow Western intellectual styles and priorities...” (cf. Mehmet, 
1995[1999]).  
 
Note that the aspects of the post-development critique that have entered the mainstream 
discourse are those that we have broadly associated with the rhetorical strategy of the 
critique. We argued above that things like the conceptualisation of poverty and education 
in the development discourse were of greater concern: how those conceptualisations came 
into being is in principle quite independent of the analysis of their real-world, present day 
consequences. What makes a universal category bad for post-development it is the very 
fact that it is universal, which is always a universalisation of the local. For post-impasse 
theorists, on the other hand, what matters is precisely how the universal came into being. 
Was it imposed unilaterally, or was it created pluralistically? Post-development, it is now 
said, was correct in its assertion that the supposedly universal truths of Western capitalist 
modernity were a “veil of Western ethnocentrism” but wrong to conclude that universals 
therefore cannot exist. Rather, “the question of what is universal is to be posed anew, not 
in Eurocentric but in polycentric ways” (Nederveen Pieterse, 2001a: 30).  
 
The end result is not a rejection of developmentalism but a disassociation from the 
modernisation paradigm. The critique of development is accepted, but in a way that 
allows it to be associated primarily with modernisation theory. This sets modernisation 
theorising apart from post-impasse theorising, regardless of the policy outcome. Thus in 
Nederveen Pieterse's (2012) distinction between 20th century and 21st century 
globalisation it is the source of rational intention (the West, as identified by post-
development), rather than its existence, that was the problem in modernisation theory. In 
the outdated, 20th century conception of development, he argues, “implicitly or explicitly, 
development is thought of as an external intervention. The root paradigm is not ‘we 
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develop’ but ‘we develop it’." However, since the turn of the millennium a new 
development era has begun, which involves, among others, a “change in the agency of 
development from metropolitan institutions to developing countries, along with a shift in 
perspective from ‘we develop it’ to ‘we develop’” and a “pendulum swing from market 
forces back to developmental states” (Nederveen Pieterse, 2012: 7, 5). Of course, the 
developmental state is still conceived as rational force called upon to “steer, push, cajole, 
persuade, entice, coordinate and at times instruct the wide range of economic agents and 
their groupings to go this way instead of that, to do this and not that” (Leftwich, 2000: 7; 
2005; 2008). Now, however, it is indigenous, as opposed to a development guided by 
Western technocrats. Is it, therefore, not internal to the developing society?  
 
Yet this is not what Cowen and Shenton (1996) had in mind when they spoke of 
'immanence'. The developmental state is not part of 'we develop'; rather, it lies at the very 
heart of 'we develop it'. For the idea of development, as was argued in Part I, did not 
originate in the West's relation with the rest of the world, but within itself. Development 
began with the state acting upon its own society; only later did it become associated with 
the West acting upon the non-Western world. It is precisely this focus, in post-
development's critique, on the West versus non-West relationship that permits the 
impression that post-impasse development might have moved beyond the post-war 
modernisation era. It permits the conclusion that the problem with development in that era 
was the wrong kind of intention. Nederveen Pieterse's (2012: 7) interpretation of Cowen 
and Shenton's (1996) distinction between immanent and intentional development is 
symptomatic of this. His 'we develop' and 'we develop it' are both intentional; the 
difference between them is the source of the force attempting to provide rational 
direction. The implication, as we saw with political modernisation versus economic 
modernisation and economic modernisation versus the 'darwinian nineteenth century,' is 
that an intentional development that is truly concerned with people, rather than merely 
claiming to be so, is the answer.  
 
How past development theorists actually saw their own role as knowledge-creators is, 
however, of little relevance to the post-development critique, except as it fits the West 
and non-West dichotomy. Consequently, post-development critics did not recognise how 
well the rhetorical part of their critique fit – rather than challenged – development's view 
of its self. The Foucauldian strategy was to produce threatening images of Westernised 
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social change – yet that is precisely how the concept of development was distinguished 
from the idea of progress. Their portrayal and assessment of Western modernity is more 
polemical but ultimately little different to that given by many modernisation theorists and 
by Mill, Marshall, and Keynes before them. Both sides agree that Western capitalist 
society is something to be overcome – the difference of opinion lies in whether it can and 
should be temporarily controlled for developmental purposes. As Frans Schuurman 
(2000: 19) put it, the task of development is studies is now to “re-establish its continued 
relevance to study and to understand processes of exclusion, emancipation and 
development – not particularly by clinging to its once treasured paradigms but by 
incorporating creatively the new Zeitgeist without giving up on its normative basis, i.e. 
the awareness that only with a universal morality of justice is there is a future for 
humanity.”  
 
To this task post-development was singularly ill-suited. It denies both the possibility of 
the universal normative basis of social-change-as-development and the possibility of 
intentional social change. Development studies has taken on board its critical insights, 
now recognising that “the rulebook for developing countries must be written at home, not 
in Washington” (Rodrik, 2008a). Similarly, “[t]he idea that there should be a single 
forward path and development model lies well behind us” (Nederveen Pieterse, 2012: 8). 
There is still a role for Western advisers, but they can only provide the ingredients, not 
the recipe. Scholars can sift through Western history to determine which aspects of it are 
universal and which the products of historical contingency, and developing nations must 
decide for themselves – within limits – what to adopt, adapt, and reject: a 'selective 
globalization' as Nederveen Pieterse puts it. The new development will ask what kind of 
growth, rather than pursuing growth for its own sake (2000: 12; Rodrik, 2008b).  
 
These elements of the new development era – the need for the state to turn mere growth 
into development, the need for developing nations to be protected from Western 
economic and social influence, the fear that economic liberalism would perpetuate 
inequality domestically and globally, the recognition that Western values and models 
cannot be adopted wholesale, the need for those models to be adapted by the developing 
nation itself, the consequent role of Western advisers as conducive to rather than 
prescriptive of development – all these elements, we have argued, went into the 
production of modernisation theories. Post-development's critique of modernisation as no 
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more than a projection onto the rest of the world of Western values and history has hidden 
these aspects of that paradigm, allowing them to be brushed under the rug as having a 
'disingenuous quality'. This incomplete picture of modernisation gives our present 
development era a sense of 'newness' that it does not deserve. 
 
The next section turns to hybridity, an approach coming to development theory from 
peace studies that recognises the return to dichotomies problem contained in many 
alternatives to dominant liberal models. Instead it explicitly seeks a middle-ground, 
making it potentially attractive as a way of moving beyond the failures of twentieth 
century development without giving up on its normative aspirations.  
 
II.4 – Beyond the Tragedy of Development II: Hybridity 
Many existing critiques of the modernisation approach in particular have focused on its 
use of temporal metaphors such as 'catching up,' according to which the West is placed at 
the pinnacle of a linear path of development and the developing world is distant from it in 
time. Walter Mignolo, tracing time-according-to-development back to the colonial era, 
has called it a 'denial of coevalness.' That is, the act of denying that the underdeveloped 
world occupies the same point in time as the developed: to be modern and developed is to 
be in the present; to be traditional and underdeveloped is to be in past. That the West has 
been thought of as more advanced than other parts of the world is undeniable, but the idea 
that existing Western capitalist society or the means by which it came into existence are 
to be emulated does not come through in our reading of development theory's history. 
Instead we have argued that the key to understanding development theory lies in its 
conceptual separation of the internal and external forces of social change and its 
recognition that they must nevertheless be reconciled. This separation is spatial rather 
than temporal. This section will argue that spatial metaphors are limiting, as they fail to 
capture the mutual dynamism of the internal-external relationship. The argument shall be 
made with reference to hybridity, an emerging approach that seeks to overcome the 
dichotomous conceptions of the local and the international found in both proponents and 
critics of liberal peace and development interventions. 
 
Hybridity scholars such as Mac Ginty (2010, 2011), Mac Ginty and Sanghera (2012), 
Richmond (2010, 2011), Johnson and Hutchison (2012), and Peterson (2012) speak of an 
emerging consensus on the inadequacies of “liberal models of externally led peace and 
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development assistance” as well as “a growing recognition that critiques of these models 
are also saddled with a number of their own limitations … including their tendency to 
homogenise practices and impacts of aid and to offer only critique as opposed to 
alternatives” (Peterson, 2012: 9; Richmond, 2011). As with post-development, so with 
these critiques of liberal peace-building: Mac Ginty (2011: 6) argues that they “inflate its 
coherence and strength,” attributing to the liberal peace a static identity and the power to 
steamroller local alternatives or resistance. Thus peace-building remains an either-or 
proposition, a struggle between two separate and pure entities, namely, the romanticised, 
internal local and the demonised, external international. To escape this dichotomous 
thinking Mac Ginty et al propose 'hybridity,' which “is taken as the composite of social 
thinking and practice that emerge as the result of the interaction of different groups, 
practices and worldviews” (Mac Ginty, 2011: 8). 
 
Most relevant to us, however, is that hybridity is explicitly concerned with how internal 
and external forces combine to produce an outcome which for the indigenous society is 
more than the grafting on of forms which, in Simmel’s words, “simply act like additions, 
as it were, that come from a sphere of values external to, and always remaining external 
to [it]” (Simmel, 1908[1997]: 57). Hybridity focusses the gaze on “the interface between 
the 'traditional, indigenous and customary' and internationally supported external peace 
and development operations” (Peterson, 2012: 10). These scholars contend that most if 
not all peaces are and should be understood as forms of 'hybrid peace,' resulting not from 
the imposition of an alien form by external interveners nor solely the alternatives offered 
by indigenous actors, but from the negotiations and adaptations that emerge from the 
meeting of the two. Liberal peace agents never have things entirely their own way: they 
are not confronted with a blank slate upon which their model of peace can be written. 
Rather, the local population will, in various ways, “confront, resist, ignore, disobey, 
subvert, exploit, and string-along the liberal peace” (Mac Ginty, 2011: 10). Building on 
this, Mac Ginty (2011: 77-78) offers a four-part model of hybridity: 1) the ability of 
liberal peace agents, networks, and structures to compel other actors to follow its will; 2) 
the ability of the same to incentivise others to follow its will; 3) the ability of local actors, 
networks, and structures to resist, adapt, and reject the liberal peace; and 4) the ability of 
the same to offer alternatives or modifications to the liberal peace. Hybridity is the result 
of the interactions among the parts, which will of course be different in each peace 
intervention. 
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As a lens through which to view empirical phenomena hybridity offers some important 
benefits, which result in a broader and more nuanced perspective on peace interventions 
than offered by the international or local vantage points taken by themselves. By 
considering the interactions of internal and external actors it encourages us, for example, 
to recognise the diversity of both and to look beyond elite-level interactions. It helps us 
see the agency of external and internal actors as more than imposition and acquiescence 
respectively. It helps us see types of political order that do not conform to the liberal ideal 
– be they informal or simply non-liberal – as potentially important aspects of peace and 
reconciliation rather than subversive of it. Valuable insights for the analyst of peace 
interventions, but for many the true appeal of hybridity lies in its potential as a 
normatively desirable alternative model. Homi Bhabha is credited with popularising the 
concept, and since those early days in post-colonial thought hybridity has been hailed as a 
revolutionary and emancipatory way of looking at the interactions among powerful, 
developed, or colonising and less powerful, underderveloped, or colonised cultures. 
 
Scholars such Ivan Illich (1971: 60) and Esteva and Prakash (1998: 113) argued that one 
of the most pernicious effects of the development discourse was the mind-set it induced 
among the developing, a mind-set that suggested that they would have to passively wait 
for social services to be provided for them. Hybridity, one might argue, would counteract 
this by allowing people in developing nations to see the active role they have played and 
can continue to play, even in the face of powerful external actors. Conversely, those 
external actors would be forced to reconsider their own role, no longer arrogantly seeing 
themselves as bringers of political order to a society where none exists. Hybridity would 
mean emancipation from the homogenising imposition of liberal models of what political 
order and society ought to look like. Thus acting upon hybridity would, it is hoped, lead 
to contextual, hybrid alternatives to Western liberal models that would have remained 
invisible to external or internal actors looking at the world solely based on their own 
perspective. 
 
For our present purposes the concept of hybridity and what it is trying to do – break down 
the dichotomy between external and internal actors – is certainly interesting. As an 
analytic lens it is very useful in certain situations, such as colonialism or peace 
interventions, where there is a clear case of an external actor stepping across borders, 
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however defined, and into another society to impose something on them. It makes sense 
in such cases to think of this internal-external divide in terms of such spatial metaphors – 
of discrete entities being 'internal' or 'external' relative to the borders of a given society.  
 
Even in these narrow confines, however, there are limitations, and Peterson (2012: 18) 
has quite rightly called for a little more caution. She raises doubts, acknowledged by Mac 
Ginty and Sanghera (2012: 7), as to the extent to which the insights of hybridity will 
change practice. The history of development studies is littered with examples of 
potentially radical ideas reduced to buzzwords and then discarded: hybridity may go the 
same way. Thus Peterson (2012: 16) argues that the growing prevalence within the liberal 
peace discourse of 'hybrid peace operations,' 'local ownership,' and 'participation' “hint at 
the trend towards hybridisation as a badge worn by those seeking greater legitimacy.” 
Rather than a fundamentally new practice, hybridity becomes a label used to distance 
practitioners from “the charges of neo-colonialism and self-interest” – not unlike our 
argument in the previous section that the insights of post-development have been used by 
other theorists to distance themselves from the modernisation approach. Moreover, the 
optimism that characterises a good deal of the hybridity literature comes close to 
romanticising the hybrid, bringing with it the tendency to overlook issues such as the 
degree to which a hybrid outcome could be conservative of existing power relations 
rather than emancipatory. Thus Moss (2003) has questioned the utility of the concept on 
the grounds that its analyses still present us with two 'pure' entities interacting with each 
other, ignoring the inequalities and power relations within them.  
 
These problems are exacerbated once we turn to the more complex problem of social 
change, and are joined by a few others. Although hybridity theorists often tack on 'and 
development' when writing about liberal peace interventions, the complexity of the 
former makes it quite different and limits the usefulness of hybridity as a tool for 
reconceptualising the internal-external relationship. These limitations stem from the 
spatial imagery which is used to conceptualise the relationship. The separation of the 
internal and external into distinct forces, effected by the concept of development, gives 
rise to spatial metaphors of separate entities meeting across a gap or border which must 
be elided if the two are to become reconciled. Viewing the relationship in this way has 
implications for who or what the internal and the external are conceived to be, which 
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affects the perception of the relationship between them and, as we shall see in the next 
section, implies a certain method for transcending their divide.  
 
In the hybridity literature (e.g. Mac Ginty, 2011) internal and external are used 
interchangeably with local and international respectively. Both are either actors or 
structures, with hybridisation occurring in the contact zones between the two. In Mac 
Ginty's four-part model, the international actor attempts to intervene in the lives and 
structures of local actors with a certain model of peace in mind, to which local actors and 
structures respond in a variety of ways – resistance, modification, acceptance, and so on. 
Immediately we can see that we are dealing with two separate entities. Moss (2003) has 
argued that therefore hybridity still essentialises: within a given analysis it treats its two 
subjects as pure forms, even if it cautions us to recognise that they are in fact hybrids of 
hybrids themselves. The focus of an analysis of hybridisation is, understandably, on how 
two entities interact to create a hybrid rather than on the two entities themselves.  
 
Depending on the case, this may not be a great issue. The well-organised military of 
single nation may be able to intervene in a relatively coherent and unified manner, 
making the fact that its own organisation and decisions are the outcome of hybridisation 
less relevant to the analysis of its interactions with locals than it would be in the case of, 
for example, a multilateral peace intervention involving INGOs, civil society 
organisations and so on. Social change, however, is so wide-ranging a phenomenon that 
the idea of it occurring as a meeting between two entities – e.g. the Western and non-
Western worlds, the developed and the developing, the modern and the traditional – 
becomes inherently problematic. It was argued in the previous section that one of post-
development's failings was its inability move beyond these homogenising and 
essentialising dichotomies: a true alternative to development must not fall into that trap. 
 
Similarly limiting is an implication of seeing internal and external factors as local and 
international actors or structures; namely, that they are internal or external in relation to 
the borders of the 'local,' be it a nation, community, or culture. Even when we are asked to 
look beyond the usual external actors – that is, Western nations – the alternatives 
suggested are just new players in international development such as China, India, and 
Brazil (Peterson, 2012: 18). While this broadening of the perspective at least moves us 
away from the West-non-West dichotomy, it still treats the internal and external as 
 136 
discrete units. Accepting this means that we start from the assumption that anything 
coming from outside the borders of a nation is alien to it and, conversely, that anything 
coming from inside the border is part of it. Serge Latouche (1989[1996] 54-55), for 
example, says that the interaction among cultures must not involve culture A adopting too 
much from culture B. Why not? The statement makes sense only on the basis of this 
assumption of external alien-ness. An alternative conceptualisation of the internal-
external relationship would have to account for how something coming from within a 
society might be alien to it and vice versa. Moreover, it would have to avoid the strong 
tendency in the internal-external as local-international approach to view the relationship 
as a top-down one, which colours the perception of both. The external is not only alien 
but bad. Although romanticising the local is recognised as a problem, demonising the 
international can be overlooked. It is important to move beyond this because taken 
together they end up reproducing the type of conceptually antagonistic relationship that 
we have criticised the concept of development for implying. An alternative to 
development must be able to see this relationship as something more than a (attempted) 
top-down imposition of an alien form. This problem will be revisited in the final section 
of the thesis. 
 
Finally, a closely related issue is that a top-down relationship prejudges the roles of both 
internal and external actors and structures. The external here is a limiting force, 
constraining the otherwise free spirit of the internal so that it changes in acceptable ways. 
Thus the activity of external structures and actors is something to which their internal 
counterparts must react. They can be genuinely active only insofar as they can “confront, 
resist, ignore, disobey, subvert, exploit, and string-along” external actors and structures 
(Mac Ginty, 2011: 10). This assumption, according to which the behaviour of internal 
actors is couched in terms of 'resistance to,' is most obvious in post-colonial accounts of 
hybridity, such as Homi Bhabha's, but is (implicitly) retained in the work of scholars such 
as Mac Ginty. It underpins much of the optimism that characterises the hybridity 
literature: emancipation from, resistance to, and modifications of external actors and 
structures is seen as an inherently good thing. Of course, it is true that external things can 
be a constraint, but assuming that they necessarily are again implies an understanding of 
the internal-external relationship as antagonistic. It is precisely this divisive 
understanding that an alternative to the concept of development will have to alter if the 
two are to be reconciled and the tragedy of development avoided. 
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Thus once we turn our attention from peace-building back to development (as analysed in 
this thesis) it becomes clear that hybridity as a lens is not enough: recognising the 
importance of internal actors, though a key insight, will not have the desired effect if 
external actors are still seen as vital to a positive outcome. In Part I it was argued that 
modernisation theorists were well aware of the problems associated with merely imposing 
local models in different contexts. Samuel Huntington, in his Political Order in Changing 
Societies (1968), criticised the United States for its attempts to do so and attributed the 
growing international influence of the Soviet Union in part to its refusal to follow suit. He 
also praised the Soviet Union for recognising that the imposition of governmental 
institutions was pointless without existing local authority and legitimacy. Moreover, the 
modernisation approach was quite infamous for accepting the (temporary) necessity of 
non-liberal political orders (Kesselman, 1973). Thus Huntington argued in favour of a 
single-party system and David Apter (1971: 19n) claimed that a period of 'unfreedom' 
may be necessary early on in the development process. Admittedly these analyses rarely 
account for informal political orders – a gap the recent literature on neo-patrimonialism is 
partly filling – but it does demonstrate that unlike peace interventions, development 
interventions have always been thought of as more than an external imposition. Indeed, 
because development is such a complex and wide-ranging phenomenon it is almost 
impossible to think of it in that way. That development, whatever the precise form it 
takes, is the outcome of an interaction between 'internal' and 'external' forces is no secret, 
even if it is believed that the external model is better in some objective sense. The 
problem is how that relationship is conceptualised.  
 
To summarise this section, we have seen that the concept of hybridity is intended to move 
the study of peace (and development) interventions away from the idea that they involve 
two pure and discrete entities, the international and local or external and internal, coming 
together with one side 'winning' and imposing its own model of peace. Either the 
international interveners impose a liberal peace or local actors and structures manage to 
flush the foreign bodies from their system. Instead of this, hybridity offers a lens through 
which one can see how external and internal actors interact to create a hybrid peace. 
Identifying the limitations of this approach as a solution to the internal-external divide 
that characterises the tragedy of development helps us see, in part, what is needed from an 
alternative to the concept of development. It will have to: avoid seeing internal-external 
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as an essentialist dichotomy; look beyond convenient borders as the location of 
interaction, separating a familiar inside and an alien outside; see the relationship as more 
than top-down; see the external as more than a limitation on the otherwise free and 
natural internal. To which we can add the point made in the previous section that our 
alternative must be non-teleological. The next section will start with a consideration of 
what the normative pursuit of hybridity as a solution to the tragedy of development would 
look like. The critique of it will serve as the basis for our own theorisation of the 
reconciliation of the internal and external. 
 
II.5 – Beyond the Tragedy of Development III: Reclaiming the Active Individual 
“The business man who assumes that this life is everything, and the mystic who asserts 
that it is nothing, fail, on this side and on that, to hit the truth. 'Yes, I see, dear; it's about 
halfway between,' Aunt Juley had hazarded in earlier years. No; truth, being alive, was 
not halfway between anything. It was only to be found by continuous excursions into 
either realm, and though proportion is the final secret, to espouse it at the outset is to 
ensure sterility”  
- E.M. Forster, Howards End (1910[2000]: 166) 
 
Overcoming the limitations noted in the previous section will involve rethinking the terms 
of the internal-external relationship, and in particular the spatial metaphors which 
underpin the thinking of hybridity theorists and post-colonial/post-development theorists 
as well as more mainstream development theorists. The remainder of next couple of 
section will attempt to provide a basis for this rethinking, with the present one focussing 
on the importance of the 'active individual.' This will involve returning the individual to 
the central role they enjoyed prior to Keynes' contributions to development theory, as 
detailed in section I.6 above. They are called 'active' because they will be conceptualised 
as standing between internal and external – in that sense not unlike Lerner's transitionals 
– giving meaning to both and mediating their relationship. Neither internal nor external, it 
will be argued, can be given any real meaning outside this individual process. From the 
previous section we conclude that the spatial imagery – of inside and outside, 
international and local, top and bottom (not to mention 'internal' and 'external' 
themselves) with borders separating them and hybrid, transitional borderlands between 
them – cannot serve as a general lens through which to view social change because it fails 
to capture the dynamic nature of the relationship. The type of relationship it posits is only 
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active on one side at a time. The reconciliation offered by spatial metaphors is one of 
'crossing over,' of reaching beyond one's own sphere, of bridging the divide between two 
separate entities. Traditionally in development theory and critiques of it this has been seen 
as taking the form of a more or less necessary imposition of the 'developed' onto the 
'underdeveloped.' Recognising that their crossings over must be welcomed by the 
developing society, development theorists have tried to make them more palatable; 
interpreting them as invasions, post-development theorists have sought to set up 
impenetrable barriers: 'each culture is another reality.' 
 
Wishing neither to be associated with the imposition of external, Western forms nor to 
romanticise internal, local forms, hybridity theorists and others have taken the obvious 
alternative route within the spatial imagination. If past thinkers have seen the two as solid, 
discrete entities with one imposing itself on the other, then their reconciliation must lie in 
de-solidifying them. Thus as Nederveen Pieterse (2001b) has argued, if both external and 
internal actors see themselves and each other as hybrids, rather than as pure and coherent 
entities, they will be more likely to devise and accept unique outcomes. Solid entities 
cannot mix: they must become more fluid. In this way hybridity can deflect the criticism 
made by Moss (2003) that it still posits two separate entities: by becoming more fluid the 
international will be able to go beyond its own sphere and reach over into one that is 
foreign to it (Peterson, 2012). 
 
It is not just hybridity theorists for whom this 'de-solidification' seems an attractive way 
out. Walter Mignolo's discussion in Local Histories/Global Designs (2000) has a similar 
flavour. Most thinking, he says, is territorial thinking: solipsistic, trapped in its own 
reality, and prone to projecting itself beyond its borders with little regard for or 
sympathetic understanding of what it finds there. All local histories are prone to 
becoming global designs, which naturally makes territorial thinking a problematic means 
by which to govern the relations among societies. In the centuries-old conflict between 
Europe and the Arab world, for example, it has become “a machine of mutual 
misunderstanding” (2000: 67). Mignolo's alternative is what he call 'border thinking;' that 
is, thinking from the borders between territories rather than exclusively from one's own 
territory. This involves simultaneously thinking from and critiquing both local histories. 
“This is the key configuration of border thinking: thinking from dichotomous concepts 
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rather than ordering the world in dichotomies” (2000: 85). Again, two separate entities 
are posited but in a way that will, it is hoped, allow for a more harmonious interaction. 
 
With these solutions, which operate within the existing spatial metaphors used to 
conceptualise the internal-external aspect of development, there are theoretical and 
practical difficulties. On the practical side, the desolidification solution undermines the 
basis upon which hybridity occurs. Mac Ginty (2012: 4) himself admits that deliberately 
pursuing a hybrid outcome may be problematic. It is not possible to devise it beforehand. 
The hybrid emerges from the interactions between external and internal actors meeting at 
the metaphorical borders; it is not something that can be created in a lab then 
implemented in the real world. It is a necessarily interactive process. It would seem that 
the desolidification solution provides a sound foundation for this process: clearly there 
can be no genuine interaction if one party imposes it will on the other, whether overtly or 
covertly. This is the argument we saw Nederveen Pieterse (2001b) and Mignolo (2000) 
making above, and it has a long history in philosophies linking tolerance with skepticism 
on the one hand and intolerance with dogmatism on the other. The assumption here, 
applied to development, is that the problem with development theory – a key component 
of the modern West's 'global design' – is its understanding of its own knowledge claims. 
In particular the arrogantly Eurocentric belief that what worked for the West will work for 
the rest. To de-solidify means to be more humble, to recognise that there are different 
ways of achieving and conceiving development. If external and internal actors perceive 
themselves to be 'hybrids of hybrids' and accept that they do not have all the answers, 
then their interaction will no longer by a clash often ending with an imposition by the 
external actor but a mixing resulting in a new hybrid.  
 
The desolidification approach conflates the process and outcome with the starting 
position: it assumes that, in the interaction of external and internal actors, for the process 
to be a mixing and the outcome a mixture the two opposing starting points have to be 
mixable. Making them so is a large part of the normative aim of hybridity and border 
thinking. The problem with this becomes apparent once we leave peace and development 
interventions and turn to more everyday forms of negotiations such as those that occur 
between businesses. Both parties recognise that their interaction will be a form of 
negotiation and that the outcome will be a compromise. If it was believed by either side 
that they could impose their will unilaterally, there would be no negotiation in the first 
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place. Yet both enter into the process with an idea of what they want the outcome to be. 
Each has a definite starting point and in the course of the negotiation each will try to find 
an outcome that is acceptable to the other and as close to their own ideal as possible. It 
would of course be problematic if one party attempts to impose their ideal on the other, 
but the act of negotiation does not preclude the existence of an ideal as a starting point. 
Indeed, it presupposes it.  
 
By undermining the solidity of the starting point, aiming for hybridity may, 
paradoxically, obstruct the achievement of hybridity. If both parties, having taken on 
board the normative implication of hybridity and border thinking that they must be 
humble with regards their knowledge claims, are discouraged from saying 'I want...' or 'I 
believe...' for fear or appearing dogmatic or universalist or ethnocentric then the basis of 
negotiation, even ultimately of conversation, is undermined. For not only is a solid 
foundation necessary to put forward a coherent argument, it is also the basis upon which 
the other participant analyses and judges the argument and returns another. It is for this 
reason that Socrates, a philosopher famous for knowing that he knew nothing, counselled 
that we should always assume that we're right. In the Phaedo Plato has him say: “[T]his 
was the method which I adopted: I first assumed some principle which I judged to be the 
strongest, and then I affirmed as true whatever seemed to agree with this, whether 
relating to the cause or to anything else; and that which disagreed I regarded as untrue” 
(Plato, in Jowett, 1892: 228). His concern was that although we should be aware that we 
do not have all the answers – that our will at the start of a negotiation will not be its final 
outcome – doubt will prevent progress toward a positive outcome as you'll abandon your 
starting position at the first sign of trouble (Frappier, 2009). Without a solid starting 
position from which to interpret new ideas, there is nothing left but conformity to the 
arguments coming at you from outside – precisely the outcome that hybridity theorists 
and Mignolo are trying to avoid. 
 
Theoretically, we can take the problem raised by Peterson (2012) a little further. Peterson, 
we saw above, expressed concern that 'hybridity' is becoming another of development's 
buzzwords, a 'badge of legitimacy' used by external actors to mask the same old practices. 
Let us assume, however, that external actors influenced by hybridity are not using it as a 
badge of legitimacy but genuinely accept and desire that the eventual intervention will be 
the outcome of various modes of interaction with local actors. They may on this basis 
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recognise the potential for non-liberal and informal institutions to contribute; they may be 
encouraged to engage with a wider range of local actors; they may take care not to regard 
attempts to resist their activities as subversive and dangerous. Yet all this is quite 
compatible with the criticism Mac Ginty (2011: 45) makes of the liberal peace's use of 
notions of local ownership and participation, namely that this “is often a superficial 
exercise that encourages local actors to conform to norms and practices established in 
the global north.” A hybrid outcome must, by definition, include some influences from 
the external actor, which may mean that norms and practices from the global north are 
'adopted' in the local society. What is the status of these adopted practices? It is not clear 
from the literature on hybridity how one would distinguish between a 'superficial 
exercise' and a genuinely hybrid process. If the answer is that it would be visible in the 
outcome – a hybrid peace that is neither local nor international rather than a liberal peace 
implemented more subtly – then there are no clear standards according to which the 
distinction could be made, beyond commonly-held assumptions that parts of the liberal 
peace model – neoliberal economic reforms, for example – could not possibly be 
acceptable on their own terms; their very existence in the local society is taken as 
evidence that they have been imposed upon it by manipulation or misinformation. If so, 
however, the agency that hybridity supposedly affords local actors is undermined: they 
are apparently not allowed to accept certain norms and practices of the liberal model as 
part of a true hybrid. Hybridity would then suffer from the problem we identified with 
post-development: it pretends to offer unlimited agency to the local while in fact blocking 
off certain pathways by excluding them from the realm of acceptable conversation. 
 
The difficulty in distinguishing the truly hybrid from a ‘superficial exercise,’ that is, good 
hybridity from bad or artificial hybridity, becomes particularly problematic when we 
apply this conceptualisation of the internal and external to social change. It may be 
argued that what counts as 'good hybridity' has a relatively simple answer when it comes 
to peace intervention: a peace intervention is good when it produces a lasting peace 
(although even this is obviously more complex that it seems). Applying hybridity to 
social change, however, it is evident that such an apparently neutral and objective 
definition of what constitutes 'good hybridity' – that is, what constitutes good social 
change, or, development – is no longer available to us. Defining in advance what counts 
as good social change undermines attempts made by development theorists to reconcile 
the internal and external. Yet if we abandon this teleological view of social change then 
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there is nothing in the mere existence in a developing society of 'norms and practices 
established in the global north,' or of anything else we associate with development, that 
would tell us that these forms came from, or are interpreted as coming from, the global 
north. Nor can their simple existence provide an explanation of their representative 
significance within the developing society – that is, their contribution to genuine social 
change in that society. There is, to use Simmel's terminology, no way to know by virtue 
of similar contents whether an external form contributes to genuine growth or acts as a 
'mere addition' which always remains external to the host. And this was, of course, 
precisely Simmel's problem: not how external objects could jump the border and 'cross 
over' into the internal life of the individual but how they could become part of the internal 
in such a way as to contribute to its growth. The problem confronted by development 
theorists is not so different. As was noted earlier, later economic modernisation theorists 
had been disappointed to find that their efforts had created 'islands of modernity' in 
developing societies, largely disconnected from the traditional sea. Desolidification may 
make it easier for internal and external actors to come together and create a hybrid 
outcome, but it cannot tell us whether this outcome constitutes good social change. 
External Western, developed cultural forms are seen as necessary to some degree to the 
development of non-Western nations, yet at the same time the process of development is 
seen as stifling the fluid and 'natural' movement of those societies by burdening them with 
these forms that, while objectively necessary, do not always 'fit' and therefore struggle to 
contribute to genuine development – hence the tragedy of development.  
 
This problem, it will now be argued, has always been looked at from the wrong 
perspective. On the belief that we are confronted with two independent acting entities and 
the consequent use of spatial metaphors to conceptualise it, the internal-external problem 
has been seen as just that: a problem. It has been seen as the 'original' relationship, the 
starting point of social change which, being problematic, must be overcome. Yet is 
appears so only on the basis of social-change-as-development, because the concept of 
development posits the necessity of external guidance for the potentially irrational 
energies of the internal. Consequently there is an inherent antagonism between them: 
“Those leading the modernisation always fear that the individual energies suddenly 
liberated in a traditional society will not be deployed in the right direction” (Latouche, 
1991[1993]: 88). However, if instead of thinking of internal and external as two discrete 
entities, one acting from within the borders of a developing society and the other from 
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without, we imagine them existing in an active relationship, then the problem appears in a 
new light. The separation of internal and external factors is no longer a starting point but 
a goal, no longer something to be overcome but something to be found and found again. It 
is in this process that we rediscover the true importance of the individual actor, who, as 
we argued in section I.6, was removed from its central position in the process of social 
change by Keynes. 
 
To understand why, we can look at how Ernst Cassirer (1942[2000]) responded to 
Simmel's argument on the tragedy of culture. Simmel, much like development theorists 
who have confronted the same problem, saw the internal and external as two 'actors': in 
Simmel's case, the individual on the one hand and cultural works on the other, each 
developing according to their own independent logics. External cultural works, though 
necessary for individual cultivation, are too rigid to satisfy the fluidity of internal spirit 
and can only hinder its free movement – hence the tragedy of culture. According to 
Cassirer, however, Simmel ended his analysis too early. Simmel's concern was primarily 
with the relationship between the creator and the work – he neglected the recipient, the 
'You' (as Cassirer puts it) who stands at the other end of the process, the subject who 
receives the work in order to incorporate it into their own life. In doing so, they transform 
the work back into the medium from which it originates; that is, that free movement of 
spirit Simmel thought to be lost upon creation of the work. Thus the work achieves its 
genuine task “not by transporting a finished content from the one to the other, but in that 
the activity of one is kindled by that of the other” (1942[2000]: 111). Cassirer stresses that 
this does not involve a picking and choosing of elements from the work – in that case, 
“this fruitful effect will not yet manifest itself. At best, it remains a superficial borrowing 
of individual elements of formation” (1942[2000]: 112). Exposure to individual elements 
is not enough: travelling does not make one worldly; attending the opera does not make 
one cultured. What matters is the effect these things have on you – whether you are able 
to change and grow through them. What is required therefore is “the will or the ability to 
penetrate into their genuine centre, into their particular form” (1942[2000]: 112). Thus it 
is not a question of copying certain aspects of this external work that may fit the internal 
force, but rather of understanding the formative powers that created them. 
 
Every renaissance, says Cassirer, is an example of this process. A renaissance may be 
inspired by a foreign or bygone culture, but it is never a mere reception or continuation of 
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that culture. Nor is it a task of sifting out what was 'universal' in the foreign culture and 
adding it to one's own. They are “triumphs of spontaneity and not of mere receptivity” 
(1942[2000]: 111). In the Italian Renaissance, for example, people like Petrarch found 
“in antiquity an incomparable source of power that they use to help bring forward their 
own ideas and ideals” (1942[2000]: 112). The encounter was not a hybrid-producing 
meeting of two pre-existing entities, classical antiquity and medieval Italy. The former 
did not leave an impression on the latter, but rather became a new vehicle of expression 
for individuals such as Petrarch who could no longer fully find such in their inherited 
tradition. By discovering for himself the 'life forms' of antiquity, through the cultural 
products it had left behind, Petrarch “fashioned his own original feeling of life” 
(1942[2000]: 112). To Petrarch, 'antiquity' was not an inert mass but a “conglomeration 
of huge potential energies, which are only waiting for the moment when they are to come 
forward again and make themselves manifest in new effects” (1942[2000]: 113). What 
this 'spirit' or 'fluidity' consists in and what recalling a work to it entails is perhaps 
unclear, and Cassirer and Simmel are both a little vague here. It can probably best be 
grasped via personal experience: anyone who has tried to put thoughts to paper will know 
that the end result is often unsatisfactory in some intangible way. The fluidity and 
limitlessness of thought is, to some degree, lost when they are given definite form in 
words. This is the spirit to which a work can be recalled. The word 'epiphany,' in its 
original meaning of 'showing forth,' reflects exactly this. It takes for granted that life is 
full of the rigidities of routine and habit, necessity and triviality, but that moments of 
transcendence may nevertheless show forth on occasion. 'Spirit' refers to what is visible 
during these moments of epiphany. By recalling apparently rigid forms to their original 
vitality, the active individual can take from them the personal and contextual meaning 
that Simmel recognised was vital to genuine growth. 
 
For Cassirer this was a uniquely individual process. After Petrarch the likes of Rabelais, 
Montaigne, Racine, Goethe, von Humboldt, and many others had to discover, through the 
same cultural remains they encountered, their 'own' antiquity. It was 'theirs' in the sense 
that it was only valuable and meaningful as a vehicle of expression because they had 
something to express. And although it is possible to 'take possession of' a new tradition 
simply as one finds it, “as a fixed cultural possession,” Cassirer maintains that its true 
formative potential is released only when it “becomes the expression of a new individual 
feeling of life” by refinding it (1942[2000]: 115). In this case, the new individual feeling 
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of life could not be adequately expressed through the inherited traditions. The individual's 
relationship to the inherited is not, however, less important for that fact. What starts out as 
an individual deviation from the inherited, inspired or enabled by something outside it, 
must, if it is to become more than a mere deviation and have a transformative influence, 
show continuity with the inherited tradition. Continuity makes the deviation 
communicable to many other individuals and hence capable of kindling their activity. As 
the process continues through the activity of these other individuals the work, initially a 
deviation, is reincorporated into the inherited tradition, thereby enriching it by adding 
modes of expression of which it was not previously capable. In this act of enlarging the 
imagination of their society, the active individual provides new ways of finding meaning 
in and assimilating works that would otherwise appear inflexible (Shelley, 1840[1915]: 
108-110). 
 
The solution to the internal-external problem we can derive from Cassirer is, therefore, 
not really a solution at all, there being strictly speaking no problem to be solved. This is 
not to say that their interaction is an easy or natural one without tensions or challenges, 
just that it is not a problem calling for a solution. Jacques Barzun (1991[1992]: 14) 
distinguished between problems on the one hand and difficulties on the other. Problems, 
he argued, are solvable once and for all. Once a generation has discovered the correct 
technique for, say, growing rice in wet environments, it can be transmitted to future 
generations for whom this will no longer exist as a problem. Difficulties, by contrast, are 
eternally recurring. They can be met but not overcome; there is no technique that will 
solve them for all time. Each new generation will have to meet the difficulty of, for 
example, parenting or dealing with the loss of loved ones. Past generations can transmit to 
them the values and ideas they found useful in this area, but it is ultimately something 
that each must do on their own terms. This is what was meant when we said above that 
the separation of the internal and external is something to be found rather than something 
to be overcome. Overcoming a division between two discrete acting entities implies 
breaking down the barriers existing between them in order to make possible a transfer of 
contents from one to the other – from the developed to the developing in the case of 
development theory. What we can take from Cassirer, however, is that it is only on the 
basis of individual judgement, gained by placing oneself in an active relationship with the 
'new' from the perspective of the 'inherited,' that the distinction between internal and 
external acquires its meaning and that the representative significance of one to the other is 
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discovered: “Their content exists for us only by virtue of the fact that it is constantly taken 
possession of anew and as a result always created anew” (1942[2000]: 111). Thus 
internal and external are not the 'prime elements' in the relationship between them since it 
is that relationship which both defines and changes them.  
 
What we imagine, then, is internal and external as 'inherited' and 'new' vehicles of 
expression respectively, defined and redefined as such by a conscious or unconscious act 
of individual judgement. This understanding of the internal-external problem avoids some 
the limitations of the spatial understanding, as outlined above. First, and perhaps most 
importantly, it does not make – or at least does not rely on – a sharp distinction between 
developed and developing countries. The external motive force of change is not equated 
with the developed, the modern, the international, the Western; nor is the internal force 
equated with the underdeveloped, the traditional, the local, the non-Western. Second, it 
does not essentialise either side; that is, it does not treat internal and external traditions as 
discrete and eternal categories. At the same time, however, it recognises the importance 
from the active individual's perspective of 'concretising' the internal and external, of 
turning the abstract conglomerations of potential energy into something finite with which 
they can work.  
 
Moreover, viewing the process as something that is created on the individual level also 
forces us to recognise the importance of the present configuration of the internal in the 
general sense. For a change that originates with an individual or small group of 
individuals to resonate throughout the broader society it must be a change that is 
(perceived as) compatible with 'the things that are part of us.' It has to be compatible with 
the 'local' culture not because of the inherent worth of that culture but because that is the 
perspective from which other individuals will incorporate the new into their own lives. 
Third, and related to the second point, this understanding of the internal-external problem 
does not prejudge the content of change from an outside perspective. The relevant point 
in differentiating good from bad social change is not so much where change is going but 
how it arose. The focus of analysis is therefore no longer on which contents ought to be 
transferred from the external to the internal or the efficiency with which this can occur 
(both the focus of traditional development thinking), but on the individual person and 
how one learns about society and the principles that sustain it, how one incorporate those 
values into one's own life and conduct oneself by them and grow through them, how one 
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can interact with people and things which, again, allows one to recognise and incorporate 
what they have to offer into one's own internal life and reciprocate something that is 
similarly valuable to others. Thus it does not judge social change according to a similarity 
of contents (whether that means recreating Western society in the non-Western world or 
just those aspects of Western society deemed universal) but a similarity of processes.  
 
If this still seems abstract and only subtly different from that of development thinking, it 
becomes more distinct the closer one gets to the real world. This will be expanded upon 
in section II.8 below, but for now we can mention as an example the fact that, as we enter 
the post-2015 development era the issue of the role and relevance of Western knowledge 
and experience has become particularly pressing. Critical of both the arrogant 
Eurocentrism they find in development theory's past and the complete rejection of 
Western influence they find in post-development, many development theorists have 
counselled that we ought to steer a middle course between them. Thus Nederveen Pieterse 
(2001a: 32) argues that we ought to look through Western history to determine which 
aspects of it are part of a 'universal human heritage' and which are particularistic and 
context-specific. The former can legitimately be part of a transfer of contents from 
developed to developing; the latter cannot and may be disregarded by developing nations. 
These calls for us to distinguish between the universal and the particular (the contents that 
can be transferred and those that are context-specific) imagine a world like a pizza with 
every other slice removed: the remaining slices have no connection with one another 
apart from the 'universal' middle where their tips converge. There is a tendency to 
interpret the existence in a developing nation of anything identified as context-specific – 
from MacDonald's and jeans to science and individualism – as impositions stifling the 
free movement of the local culture: they will always be external things. 
 
The Caribbean philosopher Edouard Glissant asks the readers of his Poetics of Relation 
(1990[1997]) to avoid this type of thinking. He argues that people in developing countries 
should not see the influences coming from the developed world as a “monolithic 
necessity” (which is how it is portrayed) that must be adopted or rejected but as a 
“multiform elsewhere” that can be engaged with on the basis of “the things that are part 
of us” (1990[1997]: 153, 155). “Integrate what we have, even if it is sea and sun, with the 
adventure of a culture that is ours to share and for which we take responsibility” 
(Glissant: 1990[1997]: 153). Placing the active individual at the heart of the internal-
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external problem helps us conceptualise that. Like Simmel on culture, what the 
aforementioned proposal fails to conceptualise is the role of the 'you,' the active 
individual who takes possession these things, approaching them not as 'inert masses' (the 
particular) on the one hand or 'finished contents' (the universal) on the other but as new 
vehicles for their own expression. Rather than trying to decide in advance what is 
universal and therefore part of true development, and what is particular and therefore not 
part of true development, it is for us a question of how people can approach the myriad 
products of the West and the creative processes behind them – from morality and art to 
institutions and economic goods – in such a way that they can 'kindle the activity' of those 
individuals and to what extent the products of that activity can do the same for others. 
The precise outcome can only be found individually, and it must be found again and again 
 
This re-framing of the internal-external question, away from inherent division and toward 
something that must be found based on an individual encounter, helps us rethink our 
conceptualisation of social change in a way that genuinely transcends the dichotomies of 
development thinking. In previous sections this thesis has argued that development 
theorists have presented us with a dichotomous view of how social change can operate: 
that it can either be self-conscious (intentional, deliberate) or unconscious (unintentional, 
random). Post-war development theorists looked back on social change as it occurred in 
eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe and argued that it was an unconscious, 
spontaneously occurring phenomenon. This view would have been reinforced by the 
criticisms received from all sides of the political spectrum: the social evolutionism of 
F.A. Hayek and, to a lesser extent, early neo-liberals such as P.T. Bauer and the post-
colonial/post-development approaches both prized the spontaneity that would exist 
without the dead hand of development policy. As we saw, however, modernisation 
theorists maintained that allowing societies to change 'naturally' was, for various reasons, 
no longer a viable option. Without deliberate guidance, social change would be 
haphazard, left to individual whim, cruel market forces, the money motive, internal and 
external Eurocentrism, and so on, as it was in the 'darwinist nineteenth century.' It is on 
the basis of this dichotomy that the existence of development studies in its present form is 
justified: development studies creates the knowledge necessary for and helps put into 
practice the direction needed for a society to turn mere change into development. Thus 
society must instead become self-conscious of growth, of its own development. It was 
argued that this separates the internal and external aspects of development as they operate 
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according to different logics, and hence the latter cannot raise the former to its 'higher' 
level of development. 
 
However, through Cassirer's understanding of the internal-external problem and the role 
of the individual it entails there emerges a third option: conscious social change. By 
focusing on the individual as the mediator of the inherited and the new, the internal and 
the external, the societal-level teleology that characterises the concept of development can 
be dropped without fear that social change would be blind. Rather, social change can be 
analysed as something that is individually teleological. C.S. Lewis has a useful metaphor 
which we can use to demonstrate the difference between conscious and self-conscious 
change. On the one hand, he says, imagine a linguist viewing language from the 'outside,' 
recommending changes to the grammar and idiom which they believe will make it 
simpler, more convenient, and so forth. The linguist sees problems in a language, which 
would be solved if only people would learn to accept the appropriate solutions and adjust 
as the language to develop in a specific, superior direction.  
 
By contrast, a poet sees difficulties in the language which must be met in the quest for 
self-expression. In this attempt to make the inherited language capable of expressing the 
new 'feeling of life' it is now asked to express, the poet “may also make great alterations 
to it, but his changes of the language are made in the spirit of the language itself; he 
works from within” (Lewis, 1944[1974]: 45). The poet does not expect to 'solve' the 
'problem' of self-expression. They understand the spirit and principles of their chosen 
medium, language, and take them in new directions. Only those who understand the spirit 
of a thing, says Lewis, “can modify it in direction which that spirit itself demands. Only 
they can know what those directions are...” (1944[1974]: 47). In the act of expressing 
themselves, the poet enriches the language: “it now contains possibilities of expression 
that … earlier were still unknown” (Cassirer, 1942[2000]: 116). Thus with the poet the 
basis of change is not the future state toward which language 'objectively' ought to 
develop, but rather their understanding of the principles and spirit upon which the present 
configuration is based, their acceptance of the demands this places upon them if their 
changes are to be communicable, and the goals they personally have for it.  
 
Talk of poets and epiphanies may give the impression that the active individual must be a 
kind of genius or a visionary – certainly someone with uncommon talents – and it goes 
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without saying that not everyone can have the impact of a Petrarch. Cassirer (1942[2000]: 
115) makes clear, however, that every action follows this basic principle: “The recipient 
does not take the gift as he would a stamped coin. For he can take it up only by using it, 
and in this use he imprints upon it a new shape.” Everyone who uses language changes it 
in imperceptible ways, just as everyone who acts in society does not leave it as it was; but 
the poet consciously uses language, and consequently the impact on it is more powerful. 
While it is not possible to know how others will 'take up' the work they create, they are 
nevertheless conscious of the imprint they are trying to leave and the material they are 
leaving it on. The active individual operates in society in just this way: their role in social 
change is one of conscious judgement. It is the individual who, by means of this 
judgement, makes the relationship between internal and external an 'active' one capable of 
having a cultivating effect on them. The internal and external motifs of development 
cannot simply be made more fluid on another's behalf. In their expression they must 
necessarily take a definite form and to try to avoid this is to empty those forms of their 
content. What matters is how these forms are approached, and the active individual, as 
with the poet and language, does not take them as inert masses but as bundles of potential 
energies. Indeed, the success of George Orwell, as Lionel Trilling (1955: 157-158) 
describes it, demonstrates that the role requires nothing of the sort. Orwell, Trilling 
argues, was no genius, let alone an uncommon genius. His mind is simply what ours 
could be 
 
“if we but surrendered a little of the cant that comforts us, if for a few weeks we paid no 
attention to the little group with which we habitually exchange opinions, if we took our 
chance of being wrong or inadequate, if we looked at things simply and directly, having 
in mind only our intention of finding out what they really are, not the prestige of our great 
intellectual act of looking at them. He tells us that we can understand our political and 
social life merely by looking around us; he frees us from the need for the inside dope. He 
implies that our job is not to be intellectual, certainly not to be intellectual in this fashion 
or that, but merely to be intelligent according to our lights.” 
 
In this sense of being 'intelligent according to our lights' rather than 'intellectual in this 
fashion or that' the active individual resembles Barzun's and Trilling's reader. They 
objected to the study of modern literature, it will be recalled, because its cultivating 
personal experience would be reduced to instances of 'the alienation of modern man' and 
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other such fashionable topics. Their method sought to satisfy the demand for a modern 
literature course without devitalising the books that were being studied. For this personal 
experience there is no standardised technique or universal method to follow; it is a matter 
of l'esprit de finesse. What the spirit of a work will look like when it 'kindles the activity' 
is not possible to say in advance due to its individual nature. This is why this section has 
spoken of active individuals as opposed to groups. Although others can lend aid in this 
process – as will be argued later – its personal nature means that the encounter must 
ultimately be an individual one. New ideas, practices, ways of thinking and being and so 
forth always implicitly ask us whether we are happy with who we are and with the way 
things are. Ideas and practices associated with social change ask intimate questions about 
how we conduct our lives as well as about how we wish to organise our society, and their 
transformative value lies in the former rather than the latter. Focusing on the latter set of 
questions, as the self-consciousness of social-change-as-development demands, robs the 
new ideas etc. of the personal immediacy and vitality according to which they can be 
incorporated into our selves. It is in the conscious response to the first set that active 
individuals take their place between the internal and external and at the heart of social 
change. In the next section it will be argued that the concept of progress provides an 
understanding of social change in which the conceptual space required for active 
individuals to work is central. Moreover, as we shall see in the section after that, II.7, the 
future-orientation of development, long recognised as problematic yet thought to be 
necessary, can be replaced by a present-orientation without fear of conservatism. It will 
make that argument by elaborating on the 'character' of the active individual by the 
system of education that came with social-change-as-progress. 
 
II.6 – The Concept of Progress  
The reader may at this point be reminded of Daniel Lerner's take on the internal-external 
problem. He believed that the 'traditional' internal and the 'modern' external were 
relatively powerless forces in development. More important was what occurred in the 
middle, where the group of people he called the Transitionals were both one and the 
other. It was argued earlier that the problem with Lerner's solution was that the 
Transitionals are transitional by virtue of where they are going rather than what they are 
doing. If they go elsewhere than intended they may be classified as Moderns or 
Traditionals depending on their bent (Lerner has been accused of 'pathologising' those in 
his case studies who would do anything entirely different) but they are not Transitonals. 
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What counts as good social change has been decided elsewhere, and the Transitionals are 
those who can adapt to its demands. The problems Lerner had conceiving of a truly active 
role for people in developing countries stem not from Eurocentric biases but from the 
teleological nature of social-change-as-development. The active individual, as described 
above, requires space in which this role can be performed. This section will argue that 
social-change-as-progress offers an understanding in which this space is not only present 
but vital to positive change. The term 'concept of progress' rather than 'idea of progress' 
will be used throughout this section. This is because the latter is linked to an array ideas 
providing a broader moral framework with which we shall not be concerned.  
 
That division is, it must be admitted, a rather artificial one given the naturally close 
connection between a conceptualisation of 'good social change' and the moral framework 
required to define 'good'. Necessary as such a framework is for a full account of a theory 
of progress, however, the focus of the present thesis remains on the internal-external 
problem and the place of the active individual within it. The aim of this section will be to 
build on the distinction between development and progress introduced in section I.3 by 
arguing that the concept of progress provides a way of understanding how good social 
change occurs that is consistent with our aim of reclaiming the active individual. 
 
Thus the concern here is with the ontological question of 'What is this thing we are 
analysing?' and how that is answered differently if social change is thought of as 
development or as progress. The concept of development, as analysed in this thesis, is not 
a theory of development, nor does it refer to an actual process of development. It is a 
fundamental way of thinking about social change. It is a concept that judges observed 
social change, directs the gaze, picks out the elements deemed important, and in doing so 
shapes our further theorising about social change. The concept of progress is an 
alternative way of doing this. By 'theorists of progress' and variations thereon this section 
has in mind a host of familiar names from the long eighteenth century, primarily from the 
Scottish and French Enlightenments: Adam Ferguson (1767[1782]), David 
Hume(1739[1896]), Adam Smith (1759[1976]; 1795[1892]), Condorcet (1796), Voltaire 
(1778), Benjamin Constant (1815[1988]), and Wilhelm von Humboldt (1792[1854])., 
who we met in section I.3. 
 
According to Alfred Marshall, “[t]he economist, like everyone else, must concern himself 
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with the ultimate aims of man” (in Galbraith, 1958[1976]: vii). What development seeks 
from social change is an end to the economic problem – the condition of scarcity – at 
least with regards 'natural wants,' or, basic needs. It analyses changes in the social world 
from this vantage point. It looks at the content of an action, and asks whether it is 
conducive to this end. In other words, where a change is going is more important than 
where the change comes from or, to a large degree, the context in which the change is 
occurring, which is considered only in in terms of the degree to which it is conducive to 
the desired change. By contrast, the theorists of progress set out to analyse individuals as 
they actually existed in society, without reference to ultimate ends for either. This 
concern arose out of a distrust of scholastic understandings of the world, which judged 
individuals and society from the perspective of what ought to be, and of the abstract 
rationalistic systems prominent in the previous century. Both sought to discover what 
Hume (1739[1896]: 11) referred to as “the ultimate principles of the soul” – an 
endeavour which “ought to be rejected as presumptuous and chimerical.” Although the 
great rationalist thinkers, such as Thomas Hobbes, certainly remained influential, the 
contractarian view of society was criticised for starting from a condition in which the 
individual, being outside society, could not be a moral agent and hence could not enter 
into a social contract (Cassirer, 1946: 175). Contra the contractarian conception of a pre-
social essence of individuals and society, Harris (2007: 7) argues in his introduction to 
Lord Kames' Sketches of the History of Man (1778[2007]) that Kames and his 
contemporaries had come to regard individuals as “having been social beings from the 
first and as being naturally fitted to a life of coexistence and cooperation.” Thus Adam 
Ferguson (1767[1782]: 13) argued that the 'state of nature,' rather than being an abstract 
thought-experiment, was in fact all around us:  
 
“If we are asked … Where is the state of nature to be found? We may answer, It is here; 
and it matters not whether we are understood to speak in the island of Great Britain, at 
the Cape of Good Hope, or the Straits of Magellan. While this active being is in the train 
of employing his talents, and of operating on the subjects around him, all situations are 
equally natural.”  
 
The state of nature, he continued, is “not prior to the exercise of [our] faculties, but 
procured by their just application” (Ferguson, 1767[1782]: 15). Thus Hume proposed 
that instead of the 'presumptuous and chimerical' search for ultimate principles, the 
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'science of man' must proceed from “a cautious observation of human life, [taking] them 
as they appear in the common course of the world, by men's behaviour in company, in 
affairs, and in their pleasures” (1739[1896]: 12). This “new species of philosophical 
investigation” was variously known as natural history, histoire raisonne, or, as Dugald 
Stewart (1793) opted to call it, conjectural history. It was conjectural in the sense that due 
to a lack of direct evidence deductive reasoning had to fill the gaps between the few 
scraps of information available on ancient and geographically distant societies: “when we 
are unable to ascertain how men have actually conducted themselves upon particular 
occasions, [we must consider] in what manner they are likely to have proceeded, from the 
principles of their nature, and the circumstances of their external situation” (Stewart, 
1793). The basic principle was the individual's ability to use reason to transform the 
world, rather than merely adapt to it, on top of which was added limited altruism and 
what economists call 'time preference' – the degree to which one is willing to sacrifice 
long-run advantages for present satisfaction (Barry, 1982: B.96-97).  
 
It is true that it had long been recognised that the unique feature of humankind, as 
opposed to animals, was the reasoning and moral faculties with which they could 
deliberately interact with and transform the world around them; this had been the basis of 
natural law theories in Greek and Christian philosophy. However, it was argued in Part I 
that the differentiation of development from progress involved a gradual expansion in the 
number of beings whose activity could not be trusted to produce positive social change. 
To Mill's barbarians Marshall added the very poor, before Keynes, finding the majority of 
his society consumed by the 'money motive,' argued that only those with knowledge of 
where social change ought to go could be trusted to produce development: the economist 
as the trustee of the possibility of civilisation. The insight underlying the concept of 
progress was that Ferguson's 'active beings,' making decisions about their person and 
property, were the foundational reality of “the astonishing fabric of the political union” 
(Stewart, 1793). From Bernard Mandeville's fable of the bees to Adam Smith's invisible 
hand, it was recognised that the most complex phenomena, from language to European 
society itself, were, in Ferguson's famous phrase, “the result of human action, but not the 
execution of any human design” (Ferguson, 1767[1782]: 90). “[T]he people,” Hume 
(1777[1987]: 435) observed, “are no such dangerous monster as they have been 
represented.” Hence they could “supply the order … formerly secured through 
authority” (Appleby, 1987: 188). Voltaire (1778: Letter VI) observed this in action at the 
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Royal Exchange in London:  
 
“There the Jew, the Mahometan, and the Christian transact together, as though they all 
professed the same religion, and give the name of infidel to none but bankrupts. … If one 
religion only were allowed in England, the Government would very possibly become 
arbitrary; if there were but two, the people would cut one another's throats; but as there 
are such a multitude, they all live happy and in peace. 
 
What this meant for the study of social change was that historical accounts of the 
emergence of European society did not require a teleological force to guide and shape 
social change– providence, fortune, the will of a leviathan. Instead, the progress of 
society could be interpreted individualistically, as the outcome of a process of action and 
interaction among 'active beings' and their 'external situation.' Social change itself, the 
outcome of these interactions, was interpreted as a 'catallaxy,' to use a phrase popularised 
by F.A. Hayek (1976[1998]: ch. 10). That is, it was a form of spontaneous order, with no 
common purpose or pre-determined goals of its own. It was, instead, a dynamic, complex, 
open-ended, and contingent process of interaction in which the different purposes of the 
participants are reconciled to their mutual benefit.  
 
The assertion that the defining feature of the concept of progress is that it is non-
teleological may seem odd given that the conjectural histories produced in this era – by 
Kames, Ferguson, Condorcet, etc. – are often considered precursors of the evolutionist 
understandings of civilisation, with Western society at the apex, that people find in the 
stages of development approach most intimately associated with W.W. Rostow (e.g. Rist, 
1997; Hindess, 2007). They are, however, of a fundamentally different character. 
Rostow's book was a work of economic history, using statistical data to identify the 
conditions of the transition from one stage to the next. As Nisbet (1969) has argued, the 
conjectural histories of the eighteenth century were not intended to account for stadial 
transitions. The stages were snapshots, constructed using deductive reasoning and 
whatever information was available from all over the world, and arranged in logical 
order. Only in this strictly logical sense could one say that a particular stage was 
inherently 'higher' than another, in the same way that language must develop before 
poetry can exist. For Ferguson (1767[1782]: 25) the fact that modern societies 'know' 
more than the Greeks and Romans, by a simple process of accumulation, was not a 
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relevant consideration. 
 
“[Are they] on that account their superior? Men are to be estimated, not from what they 
know, but from what they are able to perform; from their skill in adapting materials to the 
several purposes of life; from their vigour and conduct in pursuing the objects of policy, 
and in finding the expedients of war and national defence.”  
 
The focus was not on the direction of change but on how the basic facts of human 
existence – which Barry (1982: B.44) describes as “scarcity, limited altruism, and an 
ever-present desire … to forgo long-run advantages in favor of immediate satisfactions” 
– manifest themselves in a variety of social, political, economic, and environmental 
situations. Adding the stages together into an evolutionary theory is a distortion: there 
was no fixed order, no necessity, and no exclusion of alternative stages. Thus Dugald 
Stewart (1793) observed that due to the nature of conjectural history, different accounts 
“of the progress of the human mind in any one line of exertion … are not always to be 
understood as standing in opposition to each other.” This was because “human affairs 
never exhibit, in any two instances, a perfect uniformity.” Although a logical exposition 
of the manifestations of “that general provision which nature has made for the 
improvement of the race” required, as Nisbet (1962) recognised, a certain linearity, 
progress as it actually occurs “is not always the most natural. It may have been 
determined by particular accidents, which are not likely again to occur” (Stewart, 1793). 
Indeed, Stewart justifies this mode of inquiry not on the basis that it could give a true 
account of how European man, society, or some aspect thereof had come into existence, 
but rather on the basis that could give a plausible account of how it might have come into 
existence. This was valuable because in providing such an account it would discourage 
the tendency to ascribe the emergence of some complex phenomenon to miracles, divine 
and human. Writes Stewart (1793): “a check is given to that indolent philosophy, which 
refers to a miracle, whatever appearances, both in the natural and moral worlds, it is 
unable to explain.”  
 
Thus the proper focus of a study of social change according to the concept of progress is 
not the teleological intent of change itself – where social change is heading – but rather 
the teleological intent of the individuals involved, whose pursuit of their own goals 
produces a spontaneous order. This was the distinction noted back in sections I.3 between 
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the understandings of social change in Wilhelm von Humboldt and J.S. Mill. Mill (1848: 
IV:VI) was, unlike his predecessors, not satisfied with “merely tracing the laws of the 
movement” of society and sought to ask the further question, “to what goal? Towards 
what ultimate point is society tending by its industrial progress?” Humboldt, we saw, 
thought of positive social change as in principle unending, through which it necessarily 
becomes “a dynamic process, rather than a goal that can be specified in advance” 
(Valls, 1999: 259). If there is no end, no end can be specified. Hence Humboldt's analysis 
is not concerned with the content of self-development, but with the attitude individuals 
must take toward themselves and one another if it is to flourish – whatever the direction it 
takes. There are, for Humboldt, but two prerequisites for self-development: freedom and a 
'variety of conditions', which are provided by the free actions of others. Thus, again, 
actual social change is evaluated based on where it has come from rather than where it is 
going. The ultimate direction of social change is not a 'further question' to be tacked on to 
the analysis of a Humboldt: it represents a fundamental alternation to the understanding 
of social change upon which that analysis was based.  
 
What genuine growth requires, said Simmel, is a reciprocal interaction between what he 
called the internal and external logics, between the individual's spirit and the cultural 
forms it encounters. They must feed and be fed by each other's development. This is 
precisely how the theorists of progress saw the relationship between individuals in a 
progressing society and the stuff of development (that is, Simmel's externals). It is not the 
objective value of a cultural form that raises society to a higher plane, but rather the 
subjective value it holds for individuals. Benjamin Constant, for example, said of a 
society's legal system:  
 
“The inherent merit of the law is … far less important than the spirit with which a nation 
subjects itself to its laws and obeys them. If it cherishes them and observes them because 
they seem to it derived from a sacred source, the legacy of generations whose ghosts it 
venerates, then they fuse themselves intimately with its morality, they ennoble its 
character, and even when they are faulty, they produce greater virtue, and consequently 
greater happiness, than would better laws that rested upon the orders of authority.” 
(1815[1988]: 75) 
 
Thus what the concept of progress provides is a way of thinking about social change in 
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which the future-orientation of the concept of development is unnecessary, even 
detrimental. It is not necessary, as the like of Marhsall and Rostow believed, that 
institutions ought to be placed slightly in advance of existing society in order to give it 
something to aim for. There is, for Constant, no correct direction for the law to change, 
but there is a correct way for that change to occur – namely, one in which there is a 
mutual development between individual and institution. By contrast, the concept of 
development, looking at social change from the perspective of an ultimate end, is 
primarily concerned with the objective value of an institution, and therefore cannot 
maintain this contextualising distinction with any consistency. There is a correct 
direction, though the speed with which an institution is adopted may be altered if the 
people have not yet been made ready for it. Daniel Lerner, as we saw, made a similar 
argument to Constant regarding institutions - “individuals and their institutions must 
modernize together, or modernization leads elsewhere than intended” (1958[1966]: 78). 
But in Lerner, individuals and institutions appear as Simmel's internal and external in his 
tragedy of culture – two forces guided by different logics.  
 
The individuals Lerner speaks of are not creative of their institutions but reactive to them. 
Hence his concern with the emergence of more adaptable personality types. The people 
still need a push in the right direction – and a pull back should they threaten to “not be 
deployed in the right direction” (Latouche, 1991[1993]: 88). For Constant ((1815[1988]: 
76), this attempt to impose upon society a form that is not its own is to destroy it. 
“Nothing is more absurd than to do violence to customs on the pretext of serving people's 
interests. … The series of ideas by which their moral being has been gradually formed 
since birth can hardly be modified by an arrangement that is purely nominal, exterior and 
independent of their will.” In Lerner, individuals and their institutions are to modernise 
together but independently; in Constant, they are to change together, as a result of mutual 
influence. 
 
Of course, not all change is good change. But for progress, contra development, it is not 
where change is going that is the relevant consideration, but where it came from. What 
the idea of progress is concerned with is not the content of social change, but with the 
attitude individuals must take toward themselves, the context in which they exist, and one 
another if they and their society are to flourish – whatever the direction it takes. Change is 
the result of the efforts of people to deal with scarcity, to grasp the context in which they 
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exist and in so doing to adapt it to their needs. Progress – good change – was believed to 
occur wherever these activities could take place on a voluntary basis. Progress was 
thought to occur in a way analogous to Simmel's ideal of personal development. He said 
that true self-development is not just inner development (like a seed growing into a wild 
tree) nor just external development (like a tree trunk turned into ship's mast); rather, it is a 
combination of the two – a seed cultivated into orchard tree: “the fruit, despite the fact 
that it could not have come about without human effort, still ultimately springs from the 
tree's own motive force and only fulfils the possibilities which are sketched out in its 
tendencies, whereas the mast form is added to the trunk from an instrumental system 
quite alien to it and without any preformation in the tendencies of its own nature” 
(Simmel, 1908[1997]: 57).  
 
In the same way, progress would not occur when a rigid form was imposed upon a person 
or a society – as Constant makes clear. Nor can it occur without the input and assistance 
of others which would, in Humboldt's words, be no more than a “partial cultivation.” It 
occurs only when these internal and external forces were combined harmoniously, on the 
basis of voluntary interaction. As Humboldt (1792[1854]: 22) put it: “Whatever man is 
inclined to, without the free exercise of his own choice, or whatever only implies 
instruction and guidance, does not enter into his very being, but still remains alien to his 
true nature, and is, indeed, effected by him, not so much with human agency, as with the 
mere exactness of mechanical routine.” Thus Augustin Thierry: “Each time the governed 
gain space, there is progress.” (in Raico, 2012: 201) Thus is not because he thinks that 
society is moving toward some ideal model of Western liberal institutions: the governed 
gaining space is not in itself progress. Rather, there is progress when the governed gain 
space because that space is one of voluntary interaction, a space in which a person's or a 
community's attempts to deal with scarcity are governed by their own ends rather than 
being imposed upon them – that is, a space has been created in which progress can occur. 
 
In the early nineteenth century Benjamin Constant summed up the approach to social 
change contained in the concept of progress with this piece of advice to his government: 
“Obey time; do everything what the day calls for; do not be obstinate in keeping up what 
is collapsing, or too hasty in establishing what seems to announce itself. Remain faithful 
to justice, which belongs to all ages; respect liberty, which prepares every sort of good; 
let many things develop without you, and leave to the past its own defence, to the future 
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its own accomplishment” (1815[1988]: 157). From this apparent faith in the inevitability 
of positive social change arises the perception of 'progress' as a philosophy of optimism. 
The alternatives to self-conscious social-change-as-development would appear to be some 
form of immanent or unconscious social change, and this is how they have been portrayed 
by development theorists. These alternatives, as was argued in section II.2, are portrayed 
as leaving people to be swept along by history or frozen in time by tradition. Only 
development, by taking deliberate control of social change, is liberating and empowering.  
 
Post-development attempted to provide an alternative to this: a conceptualisation of social 
change not based on a particular end. Yet of course not all social change is good social 
change. With an end in mind – the universalisation of Western consumer society for 
example – actual and future social change can be evaluated according to the degree that it 
furthers that end. If social change is unlimited, however, then there is no end upon which 
to base an evaluation of actual and future social change. Instead, it is in post-development 
evaluated based on its unlimitedness: change is bad if it limits potentialities. Post-
development theorists were mistrustful of claims of universal standards in the means and 
ends of development, and in this sense they envisaged social change as truly unlimited. 
Social change would be, ideally, a big conversation rather than a universalised local story. 
As was argued in section II.2, however, if in this type of thinking a theorist does not 
approve of a particular form of change – Western capitalist, usually – it must be portrayed 
conversation-stopping. It has to be imperialistic, racist, universalist, sexist, and generally 
domineering; otherwise there are no grounds, no standards, for excluding it from the 
future conversation. This results in a certain interpretation – or exaggeration – of the 
development discourse. Moreover, whatever is being portrayed as conversation-stopping 
has to be powerful enough to actually do so, which results in other participants in the 
conversation being portrayed as passive or defenceless. In this way, post-development 
retains – indeed, strengthens – many of the dichotomies it was supposed to undermine. 
The West is more Western and more powerful, the non-West is more non-Western and 
more powerless. 
 
The concept of progress is unlimited in the sense that it presents no specific end, but it 
isn't unbounded: there are standards, in addition to unlimitedness. What is envisaged here 
is a social change that is in principle unlimited but in practice bounded at the individual 
level by the individual. Consequently theorists of progress were interested in the attitudes, 
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values, virtues, and practices that reproduce and further society. And 'further' here simply 
means an increase in the prevalence of those practices that reproduce society. The focus is 
on the individual person and how they learn about society and the principles that sustain 
it, how they incorporate those values into their own lives and conduct themselves by them 
and grow through them, how they can interact with people and things which, again, 
allows them to recognise and incorporate what others have to offer into their own internal 
life and reciprocate something to the external world that is similarly valuable to others. 
This kind of individual-level reciprocal interaction, between both people and things, is the 
foundation of society and the font of progress.  
 
Humboldt in particular placed few prerequisites upon a person's ability to approach life as 
an 'active individual,' yet was he was he in this respect severely underestimating the 
material barriers that stand in the way of so many people? Certainly that was the opinion 
of Mill, otherwise an admirer of Humboldt, and others who have followed in his broad 
footsteps and there can be no doubt that there a levels of material deprivation where it is a 
correct opinion. Beyond such extremes, however, one must recall the lessons found in the 
post-impasse development literature reminding us how easy it is to make the leap from 
the observance of material poverty to the assumption of helplessness and passivity (see 
e.g. (Harrison, 2010). When Humboldt (1792[1854]: 29) declares that “all peasants and 
craftsmen might be elevated into artists” he is asking people to find something in their 
lives that is or can be done for its own sake, to see it as such, and to cultivate oneself 
through so that one can consciously see this external thing for what it in fact already is: an 
expression of one's inner self. Mill linked this all explicitly with the 'higher faculties' 
thereby implying the need for more stringent material (and intellectual) preconditions, but 
for Humboldt there was an impulse towards it to be found in human nature and capable of 
expression in all manner of human activity – he argued only that people ought to give it 
more conscious expression so as to reap the full rewards.  
 
Hence Humboldt's concern with 'the manner of the performance rather than the activity 
itself or the material results of it. He is not expecting each individual to pursue great 
social projects or pen literary masterpieces but merely, in Voltaire's famous phrase, to 
cultivate their own garden, to take responsibility for and care of the small part of the 
world they can affect and make it their own, so that by an accumulation of individual 
effort “humanity would be ennobled by the very things which now … so often go to 
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degrade it” (Humboldt, 1792[1854]: 21). The contrast with Mill, who resolved to leave 
'coarse things to coarse minds' until the development of society had done away with them 
for good is stark and significant. Mill's innovation was not merely to recognise that 
material preconditions may frustrate Humboldt's romantic vision; rather, the 
preconditions he saw were the product of a very different way of approach social change 
which, by the logic followed in Part I via Mill, Marshall, and Keynes, raises the internal-
external relationship to the status of a problem to be solved. Though it is important not to 
downplay the effects of poverty it must be emphasised, given the focus of this thesis, that 
poverty, beyond its most debilitating forms, does not alter the nature of the internal-
external relationship in social-change-as-progress or the centrality of the individual to it. 
At the same time, however, these individuals were not conceptualised as the rational 
egoists of economic myth (another of Mill's innovations) pushed by an invisible hand to 
guide society along the path of progress. The next section will look at the eighteenth 
century conception of education in order to elaborate upon who was to fill the space of 
voluntary interaction.  
 
II.7 – Education for Development and Education for Progress  
So far it has been argued that the missing link common to mainstream and post 
development thinking on the internal and external forces of social change is the active 
individual who can stand between the internal and the external. The synthesis produced in 
one that emanates from within the individual and is in this sense natural, rather than the 
artificiality of a synthesis imposed from without. Yet it is not therefore inevitable. As we 
shall see in this section, education – and, in part, schooling – has an important role to play 
in creating individuals capable of performing this role. We shall argue that this 
conception of education and task of the school was held by many prominent scholars in 
the long eighteenth century. The approach to education adds to the understanding of 
social change expressed in the previous section, countering the criticism that the idea of 
progress foresaw a world of atomistic, selfish individuals out of whose interactions 
positive consequences would arise. In addition to these thinkers we shall make use of a 
number of writers from the mid-twentieth century – including C.S. Lewis (1944[1976]), 
George Roche (1969), Albert J. Nock (1932), and Jacques Barzun – who sought to defend 
or revive this tradition in the face of what they considered the pernicious influence of 
Progressive education, which would go on to form the foundation of education for 
development.  
 164 
 
Thus the section will add flesh to the bones of the active individuals at the centre of 
social-change-as-progress, contrasting them with the reactive individuals of social-
change-as-development. Ultimately a key difference between education for development 
and for progress should become clear: if development asks of education that it contribute 
to the construction of its envisioned future, progress asks that it contribute to the 
construction of an individually meaningful present. The former seeks to give meaning to 
the future through an understanding of the present; the latter seeks to give meaning to the 
present through an understanding of the past. Based on this understanding of the role of 
the schools in social change, these two approaches to education will be termed 'future-
oriented' and 'present-oriented' respectively. 
 
General disappointment with the performance of schools around the world has long 
prompted myriad critiques from across the political spectrum, accompanied by a 
proliferation of pedagogical methods. With teaching methods we shall not be explicitly 
concerned in this section. Rather, our focus shall be on the raison d'etre of the school and 
the purpose of learning, and what the concept of progress would mean in this respect 
compared to the concept of development. While thinkers in the field of education have 
spent decades debating technique, seeking a new method of teaching that will restore the 
school to its formerly held position of respect, Neil Postman (1996; 2000) has argued that 
they have ignored the importance of such a purpose: “There was a time when educators 
became famous for providing new reasons for learning; now they become famous for 
inventing a method” (1996: 26). Postman covers some narratives that have in the past 
provided meaning for American society, and with it schooling in American society, which 
have been steadily undermined – the Protestant Ethic, the melting pot, liberal democracy 
– and some from the wider world which have lacked staying power – communism, 
Nazism, fascism, American democracy. One narrative he does not mention, but which has 
been inspirational for a great part of humanity since the Second World War, is that of 
development. 
 
Development, as many others have pointed out, bears all the hallmarks of a faith, of the 
type of narrative Postman believes is necessary: it has its saints and sinners, its heaven 
and hell, its rules of conduct, its sources of authority, its vision of the future, and its 
explanation of the past. Of course, for scholars such as Rist (1997), heaven, virtue, and 
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authority and located in the West, and hell, sin, and subservience in the Third World. It is 
worth mentioning once more that we do not believe this to be the case: if development 
was seen merely as a process of Westernisation we should not expect to see the types of 
debates, proposals, and critiques that we have noted in the previous sections. As we saw 
in section I.9, the critiques of existing systems of education were precisely concerned 
with how distant they were from the everyday lives of people in developing countries. It 
was argued by theorists, practitioners, and politicians alike that schools should be part of 
the local environment, lest they produce graduates suspended between two worlds – 
divorced from the traditional, yet not quite modern. Such graduates would attempt, often 
unsuccessfully, to replicate individualistic Western ways rather than promoting the 
development of their community.  
 
This, at least, was how the existence of thousands of unemployed graduates leaving their 
traditional communities for white-collar work in the cities was interpreted; a problem that 
education for development, i.e. education organised around the development narrative, 
was intended to rectify. Although we have no reason to doubt the sincerity of these 
concerns or the good faith in which an intentional education for development was 
proposed as a solution, it was argued that because the concept of development contains a 
specific vision of what will be allowed to enter into 'modernity', education for 
development must ultimately remain oriented toward that desirable future. Thus, although 
the aim of post-war education for development was in theory to make schooling more 
suited to local needs and lifeways so that people could actively contribute to the process 
of development, in practice it tried to produce young people who could react correctly to 
the demands of modernisation. The school in the developing world remained, therefore, a 
modern thing dressed up in traditional clothing (Thompson, 1981).  
 
The failure of developing nations to achieve universal, free, and compulsory primary 
education by 1980, as promised in the education conferences of the early 1960s, was a 
source of great disappointment. The World Conference on Education for All, held in 
Jomtien in 1990, aimed to bring education back to the forefront of development practice. 
In effect it and the educational philosophy subsequently promoted by UNESCO 
reasserted the education discourse of the late colonial and post-war development era: the 
existing system was accused of producing selfish and materialistic individuals divorced 
from their cultures; if true development was to take place the system would have to be 
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reformed according to local needs and the correct civic values. This new approach has 
been called global citizenship education, citizenship education, cosmopolitan education, 
global education, and a variety of others sharing the same content and origins in 
education for development. This section will use 'global citizenship education' which, 
according to Manion et al (2011: 446), has “virtually superseded DE [development 
education] as a term.”  
 
Global citizenship education has become an important part of UNESCO's work for the 
post-2015 development era. The core competencies include: 1) knowledge and 
understanding of specific global issues and trends, and knowledge of and respect for key 
universal values (e.g., peace and human rights, diversity, justice, democracy, caring, non-
discrimination, tolerance); 2) cognitive skills for critical, creative and innovative thinking, 
problem-solving and decision-making; 3) non-cognitive skills such as empathy, openness 
to experiences and other perspectives, interpersonal and communicative skills and 
aptitude for networking and interacting with people of different backgrounds and origins; 
and 4) behavioural capacities to launch and engage in proactive actions (UNESCO, 2012: 
4). From their analysis of the official policy discourse surrounding it, Manion et al (2011: 
450) found that the “dominant themes [of global citizenship education] are solely about 
making an economic and cultural response to a fixed content, rather than any 
consideration of the possibility of making a political response to a content that might be 
changeable.” They argue that it is “best understood as a reaction to the presumed 'fact' 
of the development of a certain kind of global world economy and society or, the need for 
one, or a fear that it is threatened.” This, however, represents at most only half the story. 
Somewhat ironically, it is precisely the missing half of the story that makes global 
citizenship education a quintessentially development education.  
 
Manion et al.'s (2011) focus on the construction of the new reality is perhaps the result of 
their concern with the Eurocentrism of global citizenship education, which they suggest is 
“being used to tacitly advance particularly Western perspectives over other culture's 
views.” However, if we look at the education discourse as an expression of the concept of 
development, as being concerned with social change understood in a certain way, then a 
slightly different picture emerges. The rhetoric Manion et al. find in the policy discourse, 
according to which reality has already changed and the schools must reflect it, is the 
means by which alternatives ways of doing education are dismissed rather than the 
 167 
organising narrative for education. That is, its function is critical rather than constructive. 
Due to its function Mirel (2003) refers to this rhetoric as a 'rhetoric of revolution' and 
traces it back to the rise of Progressive education in early twentieth century America. 
Mirel makes clear, however, that the new reality is not seen as an unmixed good. Thus 
while Manion et al. are quite correct when they argue that the citizenship education 
discourse posits the emergence of a new reality, that reality is not the fixed content they 
believe it to be. It most certainly does require the kind of political response Manion et al. 
find lacking if mankind is to take advantage of the opportunities it has opened up. The 
key point is not that the world has become a certain way but that having become so it is 
now changing in a certain direction. It is the direction of change rather than the new 
reality itself to which individuals must adjust by making the correct political response to 
the new reality. Thus according to Learning: The Treasure Within (1996: 11), UNESCO's 
statement of its educational philosophy, today's generation of adults is “all too inclined to 
concentrate on their own problems.” People were too concerned with short-term, 
materialistic considerations - “the ephemeral and the instantaneous” (1996: 5) Although 
the developing nations could not yet afford to disregard the imperatives of economic 
growth, it was now evident that “all-out economic growth can no longer be viewed as the 
ideal way of reconciling material progress with equity, respect for the human condition 
and respect for the natural assets that we have a duty to hand on in good condition to 
future generations” (1996: 13). It was the task of education to guide society in the proper 
use of the resources created by economic growth.  
 
UNESCO (2012: 3) has more recently described global citizenship education as “a 
psychosocial framework for collectiveness,” portraying it as a bulwark against selfishness 
and materialism. One report for UNESCO on citizenship education in Barbados talked 
about “low voter turnout at general elections, and escalation in the rates and intensity of 
crime and racially motivated attacks” in countries such as the US and the UK and even 
the genocide in Rwanda as evidence of the need for continuous citizenship education. 
Turning specifically to the situation in Barbados, the authors noted “a lack of cohesive 
spiritual and social values, and unrestricted acquisitiveness in Barbadian society; this 
ruling social passion is tied to a peculiar conception of 'freedom,' one shaped by highly 
individualist perceptions and impulses around crass indifference and materialism” 
(Howe and Marshall, 1999: 11). Note that this 'peculiar conception of freedom' is based 
on perceptions and impulses rather than reason and learning. These people are 
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'uninformed citizens,' who “may have radically different conceptions and understanding 
of the meaning of citizenship for women, the disabled, and other disadvantaged or 
discriminated against groups in the society” compared to informed citizens. “They may, 
likewise, have a very different understanding of the effects and implications of the many 
changes and challenges being produced by globalization.” For 'different', read 'not 
compatible with a truly developed world.' To counter this, citizenship education must 
“inculcate in students values consistent with and supportive of democracy.” In doing so it 
“will be helping to forge the type of citizen the region needs” (Howe and Marshall, 1999: 
6). 
 
Here one can clearly see what the concept of development as an organisational narrative 
for education calls upon the schools to do: it asks them to mould from the young of today 
adults for a specific tomorrow. That is, it calls for schools to be specifically concerned 
with the future. For example, Papastephanou (2002: 69) writes with regards to 
cosmopolitan education – aka global citizenship education – that it “undertakes to impart 
this [cosmopolitan] ideal to the young so as to prepare the advent of such a society. Like 
all visions that regulate actions, the educational ideal of cosmopolitanism is necessarily 
and centrally oriented toward the future.” This future-orientation is clearly evident in 
UNESCO's official literature on education. As it returned education to the development 
agenda UNESCO promoted the idea of a 'necessary Utopia' – an optimistic vision of a 
peaceful and prosperous future society toward which it was the task of UNESCO and its 
education programmes to guide us. “We must be guided by the Utopian aim of steering 
the world towards greater mutual understanding, a greater sense of responsibility and 
greater solidarity, through acceptance of our spiritual and cultural differences. 
Education, by providing access to knowledge for all, has precisely this universal task of 
helping people to understand the world and to understand others” (UNESCO, 1996: 34). 
To this end education would be guided by four pillars: learning to live together, learning 
to know, learning to do, and learning to be. Interestingly, of those four the first was given 
prominence:  
 
“… the Commission has put greater emphasis on one of the four pillars that it proposes 
and describes as the foundations of education: learning to live together, by developing an 
understanding of others and their history, traditions and spiritual values and, on this 
basis, creating a new spirit which, guided by recognition of our growing interdependence 
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and a common analysis of the risks and challenges of the future, would induce people to 
implement common projects or to manage the inevitable conflicts in an intelligent and 
peaceful way. Utopia, some might think, but it is a necessary Utopia, indeed a vital one if 
we are to escape from a dangerous cycle sustained by cynicism or by resignation.” 
(UNESCO, 1996: 20) 
 
This single passage implies a great deal about how UNESCO views positive social 
change and conforms to all that we have said about development's construction of its self 
and its other. Social-change-as-development is motivated by altruism, not selfishness; 
community spirit, not individualism; normative values, not crass materialism; concern for 
the poor, not social Darwinism; it respects traditional cultures, rather than simply 
imposing Western ways; and it is optimistic, not cynical. “Real development is human 
development”, according to the background paper to the Jomtien conference, and basic 
education is its “very foundation” (UNESCO, 1990: 1). Though the paper spoke of 'basic 
education' – a phrase that evokes images of children learning reading, writing, and 
arithmetic – it was promoting an 'expanded vision', in which 'basic' education went 
beyond these essential skills to encompass the values that would be transmitted at the 
secondary school: “Now … there is a need to reinforce and extend basic education to 
bring into being forms of sustainable national development that reconcile cultural and 
technological change within social and economic development” (UNESCO, 1990: 2). As 
Thompson had noted with regard to education for national unity in Africa, this emphasis 
on secondary school education clearly “implies a desire to form the minds and outlook of 
those who are most likely to assume positions of leadership in the society” (1981: 71). 
What UNESCO (1990: 8) had in mind was an active citizen with “the skills to participate 
in a literate, technological world and the knowledge to transform their environment”. 
Education would provide these tools; to be deprived of it would leave the individual 
incapable of “modern living” (UNESCO, 1990: 8). Of course, the 'active' citizen would 
be active in a specific way and for specific ends:  
 
“The satisfaction of these [educational] needs empowers individuals in any society and 
confers upon them a responsibility to respect and build upon their collective cultural, 
linguistic and spiritual heritage, to promote the education of others, to further the cause 
of social justice, to achieve environmental protection, to be tolerant towards social, 
political and religious systems which differ from their own, ensuring that commonly 
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accepted humanistic values and human rights are upheld, and to work for international 
peace and solidarity in an interdependent world.” (UNESCO, 1990: 11) 
 
Just as post-war development education in practice sought to produce people who could 
react properly to the demands of modernisation, so too is the type of activity envisioned 
in global citizenship education more adequately described as reactivity to an external 
motive force. 'Participation in public life' consists here of the individual demanding that 
the state provide those values inculcated during their education. In effect, education 
teaches people to want and demand the specific form of social change called 
development. It helps people “realise their rights” and gives them the skills to demand 
them (UNESCO, 2012: 3; Hanson, 1964[1966]). Thus 'activity' in this sense becomes 
asking for something to be given to you, rather than working to provide it for yourself, 
either individually or collectively. This is quite the opposite of what Humboldt had in 
mind by activity, and indeed works to suppress it: “He [the citizen] now conceives 
himself not only irresponsible for the performance of any duty which the State has not 
expressly imposed upon him, but exonerated at the same time from every personal effort 
to ameliorate his own condition...” (1792[1854]: 20). It discourages both self-reliance 
and the ability of individuals to rely on each other, and is thus anathema to individual 
self-development and social progress. Early in the nineteenth century, Herbert Spencer 
had argued that this conception of the active citizen, who is active in pre-approved 
channels, would be the inevitable consequence of adopting the proposals for national 
education that had at the time started to gain prominence in the Western world: 
 
“For what is meant by saying that a government ought to educate the people? Why 
should they be educated? What is the education for? Clearly to fit the people for social 
life — to make them good citizens? And who is to say what are good citizens? The 
government: there is no other judge. And who is to say how these good citizens may be 
made? The government: there is no other judge. Hence the proposition is convertible into 
this — a government ought to mould children into good citizens. … It must first form for 
itself a definite conception of a pattern citizen; and having done this, must elaborate such 
system of discipline as seems best calculated to produce citizens after that pattern.” 
(Spencer, 1851: 205) 
 
A similar critique was made by post-development theorists as well as some of their 
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forebears in the New Left. They approach the problem from a different vantage point but 
reach the same conclusion. Esteva and Prakash (1998: 112), for example, criticised the 
'secular religion' expressed in the UN's Declaration on Human Rights for urging people to 
demand what they 'need' from the state. Developers have long been trying and failing to 
provide these services to indigenous peoples; now they need only 'educate' them as to 
their 'needs' and 'rights', so that they will actually demand these services previously 
rejected. In doing so, however, people lose the ability to provide for themselves through 
their communal support networks, and fall into modern ruts: “addictive dependencies on 
'social services' that fail to genuinely satisfy or be 'social'” (1998: 113). Helping oneself 
is seen as irresponsible and unreliable, and community solutions not provided or 
approved by the political authority are seen as “a form of aggression or subversion.” For 
both the New Left and the 'old right' demanding one's rights does not constitute activity – 
with both 'rights' and 'activity' understood in the sense used here. Speaking of a right to 
aspects of development is a demand for something that has already been created in and 
for a different context, the product of a prior engagement with internal and external, and 
hence discourages the kind of activity we have in mind, namely, the kind that consists in 
placing oneself between internal and external and finding their synthesis anew. A right is 
a settled question, in principle non-negotiable, and absolute except with regards to other 
rights:  
 
It is not incompatible with this to acknowledge that there are things that people, by virtue 
of being people, have a right to. Humboldt's aim in The Limits of State Action 
(1792[1865]) was as much to argue that individuals had a right to protection from the 
state as to argue that they ought not, in the interests of human excellence and flourishing, 
demand any more than that. It is not even incompatible to suggest that there may be, in 
addition to this, positive rights that individuals ought to be able to claim. The key 
consideration to this thesis, however, is that if active individuals are central to the 
internal-external problem their field of action must remain broad, and any additional 
'right' that must be provided for them narrows that field. The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights has 30 articles, sufficiently broad of scope for Esteva and Prakash (1998: 
112) to speak of it as a Trojan Horse, together forming a 'manufactured maturity' (Illich, 
1971: 60), forcing developing countries down the path followed by Western democracies. 
This approach, according to Ivan Illich (1971: 2-3), leads to a “progressive 
underdevelopment of self- and community- reliance.” The problem here is not merely the 
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imposition of Western ways on the developing world – the critique we have seen levelled 
at schooling in the developing world since the Phelps-Stokes report – but rather the 
attitude that its teaching encourages among the poor; namely, that they have a right to be 
helped. Writes Illich (1971: 60): “Demand for manufactured maturity is a far greater 
abnegation of self-initiated activity that the demand for manufactured goods. … By 
making men abdicate responsibility for their own growth, schools lead many to a kind of 
spiritual suicide.” Thus students are taught that they and their community cannot or 
should not provide certain services for themselves, that they cannot develop themselves. 
Education and schools are here still conceptualised, as in the post-war era, as a bridge 
between tradition and modernity, with an activist role in the pursuit of social-change-as-
development. 
 
If we reject the idea of a deliberately future-oriented education, does education not 
become a conservative force merely reproducing existing society? As we saw above, John 
Dewey (1937:235-238) certainly presented the possible roles of the school in such terms: 
assuming we do not ignore its influence on social change, the school must either help 
build a new future or maintain what is. This claim mirrors the one we have frequently 
seen made by development theorists; namely, that the alternative to intentional social 
change must be conservative of the existing system, with all its follies and injustices. The 
dichotomy, however, is no less false applied to the field of education. Here again the 
concept of progress provides a true alternative. Dewey argued that a present-oriented 
education system would not contribute to social change; we shall now argue that though it 
would not contribute to social-change-as-development, it is vital to social-change-as-
progress. 
 
Much of the thinking on education in the eighteenth century proceeded on the basis of the 
cultivation metaphor, which describes the vital role of education in the journey from 
childhood to adulthood. The metaphor comes in a number of variants. Rousseau, for 
example, in his famous Emile (1762[1921]: 9), envisioned children as seedlings with the 
potential to blossom into a flower given proper nurturing: “Plants are fashioned by 
cultivation, man by education.” Similarly Fordyce (1745: 191-2) wrote that: “[A]s the 
Minds of Children resemble the uncultivated Garden of Nature, their Improvement will be 
according to the Nature of the Soil, and the Care and Skill of the Gardeners they meet 
with.” Benjamin Franklin (1749), in a pamphlet on education in colonial America, 
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compared education with the tilling of soil: “though the American Youth are allow'd not 
to want Capacity; yet the best Capacities require Cultivation, it being truly with them, as 
with the best Ground, which unless well tilled and sowed with profitable Seed, produces 
only ranker Weeds.” Meanwhile Felton compares the child to a rough diamond: “the 
fairest diamonds are rough till they are polished. … We are untaught by Nature, and the 
finest Qualities will grow wild and degenerate, if the mind is not formed by Discipline, 
and cultivated with an early Care” (1713: 8). 
 
Further examples could be drawn from tracts on education from throughout the eighteenth 
century; the education as cultivation metaphor was ubiquitous. This is important for an 
obvious reason: it tells us what these writers thought education was supposed to be. 
Implied in the metaphor is a conception of education as a process of maturing. The child, 
the little seedling, contains within the potential to grow into a flower, if their soil provides 
sufficient nourishment and the gardeners they meet along the way provide proper care. It 
is, therefore, explicitly teleological; its aim is to turn the child into an adult human, to 
“initiate him in the Elements of the Perfection of his Being...” (Fordyce, 1745: 197). This 
has important implications for the curriculum, the most obvious of which being that it 
must be centrally concerned with what was then called the nature of man, its telos. This is 
why, as Turnbull put it, “man is the properest study of man.” He continues: “Whatever 
else one may have learned, if he comes into the world from his schooling and masters a 
mere stranger to the world, quite unacquainted with the nature, rank, and condition of 
mankind, and the duties of human life (in its more ordinary circumstances at least) he 
hath lost his time; he is not educated; he is not prepared for the world; he is not qualified 
for society; he is not fitted for discharging the proper business of man” (1742[003]: 161; 
Fordyce, 1745: 30). The 'nature of man' is, of course, an unfashionable phrase these days. 
It has too often been used as a lazy rationalisation of what is – it is 'human nature' to be 
selfish, to make war, to care only for one’s own kind, and so forth. As it is used here, 
however, the phrase does not have such a specific content. As Turnbull saw it, for 
education to impart to the child an understanding of the nature of 'man' the curriculum 
would have to address questions concerning 
 
“what is the perfection to which man may be cultivated, and what is the culture and what 
the means for accomplishing this noble end. And to know the stock, the furniture, with 
which nature hath favoured man, the best use of this provision, the end for which it is 
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bestowed upon us, the dignity to which we may arrive by the proper cultivation and 
employment of it; and what is this due culture and best employment of the powers 
conferred upon us, that make our stock for use and enjoyment.—This is to know man; to 
know his rank in nature, the end of his creation, and his relation to the universe, and to 
its supreme Maker and Lord. And thus alone can one know what he was designed for, or 
what he ought to aim at and intend; what is his best employment and truest good, the 
noblest and wisest course he can pursue”. (1742[2003]: 164) 
 
Mankind's 'rank in nature' fell between the divine (pure spirit) and the animals (pure 
appetite), the 'furniture with which nature hath favoured him' being the reason by which 
an individual could regulate their impulses and become their unique self: “we have it in 
our power to examine our opinions, and to chastise and correct our fancies, and by this 
discipline to take off our affections from improper objects, and to place them aright, or 
according to the true estimations of pleasures and pains” (1742[2003]: 176-177). It was 
the “chief business of man” to govern oneself according to one's reason, which involves 
not the suppression of the affections – the passions and imagination – but rather the 
ability reflect maturely before we choose and the commitment to act accordingly: it is 
evident, Turnbull said, “that the perfection, the dignity of a being endowed with the 
power of comparing, computing, judging and choosing, called reason, consists in 
reason’s holding the reins of government with a steady hand, and letting out or taking in 
the affections, and directing all their courses according to its best views, upon duly 
weighing and balancing the consequences of pursuits and actions” (1742[2003]: 164). 
Thus Turnbull argued, in light of the 'nature of man,' that one of the most important aims 
of education was to teach children how to gain self-mastery over their 'affections' by 
imposing on themselves a set of values and practices which they had made their own.  
 
Education is here based on the belief that “the really valuable power in this universe is 
not the power over other men, but the power over oneself. This power reflects not only 
knowledge, but restraint; not only energy, but will. To maintain standards means to 
develop the capacity to choose and reject, to have so disciplined ones attitudes as to have 
established an ethical center uniquely oriented to self, producing right conduct in the 
individual no matter what the conduct of the world around him might be” (Roche, 1969: 
80). It is in the formulation of a style or decorum that is uniquely one's own that, in Irving 
Babbitt's words, “man attains to the truth of his nature” (1919: 128). Thus education was 
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considered formative because it sought to “powerfully inculcate the views of life and the 
demands on life that are appropriate to maturity and that are indeed the specific marks, 
the outward and visible signs, of the inward and spiritual grace of maturity. [T]he 
establishment of these views and the direction of these demands is what is traditionally 
meant … by the word 'education'”(Nock, 1932: 53). 
 
How was this to be achieved, and in what respect do we believe that these adults are the 
active individuals described above? Before we look at the type of subjects recommended, 
one point is of vital importance: education is ultimately something that has to be achieved 
by the individual. The modern expression that one goes to school to 'receive' an education 
is entirely out of place here. It is clear from the cultivation metaphor that education was 
thought of as formative, that there was a plant toward which the seedling was 
progressing; but the child is not taught citizenship, or tolerance, or how to get along with 
others (all of which have been part of education for development). These may result from 
education but are not part of it. C.S. Lewis (1944[1974]: 23) described the difference as 
follows: “When the old [style of education] initiated, the new merely 'conditions.' The old 
dealt with pupils as grown birds deal with young birds when they teach them to fly; the 
new deals with them more as the poultry-keeper deals with young birds – making them 
thus or thus for purposes of which the birds know nothing.” John Locke, who’s Some 
Thoughts Concerning Education was immensely influential to eighteenth century 
thinkers, stressed this point: “Every man must some time or other be trusted to himself 
and his own conduct; and to be a good, a virtuous and able man, one must be made so 
within. And therefore, what he is to receive from education, what is to sway and influence 
his life, must be something put into him betimes: Habits woven into the very principles of 
his nature, and not a counterfeit carriage and dissembled outside …” (Locke, 
1690[1824]: 24). The curriculum was designed, as J.W. Gardner would later put it, to 
“shift to the individual the burden of pursuing his own education.” The teacher does not 
form the child, but rather is there to provide the tools, the building blocks, and the 
example of an educated adult that children will need if they are to cultivate themselves. 
For, as Percy Shelley reminds us, “[t]he plant must spring again from its seed or it will 
bear no flower...” (1821: 4) 
 
We might broadly divide education into the three aspects just mentioned – examples, 
tools, building blocks – with the caveat that they were not intended to be as distinct in 
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practice as that would imply: all are present at every stage in the child's education, though 
their relative importance changes. Fordyce divided education into four stages, of which 
the last, 'commerce with the world,' takes prominence only after school. The other three 
are infancy (up to 5 years old), domestic (up to 14 years old), and academic (up to 20 
years old). On the importance of examples we need not say too much, as this was of 
primary importance only during the very early years of education – Fordyce's 'infancy' 
stage. Locke's associationist psychology had taught that the child's mind was susceptible 
to picking up good and bad habits from an early age, and the earlier they are picked up 
the more ingrained they become. As the child familiarises himself with the uses of reason 
– the capacity to understand, compare, judge, etc – the relevance of good examples 
gradually diminishes. The exception to this is the example set by the teacher, which must, 
according to Fordyce (1745: 15), always contain “more persuasive and emphatic lessons 
than all his Precepts.” The teacher must live their lessons rather than merely preach 
them, otherwise their students are likely to reject them. 
 
More relevant here are the other two aspects: the tools and the building blocks. The 
master tool was, of course, the reason with which nature hath favoured man. Like any 
tool, the child would require training in order to gain proficiency. Here we find in 
curriculum proposals from this era (such as Robert Dodsley's The Preceptor and 
Benjamin Franklin's Education of Youth) familiar subjects such as reading, writing, 
arithmetic, and English. In addition, there were subjects which have since fallen out of the 
curriculum, the most prominent of which were oratory or rhetoric, the art of public 
speaking and argumentation, and logic, the art of thinking. These latter two were rightly 
considered absolutely vital if the schools were to turn out adults capable of calm 
judgement and independence of thought. Both analyse statements and arguments, and 
how they can be used either to discover truths about reality or abused to hide them 
(Fordyce, 1745: xxiv). Mastery of these subjects would provide the student with 
“everything … one needs to know in order to use a language in a disciplined way and to 
know when others aren't” (Postman, 2000: 163). In short, they teach the student how to 
think for themselves. This was both a guard against political and religious propaganda 
and other fallacious arguments made by others, but also key to Turnbull's assertion that 
individuals ought to examine their own opinions and 'chastise their fancies.'  
 
During this stage the child would also become acquainted with more academic subjects 
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such as history and geography. At this point, however, they are taught primarily with a 
view to their formative potential. By introducing the idea of distance in space and time 
the child gains a sense of perspective, learning that there are many interesting things 
going on outside their own small part of the world. Benjamin Franklin, in his pamphlet on 
education, gave this introduction to history a special name: chronology. The child would 
here learn the 'several principal Epochs' into which the past can be divided, through which 
they would gain a sense of how long ago some major event happened, “what Princes 
were Cotemporaries, what States of famous Men flourish'd about that Time, &c.” At the 
same time, in geography the child would be “required to point out the Places where the 
greatest Actions were done, to give their old and new Names, with the Bounds, Situation, 
Extent of the Countries concern'd,&c.” (Franklin, 1749; Dodsley, 1748: xxi) From these 
studies, according to Jacques Barzun, “[w]hat should be left in the young mind is: the 
doings and the names of men and women who actually lived on this earth 'like you and 
me' and the vision of their dress, hairstyles, equipment, and modes of speech. With these 
fundamentals should go the notion that each of us has a history of our own, each of us is 
part of the stream of history. [And that] 'one of us in the class' may in the future be 
'important historically'” (1984[2002]: 404).  
 
The aim of education for progress, to repeat, was to turn out adults capable of judging, 
choosing, and acting well in the world. For this, as Turnbull noted, it was necessary to 
have the type of knowledge of things that could only be gained by formal learning: 
“wisdom consists in having just ideas of pleasures and pans, true notions of the moments 
and consequences of different actions and pursuits, whereby we may be able to measure, 
direct or control our desires or aversions”  (1742[2003]: 177). Thus as the child grows 
older the curriculum becomes increasingly oriented toward academic content – Fordyce's 
final stage of schooling. The subjects are generally familiar to us, though not all remain in 
the school curriculum: natural sciences, mathematics, economics, literature, history, law, 
religion, ethics. Again, however, their role in the formation of mature adults influences 
how these subjects are presented to the student: they were all to be taught historically. 
According to William James (1907[1987]: 1243):  
 
“You can give humanistic value to almost anything by teaching it historically. Geology, 
economics, mechanics, are humanities when taught with reference to the successive 
achievements of the geniuses to which these sciences owe their being. Not taught thus, 
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literature remains grammar, art a catalogue, history a list of dates, and natural science a 
sheet of formulas and weights and measures.”  
 
In practice this meant that the subjects were taught in terms of the knowledge mankind 
has created about the world (sciences, economics, maths, languages), the values and 
beliefs past generations have found useful when acting in the world (ethics, law, religion, 
literature, arts), and, of course, accounts of what they have actually done with their 
knowledge and values (history). Thus the student, having become acquainted with the 
nature of man, now surveys and scrutinises “the …  record of what the human mind has 
hitherto done with those [fundamental] instincts [of mankind]; what it has made out of 
them; what its successes and failures have been; and what is to be learned from both” 
(Nock, 1932: 54). Most importantly they were to be taught as that record. Teaching 
economics historically, for example, would involve not just modern orthodoxies but also 
past successes and failures, the innovations and struggles which give those orthodoxies 
contextualising meaning and life. This gives context to the facts the child learns – without 
which, says Dodsley (1748: xxi), the child would only “darken his mind with a Crowd of 
unconnected Events.” – as well as providing examples of what the human mind can 
accomplish in skilful hands, the struggles behind all achievements, and the values and 
attitudes others have found useful in meeting such struggles. 
 
By the end of their school career, the child, it was hoped, would be furnished with the 
tools (reason, self-command, vicarious experience) and the building blocks (knowledge, 
values) with which they could complete their own transformation from seedling to plant, 
from child to mature adult. The child is then no longer “a mere stranger to the world, 
quite unacquainted with the nature, rank, and condition of mankind, and the duties of 
human life...” Rather, they are “prepared for the world … qualified for society … [and] 
fitted for discharging the proper business of man” (Turnbull, 1742[2003]: 161) An 
understanding of what one is, where one is, and what one sees allows the child to “feel 
more at home in our inescapably double environment, natural and man-made.” (Barzun, 
1991: 95). The individual who is educated in this traditional sense is one in possession of 
a mind that is both disciplined and experienced: disciplined by the content of its studies, 
experienced by their historical perspective. It is “a mind that instinctively views any 
contemporary phenomenon from the vantage point of an immensely long perspective 
attained through this profound and weighty experience of the human spirit's operations” 
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(Nock, 1932: 52). It is this ability to stand back from the vicissitudes of life, to judge and 
compare and choose from a position of knowledge both of oneself and of the outside 
world that was considered the mark of maturity: “One able to oppose desires, and to call 
his opinions to account, and furnished with the knowledge of the effects and consequences 
of actions requisite to shew him how he ought to behave in every case, is qualified for life. 
But without the latter, one cannot judge, but is in darkness. And knowledge, without the 
former, can only serve to create remorse for not taking or following its counsels” 
(Turnbull, 1742[2003]: 177). 
 
The similarities between the role played in the progress of society by this educated adult 
and by the active individuals described above should now be evident. Convinced, as we 
have seen, that progress required on the one hand voluntary social interaction and on the 
other individually structured practices of freedom – that is, societally unlimited and 
individually teleological social change – education for progress was to turn out the types 
of individuals who could put the theory into practice. “This educational goal,” says 
Roche (1969: 14, 22), “might be described as the quest for 'structured freedom,' freedom 
for the individual to choose within a framework of values … It is this capacity to choose, 
limited by the framework we have inherited, which man must come to understand and 
deal with if he is to be truly 'educated.'” This educated individual is able to perform the 
task attributed by Cassirer to the individual recipient of cultural forms. Cassirer's 
individual sees these forms not as something solid to which one must 'adjust' (the goal of 
education for development), nor as something made up of smaller but equally solid 
entities from which one might pick and choose. Rather, because they have, thanks to their 
education, “the will or the ability to penetrate into their genuine centre, into their 
particular form,” these individuals can turn the apparently solid cultural form back into 
the spirit Simmel thought was lost (Cassirer, 1942[2000]: 112). It is not, as Simmel 
believed, the nature of the form itself that is relevant here, but the individual receiving it, 
and whether that individual is willing and able to judge it for what it is and incorporate it 
into their self.  
 
There is no methodology to work with here, to tell one where to go and what to look for: 
only individual judgement of what is relevant. Hence what Goethe thought was the 
modern thing to say: “But is this really true – is it true for me?” (in Trilling, 1961[2008]: 
382). Felton contrasted these approaches to cultural forms in his Dissertation on Reading 
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the Classics (1707). He had little respect for those who merely look for and record what 
various classical authors said on a certain theme, rather than reading the works 
reflectively and as a whole. He accepts that the latter is necessarily lacking in a rigorous 
method, but argues that this is not to be held against it: “how many Scribblers are there 
who observe the [method], and neglect the meaning, and what number of Pedants do we 
meet with, that keep to the Letter and lose the Spirit?” (1707: ix-x). He compares this 
with someone taking down a beautiful old building and arranging the different materials 
into groups. “The materials are certainly very good, but they understand not the Rule of 
Architecture, as to form these into just and masterly Proportions any more. And yet how 
beautiful would they stand in another Model upon another Plan!” He advised that the 
proper way to study and remember the ancients is not through pedantry: one must “relish 
their way of Writing, enter into their Thoughts, and Imbibe their Sense.” That is, there is 
no need to imitate the ancients, but rather to enter into their spirit and take inspiration 
from them. The great schools of artistic endeavour that emerged during the Renaissance, 
he points out, took inspiration from the Greek artistic spirit, yet are esteemed as original 
and valuable in their own right. Thus he concludes: “this is what I would have Your 
Lordship do: Mix and incorporate with those ancient Streams; and tho' Your own Wit will 
be improved and heightened by such a strong Infusion, yet the Spirit, the Thought, the 
Fancy, the Expression which shall flow from Your Pen, will be entirely your own” (1707: 
43-47).  
 
For this to work as intended one needs not a method but a framework of values that one 
has made one's own, a sense of self from which the cultural form can be approached. A 
self - “that is to say, a solid entity that you can trust, because you have made it yourself 
and made it well” - which is not a haphazard collection of habit and prejudices and 
notions but “an ordered set of reflections, conclusions, and convictions” (Barzun, 1991: 
199, 200). The formative side of education in the traditional sense aimed to provide 
students with the tools (logic, rhetoric, language, historical perspective) and the building 
blocks (history, art, literature, economics, sciences) to construct their own unique sense of 
self. This solid self, furnished with knowledge and judgement, would provide a reference 
point, allowing the educated adult to understand and judge the world around and to act in 
the world based on that judgement from within a framework of values giving meaning to 
his or her actions. Writes Turnbull (1742[2003]: 162-263): 
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“Where are we? Under what roof? On board what vessel? Whither bound? On what 
business? Under whose pilotship, government or protection? What are we? Whence did 
we arise? Or whence had we our being, and to what end are we designed? To what 
course of action are we destined by our natural frame and constitution? What have we to 
do? How are we to steer? What to pursue, and what to avoid? What goal are we to aim 
at; and how are we to direct and turn the chariot? These are the great and important 
questions with regard to which till one is able to satisfy himself, he is an absolute 
stranger to himself, to his nature, origin, end, interest and duty.” 
 
As mentioned above, one criticism of this approach, which became increasingly prevalent 
as Progressivism took over education, was that it merely sought to transmit traditional 
views and ways of life to the young. Worse, those traditions were said to be the product 
of a world that no longer existed. It seemed both conservative and anachronistic. The old 
way, Dewey said, was “very much at odds with democracy” as it developed behaviours 
“in which most individuals are expected to submit constantly and docilely to the authority 
of superiors” (Dewey and Dewey, 1915: 163). He thought very little of the conception of 
education based on the cultivation metaphor, mocking the idea that “education is making 
a little savage into a little man, that there are many virtues as well as facts that have to be 
taught to all children so that they may as nearly as possible approach the adult standard” 
(Dewey and Dewey, 1915: 135). Just as Keynes argued that the industrial age called for 
'new wisdom' in economics, so Progressive educators such as John and Evelyn Dewey 
(1915), Harold Rugg and Ann Shumaker (1928), and W.H. Kilpatrick (1918) felt the need 
for a revolution in education to fit the new age: “We are living to day in a totally new 
civilization – an order of life utterly unlike that known to men or conceived prior to the 
nineteenth century. Industrialism has transformed an individualistic order into a mutually 
interactive group life” (Rugg and Shumaker, 1928: 13). The world, they argued, was now 
changing at such a rapid pace that there was little point in learning the traditional 
discipline(s). Children would have to learn practical knowledge and skills, as well as what 
we would now call 'critical thinking' (which then as now does not involve the study of 
logic and rhetoric but, as Lionel Trilling (1966: 5) wryly notes, “means to think in the 
progressive pieties rather than in the conservative pieties.”) The quest for the mature 
adult, who could structure his or her world and guide their actions according to a well-
developed self was not a fit goal for education in the industrial, democratic age. It 
produced rigid, stubborn individuals who could never be at home in the new world, which 
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required more adaptable and group-focussed citizens: 
 
 “The idea of perfecting an "inner" personality is a sure sign of social divisions. What is 
called inner is simply that which does not connect with others-which is not capable of 
free and full communication. What is termed spiritual culture has usually been futile, with 
something rotten about it, just because it has been conceived as a thing which a man 
might have internally-and therefore exclusively. What one is as a person is what one is as 
associated with others, in a free give and take of intercourse.” (Dewey, 1916: 143) 
 
How different from Voltaire's injunction in his Candide (1759[1901]) to cultivate your 
own garden, according to which each individual's perfection of their own inner 
personality is a vital component of social progress. How different from Goethe's maxim 
that “Anything that emancipates the spirit without a corresponding growth in self-
mastery, is pernicious.” Rather, 'society' produces its own growth; teaching the child 
anything but conformity to it clearly has 'something rotten about it.' We can see here why 
Dewey's ideas were so influential among post-war educators working in development: the 
world is changing in a certain way, to which the individual must be taught to adjust. This 
is the new goal of education for the new age. The child must learn, as we have seen, the 
technical skills required carry out the plans made by others, and the social-democratic 
values of adjustment. 
 
Education for progress, on the other hand, aimed to turn out individuals who approach life 
in society as a poet approaches language: with an understanding of its principles, an 
understanding of the demands it places upon them, a recognition that while it is not 
wholly their own they can nevertheless, with this understanding and the commitment to 
act upon it, use it to nourish themselves and others. Progress is teleological at the 
individual level; education for progress is concerned with how that telos is chosen: “The 
individual must be free to choose, yet must be provided with a framework of values within 
which meaningful, civilized choice can take place” (Roche, 1969: 24). It is, to quote 
Albert J. Nock (1932: 54), “the establishment of certain views of life and the direction of 
certain demands on life, views and demands which take proper account of the 
fundamental instincts of mankind, all in due measure and balance; the instinct of 
workmanship, the instinct of intellect and knowledge, of religion and morals, of beauty 
and poetry, of social life and manners.” A recent Oxfam (2006: 3) publication, by 
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contrast, asked that schools produce adults who are “outraged by social injustice” – as if 
outrage is a suitable foundation for change in society. The 'historical sense' one gains 
through the vicarious experience of reading history guards against precisely this: seeing 
the world in terms of extremes, of good and evil. It reminds us that all motives are mixed; 
that abstract ideas must be filtered through concrete interests and experience. It tells us 
that there are practical limits to utopias and comforts us with the knowledge that our 
present-day problems have been and are being faced by others. It guards against the 
tendency to be taken in by panics and fads. 
 
Whether such a present-oriented educational system contributes positively to social 
change depends on how on conceptualises social change. One can easily imagine that 
from the perspective of social-change-as-development, education for progress would 
seem unreliable and conservative. Recall Papastephanou (2002: 69), for example, 
describing citizenship education as the means to “prepare the advent of [a cosmopolitan] 
society” which entails that it is “necessarily and centrally oriented toward the future.” 
Clearly if the school is no more than a reflection of existing society there is no reason to 
expect the emergence of the desired future state. However, from the perspective of social-
change-as-progress, because it focuses on how the individual acts in the present as the 
key to progress, it is important to have an education system that instructs the child in how 
to understand that present and the making of choices within it, based in part on the 
experiences of past generations. Thus, such an educational system does not, as Dewey 
claimed, neglect its role in social change. Its envisioned role is based on a different 
conception of social change: it does not presume to know where the children of today will 
take society tomorrow; rather, it attempts to ensure that they understand both themselves 
and what they are changing. The shift from one to the other, writes Richard Weaver 
(1964: 260-261), was nothing short of a revolution: 
 
“[I]n the past every educational system has reflected to a great extent the social and 
political constitution of the society which supported it. This was assumed to be a natural 
and proper thing, since the young were to be trained to take places in the world that 
existed around them. They were "indoctrinated" with this world because its laws and 
relations were those by which they were expected to order their lives. In the period just 
mentioned, however, we have witnessed something never before seen in the form of a 
systematic attempt to undermine a society's traditions and beliefs through the educational 
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establishment which is usually employed to maintain them. … [T]hey have issued a 
virtual call to arms to use publicly created facilities for the purpose of actualizing a 
concept of society not espoused by the people. The result has been an educational 
system … increasingly at war with the aims of the community which authorizes it....”  
 
Properly considered, then, education for progress is not a conservative barrier to social 
change. Recognising this avoids the dilemma which, as we saw in section II.9, was 
experienced by post-war educationists working in developing countries. They wanted 
schools to contribute positively to social change, yet simultaneously knew it was 
important that they were perceived to be part of the indigenous community. The solution, 
whereby schools were intended to act as a ‘bridge from tradition to modernity,’ failed 
because the school remained modern in spirit and was not incorporated into the 
developing society in the way intended. But the problem itself, the disconnect between 
the two requirements for the school, exists only when social change is viewed from a 
particular perspective – social-change-as-development – according to which the school 
must first be taken out of 'traditional' society and made more 'modern' before it can 
contribute to social change, whereupon it is returned to society disguised in a manner that 
will make its modern spirit seem less alien. According to the concept of progress, this 
dilemma never existed: a school that contributes positively to social change and a school 
that reflects in spirit 'the community which authorizes it' are one and the same thing. A 
present-oriented education does not merely reproduce existing society, as Dewey believed 
it would, because it enables people to take conscious possession of their present. Just as a 
poet has a more conscious relationship with their language than do people who simply 
grew up with it, so too is that kind of relationship possible with the rest of the social 
context in which we live. 
 
This understanding of who the educated individual is and why they are key to positive 
social change fills a gap often left by analysts of the eighteenth century idea of progress 
who would portray its proponents as naïve idealists. As Peter Gay (1964: ch.9) long 
argued, although the eighteenth century has often been derided for its apparent ahistorical 
optimism, for believing that progress was inevitable, for writing off the Middle Ages as a 
'blip' in the story of progress, the great histories of this century – Voltaire's, Vico's, 
Gibbon's – all attest to and investigate the rise to and fall from civilisation. Progress was 
not something that had been 'done,' nor a thing to be 'achieved' or a problem to be 'solved' 
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once and for all. It is only in the work of modern development theorists that we find any 
suggestion that the material progress of society in the West has become automatic and 
that it can become so elsewhere. Rather, there was a recognition that, as the Spanish 
philosopher Ortega y Gasset pointed out, “[c]ivilisation is not 'just there,' it is not self-
supporting. It is artificial and requires the artist or the artisan. If you want to make use of 
the advantages of civilisation, but are not prepared to concern yourself with the 
upholding of civilisation- you are done. In a trice you find yourself left without 
civilisation. Just a slip, and when you look around everything has vanished into air. The 
primitive forest appears in its native state, just as if curtains covering pure Nature had 
been drawn back” (1930: 61). He warned that forgetting this is a tragic failing. Writing in 
1930, he argued that society was producing people who did not  
 
“see the civilisation of the world around [them], but [who use] it as if it were a natural 
force. The new man wants his motor-car, and enjoys it, but he believes that it is the 
spontaneous fruit of an Edenic tree. In the depths of his soul he is unaware of the 
artificial, almost incredible, character of civilisation, and does not extend his enthusiasm 
for the instruments to the principles which make them possible. … The principles on 
which the civilised world – which has to be maintained – is based, simply do not exist for 
the average man of to-day. He has no interest in the basic cultural values, no solidarity 
with them, is not prepared to place himself at their service.” (1930: 56, 62)  
 
Around the same time we have seen that Georg Simmel had made a similar observation, 
attributing the disconnect between individuals and the various cultural forms to a 
seemingly inevitable tragedy of culture. He believed it was inevitable because the finite 
forms a culture produces – its arts, laws, morals, economic products, etc. as they actually 
exist – can never fully satisfy the fluidity of the spirit which produced them. He argued 
that cultural objects would increasingly “deviate from the direction in which they could 
incorporate themselves into the personal development of human minds” ((1908[2000]: 
72). Ernst Cassirer, we saw above, proposed that Simmel's mistake was to consider only 
the creator and the created, and to ignore the recipient of the cultural form who can turn it 
back into the spirit which produced it. If so, the phenomena Simmel attributed to a 
tragedy of culture are in fact, as y Gasset recognised, evidence of a human failing, a 
decline in the qualities and attitudes required to act as Cassirer's active recipient. C.S. 
Lewis (1944[1974) saw it too, and argued in his short work on education that the decline 
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of traditional curricula and standards was leading to an 'abolition of man' in the sense 
which the likes of Turnbull used that word. As we have argued in this section, education 
for progress aims precisely to create and nourish in the child the capacity and inclination 
to judge, understand, and incorporate, – all from the perspective of one's individual self 
and within a framework of values – which the eighteenth century associated with the 
mature, civilised, educated adult. The mature adult was the key to positive social change 
because of their capacity to operate in the spaces for voluntary (inter)action opened up by 
the idea of progress: a good, present-oriented education provided them with, on the one 
hand, the ability to give meaning to the world based on their own knowledge, values, and 
convictions, and, on the other, with the understanding of and solidarity with the principles 
upon which previous generations had built the world they found themselves in which is 
necessary to change it in compatible ways. Satisfied that it had done this work, the school 
could send its charges out into the world, confident that although it had not sought to 
prepare the advent of a desired society, the future of society had not therefore been left to 
chance or whim. 
 
II.8 – Implications: Development, Progress, and the West 
Any attempt to take lessons for the contemporary approach to social change, both 
theoretically in terms of how it is conceptualised and practically in terms of how it feeds 
into areas such as education, must take into account an important feature of the modern 
world, namely, the existence of ‘developed’ nations. For the eighteenth century theorists 
of progress and education whom we have met in the previous two sections this was not a 
major concern. For development theorists it is inescapable, however problematic the term 
‘developed world' might be. Indeed, the form that the internal-external problem has taken 
has been, as was mentioned in the introduction, the proper relationship between 
developed and developing in the process of development. Undoubtedly it is difficult not 
to be self-conscious of the social change of one's own society when such prominent 
examples of development exist. In this section the issue how to act 'consciously,' as an 
active individual, in a world where one is encouraged to act 'self-consciously' according 
to the powerful example set by e.g. the West (which may also take the form of 
deliberately rejecting that example) will be considered. It will do so by exploring the 
place of the experience of the developed world in the process of development in light of 
the foregoing discussion of the internal-external problem as conceptualised by the 
concepts of development and progress. The reintroduction of the active individual allows 
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us to conceptualise the Western example as a focus for creative 'imitation' rather than as a 
'monolithic necessity' to be adopted, adapted, or rejected. The implications for an 
education for progress updated for the modern world will be explored as the section 
proceeds, along with some potential objections. 
 
The role of the developed world in the process of development is more ambiguous than it 
first appears – even in modernisation theory, which, we are told, was little more than a 
'celebration of the achievements of the advanced industrial countries' (Brohman, 1995: 
125). It was argued in Part I that development is a self-conscious understanding of social 
change, in the sense that it posits that for social change to be positive a society must 
become aware of its own future and take control of its movement towards it. As Pearson 
(1970: 6) put it, development “unites … the belief in progress and the conviction that 
man can master his destiny.” Thus development requires something outside of the 
spontaneous, internally-generated change of the society itself in order to turn mere social 
change into development. The problem is not that the 'internal' element is ignored by 
development theorists, but rather that while both it and the external force are both 
necessary they are operating according to different logics. Development theorists have 
been charged with placing agency in the hands of the developers rather than the 
developing, but that is only half the story. It is in fact recognised by all that it is the 
internal which must remain the ultimate font of agency. Thus the problem confronted by 
development theorists is how to retain a role for the external, though it is understood to 
impose an alien form, so that change occurs in desirable directions and by desirable 
means, but to simultaneously give to the internal, which is perceived to be the ultimately 
creative force, a large enough role such that the external influences will not become 'mere 
additions' but will constitute genuine and sustainable development. 
 
Consequently, on the understanding social-change-as-development the Western example 
is emphatically not the great creative force in social change. It is suppressive of the free 
movement of developing societies. Of the three possible responses Lerner believed 
developing nations could make to the various elements of the Western example, only 
adapting and rejecting are creative. 'Accepting' is seen as a mere copying of an external 
model, to which the other two are necessary additions borne of a recognition that 
development must be something more than that. This is why Samuel Huntington could 
find more to praise in the Soviet government's interactions with the Third World than he 
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could in the United States'. The US, he felt, tried to dictate too much to developing 
nations, while the USSR allowed for far more room to manoeuvre provided the country in 
questions remained within the Soviet sphere of influence. Learning from the Soviet 
approach, he believed, would benefit both the US in its fight against communism and the 
Third World in its quest for development. The difference between 'mainstream' 
development theory and alternative approaches such as dependency or post-development 
is on this point rather small, being one of degree rather than principle. All are in 
agreement that imitation of the external – that is, adopting certain aspects of it without 
significant alteration – is not a creative act. They differ only in the degree to which they 
believe that it is a necessary one. Either way, the external is thought of as a force that 
suppresses the free movement of the internal, and the acceptance of its demands are an 
acquiescence to power.  
 
We see this, for example, in the modernisation theorists' concern with the 'internal 
Eurocentrism' of developing societies, which would cause them simply to passively 
accept Western influences rather than adapting them to their specific context or rejecting 
them as incompatible with it. It is visible more concretely in policies aimed at protecting 
indigenous languages from the spread of English or protecting traditional products and 
methods of production from alternatives imported from overseas. More clearly, however, 
we can see the implications of this understanding of the relationship between developed, 
developing, and social change in the realm of education. 
 
The stand-out feature of modern education for development – the variations on 
'citizenship education' – is its global outlook. Unsurprisingly many scholars – such as 
Gough (2002), Jickling and Wals (2007), Manion et al (2011) – have expressed 
skepticism about the globality of global citizenship education (GCE). Manion et al (2011: 
452) argue that GCE is a Western response to Western concerns about “the presumed 
'fact' of the development of certain kind of global world economy and society.” 
Consequently it is “worth interrogating for signs that it is being used to tacitly advance 
particularly Western perspectives over other culture's views.” For, being a Western rather 
than a truly global perspective on and response to globalisation, GCE serves to reduce 
“conceptual space, autonomy, and alternative ways of thinking” (Jickling and Wals, 
2007: 4). Accurate as these critiques may be, there is no reason, given the presumed place 
of the West just mentioned, to believe that it will cause great concern among development 
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theorists and practitioners, who are presumably aware of their Western influences. For 
example, Gough's (2002) primary concern is the environment and sustainability in GCE, 
which he finds to be based on a Western understanding of mankind's relationship with the 
natural world. However, he must admit that the authors of the work on which he focuses 
his critique engaged carefully and sympathetically with non-Western alternatives before 
reaching their conclusions. They are, therefore, well aware of their 'Eurocentrism' (as 
Gough still insists on calling it) and the change in outlook it will require in many 
societies.  
 
What has happened – missed in Manion et al.'s (2011) account of education's 'global turn' 
– is that the perceived 'development of a certain kind of global world economy and 
society' has required a re-evaluation in what it is in the Western example that is relevant 
today. Thus Howe and Marshall (1999: 6) argue for the necessity of GCE in the 
Caribbean based on the new reality of a “Western hegemonic power which is now no 
longer about repression, but rather characterised by a deceptive subtelty capable of 
undermining Caribbean sovereignty, dignity, and identity.” As we saw in the previous 
section, combating this includes some classics such as education regarding democracy 
and equality, to which are added modern concerns such as respect for diversity and 
sustainability. These are the new global values, necessary for development to occur in the 
modern world. 
 
This has an obvious benefit for the advocates of GCE, for it allows them to associate 'bad' 
citizens with those who have uncritically adopted the subtly hegemonic negative aspects 
of Western culture. This allows them to avoid the charge that they are essentially 
criticising a society for not being Western enough. When Howe and Marshall say that the 
“uninformed citizen” may have “radically different” understandings of the role of 
women and minorities or of the origins and effects of globalisation, they do so in the 
context of a Barbadian society they say is currently in the grip of “crass indifference and 
materialism” (1999: 6, 11). It is the deceptive subtlety of Western political and economic 
power, rather than any deficiency in the local culture, which necessitates the inculcation 
of values no less Western in reality yet said to be part of a universal human heritage. 
 
'Protecting' developing societies from excessive Western influence is one of the few areas 
where the old paternalism of development, so heavily criticised, remains acceptable. 
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Indeed, with the portrayal of the modernisation approach as being rabidly pro-Western 
this particular form of paternalism has been disguised as the product of modern 
enlightened sensibilities. Yet it is at heart little different to the modernisation theorists' 
concern with internal Eurocentrism. As times change and our understanding of what it is 
in the experience of developed nations that is worthy of being shared with others shifts, so 
the old understanding comes to be seen as less necessary and therefore merely restrictive 
of the developing world. On that basis it can be reinterpreted as never having had any real 
concern with the developing world, being merely a celebration of the achievements of the 
West, as Brohman said of modernisation theory, or an attempt to spread globally what 
was thought to have worked for the West, as Cyril Black alleged of nineteenth century 
liberalism. The new approach will be different because it will recognise the central 
importance of the developing society itself, as Lerner claimed political modernisation 
would do, and hence become a more inclusive approach to development, as Ban Ki Moon 
has said of the post-2015 agenda.  
 
It may be thought that this is, in the real world, a reasonable balance. It is not perfect, but 
is it not idealistic to imagine that the developing world could be a fully active producer of 
its own development without 'de-linking' from the developed world? For better or worse, 
there exists a developed world, and we would be foolish to ignore it in our pursuit of the 
world we want. Given that the wealthier nations have knowledge, expertise, or at the very 
least resources that could be of some benefit to the developing world, why not try to use 
them even if some of the 'spontaneity' with which social change may have occurred in the 
past is lost? Of course, there are some things which we count as universal aspirations – 
democracy, equality, etc. – but if development can be pursued without it involving the 
imposition of a certain way of life, with the wealthier nations using their power not to 
dictate to the developing world but to facilitate their own conception of positive social 
change, flavoured with those universal aspirations, would it not be wise to take that 
course regardless of abstract considerations of what really constitutes an 'active' role in 
social change? At the very least it sounds like a step in the right direction, signalling a 
recognition that development must be a global conversation in which all can have a voice 
rather than being a Western story imposed upon the world. However, understanding 
social change according to the concept of progress, with the active individual at its centre, 
we can see that the world does not have to settle for this. Re-imagining the place of the 
developed world is vital to moving development beyond this situation and beyond its past 
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failures.  
 
The place of the experience of developed societies in the process of development appears 
differently when viewed according to social-change-as-progress. Thinking of social 
change as a conscious rather than self-conscious endeavour helps us see how 'imitation' of 
the external can be a creative act on the part of individuals. Imitation of an external 
example can be creative from the point of view of conscious social change because the 
internal and external exist in a relationship given concrete meaning by this imaginative 
effort of individuals. Take, for example, the issue of gender equality, a key component of 
the new post-2015 development agenda and an important value for GCE to inculcate. 
Gender equality is considered not only a good in itself, it is also an instrumental good in 
relation to development. For instance, it unleashes the creative and productive power of 
women in economic, political, and social life, thus driving and shaping social change in 
ways that in principle reflect the entire society rather than just half of it. Now, concepts 
such as gender equality do not exist in isolation from other concepts because they do not, 
as Hume pointed out, refer to a 'fact' in the real world. Instead, they refer to other 
concepts. Gender equality is and must be defined with reference to concepts such as 
liberty, justice, democracy and so on in a self-referential web (see Dworkin, 2011: Part 1). 
The totality of this web is the current form of the intellectual, moral, and cultural tradition 
just mentioned, the reality with which the term gender equality is connected. 
Incorporating a concept such as gender equality into one's life and worldview involves 
more than accepting its demands in an abstract way. To do so would be to treat it, as 
Locke put it, as a 'counterfeit carriage,' in the sense that it has a tendency to assert itself 
over other concepts when called upon but remains silent when not. Creative imitation 
involves, in Babbitt's (1919: 18) phrase, an “immediate insight into the universal” – that 
is, in the present case, an insight into the intellectual, moral, and cultural totality of which 
the concept is part. As we are here concerned with the interaction of internal and external, 
developing society and a Western example, we can go further and say that it involves an 
insight into two totalities: that of the external concept and the internal life into which it is 
to be placed. Reconciling them is a process that involves subtle refinements of the 
concept itself and delicate alterations to the strands of the web into which it is to be fitted. 
Imitation thus conceived is a 'soul to soul encounter,' and insofar as the apprehension of 
the 'soul' of a thing requires an insight that cannot simply be communicated to someone 
else it is profoundly creative.  
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It should go without saying that there is no final definition of this totality. There is no 
essence or entity that can be approached. At the same time, however, the active individual 
needs something solid. Out of the abstract and fluid 'conglomerations of huge potential 
energies' that are the internal and external, the individual must create something concrete 
and approachable to work with. “Their content exists for us only by virtue of the fact that 
it is constantly taken possession of anew and as a result always created anew” (Cassirer: 
1942[2000]: 111). Once again we find ourselves in the realm of l'esprit de finesse, where 
the concepts are familiar yet unclear and where only individual judgement can help us 
find our way. There is a reciprocity here which is too often overlooked. Each attempt to 
'define' the Western example, to give definite form to its fluid energy, will be incomplete 
and ultimately unsatisfactory. This is as inevitable as it is irrelevant. For at the other end 
of the process there is that being ignored by Simmel: an active individual, for whom this 
incomplete definition of 'the West' functions as “a working model. It allows us to 
imagine” (Glissant, 1990[1997]: 169). Or more precisely: it allows us to re-imagine. It is 
not a rigid form suppressing the free movement of developing societies from which they 
need to be protected so that they can accept, adapt, and reject aspects of it. Rather, it is as 
the classical world was to Renaissance Italy: a “conglomeration of huge potential 
energies, which are only waiting for the moment when they are to come forward again 
and make themselves manifest in new effects” (Cassirer: 1942[2000]: 113). Thus neither 
external nor internal is the creative force; only the active individual standing between 
them, giving them shape and meaning. 
 
Presenting Western ideals as universal and necessary has generally been criticised for 
silencing alternative voices. Based on the analysis of this thesis we might say instead that 
the practice should be condemned for failing to provide a 'conversation partner,' a vehicle 
for the further expression and articulation of the internal conducted by individuals. The 
problem is not that schools pass on to students Western concepts which suppress their 
own culture, but that the interaction between them is so heavily mediated (in order to 
avoid rather than achieve the suppression of the internal wherever possible) that the 
possibilities for a cultivating encounter are severely reduced. In effect, students are taught 
to accept some aspects of the Western experience as 'global' things and on that basis – 
rather than on the basis of 'the things that are part of [them]' as Glissant advised – reject 
other aspects. This reflects the focus on the place of the developed world, which stems 
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from the belief that imitating (aspects of) it is not a creative act on the part of the 
developing society and hence that the developing society needs to be protected from it in 
some measure. The external consequently does not interact with the internal until the 
former has been 'sanitised.' When the two do finally meet the external has been largely 
emptied of the intellectual, moral, and cultural baggage which filled it with the 'spirit' 
necessary for it to serve as a vehicle for transformative engagement. Removing this 
baggage means that it has little connection to a reality of its own and consequently no 
obvious connection with the 'internal' intellectual, moral, and cultural reality in which the 
student exists (Manda, 2007: 36). 
 
Faced with the overbearing power of the Western example the impulse is to make it less 
'active.' This has been the goal of modern development theory, but the attempt to 'de-
Westernise' development has the opposite of the desired effect. It upsets what Glissant 
calls the 'age-old ways' of cultural interaction, which involved active relay agents who 
“needed relative obscurity … in relation to their perception of the results of their action” 
before they could be picked up by the host society. Today, Glissant argues, we have 
neutral 'flash agents.' They are neutral not in the sense of being ineffective but in the 
sense that they are obscured beneath the spectacle they produce: “what is spectacular 
about the agent overrides the continuum of its effect, and masks it through the very 
organization of its spectacle” (Glissant, 1990[1997]:166, 177). The neutrality of the 
agents of modern cultural interactions – which Glissant finds manifested in international 
institutions, globalised ideas and ways of life and so forth – impedes the reciprocal re-
imagining noted above because the context of a concept such as gender equality is 
masked beneath the spectacle of the concept itself. As a consequence these agents “send 
consciousness hurtling into the sudden certainty that is the possession of the obvious keys 
of interaction or, usually, into the assurance that it does not need such keys” (Glissant, 
1990[1997]: 166). Where once the neutrality of the Western example came from its 
universality, now it comes from the denial of its universality. It is the spectacle thus 
produced – the spectacle that sends consciousness hurtling – that it must be possible to 
stand back from if the Western example is to be approached by active individuals as a 
focus for creative imitation. The Western example – or any other external example – does 
not need to be hammered into shapes or expressed in terms that are more 'relevant' to 
other societies prior to its interactions with them. It is more important that the sense of 
vitality and potential energy, of the concept's complex and varied connection with a 
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recalcitrant reality, be maintained, for it is this rather than isolated concepts that must be 
engaged with if the encounter is to be a cultivating one.  
 
Post-colonial theorists have also criticised GCE for ignoring the degree to which the 
concepts and values it covers are embedded in a Western context, yet because they, too, 
tend to understand the Western example as an imposition the conclusions they draw are 
similarly detrimental to the work of the active individual. The post-colonial premise is 
that the claims to universality present in development education – as taught in both the 
West and elsewhere – serves to mask and reproduce colonial attitudes and unequal power 
relationships. Hantzopoulos and Shirazi (2014), for example, studying GCE in Jordan and 
the United States, argue that the discourses of ‘choice,’ ‘accountability,’ and 
‘participation’ surrounding GCE produce and are produced by an image of the citizen 
which suits the needs to the state in the seemingly inescapable reality of the neo-liberal 
world economic order. By failing to problematise these concepts GCE reproduces the 
structures that produced them. Moreover, Andreotti (2006) and Dobson (2006) have 
argued that by struggling to acknowledge the historical, social, and cultural roots of the 
injustices it seeks to address (by which they mean the West’s complicity in them) 
development education leaves people with a vague moral commitment to a common 
humanity rather than a desire to do justice to those who have been wronged. This, worries 
Andreotti (2006: 83), “may end up promoting a new civilising mission as the slogan for a 
generation who take up the ‘burden’ of saving/educating/civilising the world. This 
generation, encouraged and motivated to ‘make a difference,’ will then project their 
beliefs and myths as universal and reproduce power relations and violences similar to 
those in colonial times.” Well-meaning as development education is, if it does not 
recognise the depth and complexity of the power relations in which it is embedded it will 
be doomed to reinforce rather than challenge Western superiority. 
 
Development education ought, from this post-colonial perspective, be geared towards 
confronting and challenging the historical nature of the injustices of the present and the 
assumptions and attitudes that sustain them. The ‘Through Other Eyes’ project was one 
attempt to put the theory into practice in Western classrooms. According to Andreotti and 
de Souza (2008) the project conceptualised four learning aims: 1) learning to unlearn, 
which involves perceiving our ‘cultural baggage,’ how it came into being, and what 
sustains it; 2) learning to listen, which involves recognising the limits of our own 
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perceptions and being receptive of others’; 3) learning to learn, which involves learning 
how to re-arrange and expand our own perspective, to be comfortable ‘crossing 
boundaries’ without the desire to turn the other into the self or the self into the other; and 
4) learning to reach out, which involves learning, engaging, and teaching with respect and 
accountability in the unpredictable space in which identities and power and negotiated. It 
is instructive that they speak, in the first place, of ‘unlearning.' It is, in this view, the 
social duty of schools to stand as a bulwark against all the inherited prejudices and 
assumptions of normalcy that are transmitted to young people via everything from 
newspapers and entertainment to parents and politicians. A major part of traditional 
education, argues Spivak (1999: 2), has been to 'teach' students to ignore that “[t]he 
mainstream has never run clean,” amounting to a “sanctioned ignorance.” Western 
society is trying to reinforce its own position of power relative to the developing world; 
the great hope for positive social change is an education system that stands against society 
in order to help its students break the cycle.  
 
This understanding of the social duty of the school permeates the post-colonial 
educational literature (see e.g. Beverley, 1999; Moore-Gilbert, 1997). Thus Paulo Freire, 
who in his Pedagogy of the Oppressed (1968[2000]) was one of the first to articulate a 
post-colonial approach to education, argued that the ‘oppressors’ have created an 
“unauthentic view of the world” in which the reality of oppression is hidden or justified 
(Freire, 1968[2000]: 50). Traditional education would only reproduce this false yet 
powerful ‘reality,’ and thus it was necessary for people to be educated in a way that 
“presents this very situation ... as a problem. ... A degree of consciousness of their 
situation leads men to apprehend that situation as a historical reality susceptible to 
transformation” (1968[2000]: 73). Herein lies the value of ‘unlearning.’ People are 
submerged in what presents itself as a “dense, enveloping reality” and emerging from it 
is a step towards consciousness (1968[2000]: 100). Based on this, Freire argued that the 
eponymous pedagogy would have two parts: first, the world of oppression must be 
unveiled and the student committed to transforming it; second, the myths of the old order 
which are confronting the new must themselves be confronted.   
 
Thus it is, from the post-colonial perspective, by unlearning the West and the ‘reality’ that 
its example creates that the West’s position of power and dominance over our minds will 
be reduced.  Now, ‘unlearning’ implies some prior learning, but it what sense have the 
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students of development education learnt the social context they are to question? In Freire 
(1968[2000]: 100), the Latin American poor with whom he is concerned are already 
‘submerged’ in the false reality; Spivak speaks of inherited prejudices and a sense of 
certain things as ‘normal’ (Moore-Gilbert, 1997: 31); Andreotti and de Souza (2008), in 
their discussion of the Through Other Eyes project, are concerned with the ideas, values, 
and attitudes written on to our identities by the social context in which we live. In each 
case the process of learning that which is to be unlearned is rather passive. Students have 
not held the social context before them as an object of contemplation or study. They are at 
this stage surely only partially immersed in it and are at best only vaguely aware of its 
constituent parts and their meaning. TOE used a metaphor to explain that we all have our 
own experiences, values, and concepts: they are the shoes we wear as we walk through 
life. What they do not say is that it takes time for a child to grow into shoes that have 
been handed down by previous generations, to learn how to tie their laces so that the 
shoes are a help not a hindrance, and to learn how to take such care of their shoes that 
they can be handed down, marked by another life of use yet still intact, to the next 
generation. 
 
This is important because the stated aim of these approaches is to encourage critical 
thought about aspects of our social context that appear natural or universal. This is, as 
mentioned above, how post-colonial education proposes to deal with the place of the 
West in the modern world. Yet without prior engagement with the target of ‘unlearning’ 
there is no foundation for critical thinking. Critical engagement requires the ability to 
make the object of critique ‘speak’ back to you, and this will not occur if you cannot give 
it voice. Some vaguely-held prejudices will offer no resistance and thus give students 
little sense of the recalcitrance of the reality they are confronting, At best the result will 
be a phenomenon that Lionel Trilling observed in progressive education, namely, the 
replacement of the conservative pieties by the progressive pieties. It is difficult, for 
example, to imagine how a person, having gone through development education along the 
lines of Freire, could come to the conclusion that the capitalist system is just and still be 
considered to have demonstrated critical thought.  
 
At worst unlearning without learning would result in the distortion of both the target and 
the critique itself. Some anecdotal evidence may suffice to make this clearer. In essays 
relating to post-colonialism many students use Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness 
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(1990[2008]) as an example of Western portrayals of Africans as savage and primitive, 
because it is an example popular in their reading. In fact, in Heart of Darkness and other 
short stories such as An Outpost of Progress, first published in 1899 and 1897 
respectively, Conrad effectively mocks the liberal pretensions of later imperialism, but as 
most of these students do not actually read his work Conrad becomes, in their mind, just 
another Western imperialist, too submerged in the prejudices of his day to see things from 
our enlightened perspective. Moreover, without engaging with its target the critique itself 
loses its nuance and sense of its limitations. The significance and meaning of a rich story, 
full of insights into the human condition and with a complex relationship with 
contemporary imperialism, is collapsed into a single word – savages – and thrown out 
with other examples of imperialistic racism. The part highlighted by the critique becomes 
the whole, because the rest is unknown and, indeed, not worth knowing. 
 
While post-colonial education envisions school as a place where students learn to think 
critically about a reality thrust upon them by the rest of society, the conceptualisation of 
that reality as something passively received, half-formed and vague precisely because it 
seems ‘normal,’ undermines that goal. There is a significant difference between being 
able to criticise something and being able to think critically about it. The post-colonial 
approach focuses on the ability to criticise a world that from the outset is assumed to be 
unjust in specific ways, and is thus likely to produce individuals who, like the students 
who saw no need to read Conrad, have little willingness to engage with a society so full 
of prejudice and injustice. Unlearning something you have never learned amounts to a 
refusal to learn, a refusal to engage with it on its own terms. Clearly this is not conducive 
to the active individual’s need to approach the Western example as a ‘conglomeration of 
potential energies’ rather than as something that is necessarily restrictive. The post-
colonial perspective is, like education for development, hampered by the assumption that 
to contribute to social change schools must in some way stand against society as it 
currently exists. The concept of progress, as was argued above, denies this and gives 
schools the task of creating a meaningful present rather than of guiding society towards a 
more progressive future. The individual is, to be sure, born into and shaped by a social 
context; but it is only through education that they actually take possession of it and make 
it a part of themselves. Although both may be said to ‘re-produce’ existing society they 
are of a very different nature, just as the poet ‘possesses' a language in a different way 
from the average native speaker. This process of becoming conscious of one's social 
 198 
context is education in the truest sense of the word: the effort of cultivating a self that is 
more than a bundle of attitudes, prejudices, and values received from society. It is, from 
the perspective of education for progress, the social role of schools to start children on 
this lifelong journey. 
 
An important part of that is what post-colonial education tries to do: point out the 
constructed and contested nature of most of what makes up our social contexts. Yet 
individuals must be able to turn those formless conglomerations into something more 
concrete and personal with which they can act. Engaging with them creatively – as 
opposed to merely accepting, adapting, or rejecting them – requires the ability to see past 
the neutralising spectacle produced by the modern world. It requires a mind that refuses 
to see things in terms of extremes of good and evil; that recognises that all motives are 
mixed and that no virtue and no vice need imply another; that understands that abstract 
ideas must be filtered through interests and practicalities; that knows there are limits to 
utopias but does not let this lead to cynicism; that, seeing how our present-day difficulties 
have been and are being confronted by others, does not get taken in by panics and fads; 
and that accepts that we, other people, and the world do not need to be perfect to be good. 
The education for progress described in the previous section aims to help individuals 
achieve this, not by providing a clear method or by simply telling students, as the TOE 
project did, that all cultures have an internal dynamism, but by accustoming their minds 
to the vision of this human drama. For above all it requires a mind that knows these things 
not in the abstract but through experience. That experience comes from encountering and 
engaging with the history, literature, art, poetry, ideas, and values that make up our social 
contexts. 
 
In order to achieve this what is needed in schools is not less of the West but more of it, 
approached and taught differently. Development-related concepts with origins in an e.g. 
Western intellectual tradition ought to be taught as Western concepts rather than as global 
or universal – even if one believes them to be the latter. With a contextualised 
understanding of how people have dealt with the issue of e.g. gender equality in the past, 
how its scope and definition have been contested, and the implications this has had for 
wider society students will be far more capable of effecting lasting change than if they are 
taught merely that they ought to be 'outraged by social injustices.' The Western example 
ought to be treated in schools as Barzun and Trilling argued literature ought to be treated. 
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There, too, one is confronted with concepts that are in plain view but messy and 
unfocussed, and 'reading' them requires experienced, individual judgement if they are to 
be turned into something meaningful. As mentioned in the introduction, they objected to 
studying modern literature academically because we are already part of the social context 
that gives life to those works, but they recognised that it was still necessary to have the 
skills – no longer supplied by the education of their day – to stand back and use that 
context. Hence their approach to teaching literature:“[T]he group [of students] would 
read the books assigned and discuss them with the aid of all relevant knowledge – 
historical, aesthetic, logical, comparative, philosophical, [etc] … no holds barred. But 
what was relevant? Ah, that was the purpose of the exercise: to develop judgement to the 
point where nothing foolish, nothing forced, nothing 'viewy,' nothing unnecessary is used 
that might stand in the way of understanding and enjoyment” (Barzun, 1989: 83). The 
judgement thus developed is what is required to act as the 'You' in Cassirer's response to 
Simmel; the active individual who can approach a cultural form not as something rigid 
but as something that can be incorporated into them and 'kindle their activity.' 
 
Education for progress, then, would seek neither to deny the ‘Western-ness’ of the 
Western example, as GCE does, nor to follow post-colonialism and undermine its 
influence; rather, education for progress would seek to enable people to stand back from 
the spectacle produced by the Western example. This will naturally require a broader 
study of Western thought, art, and history than is presently the case. However, it should 
not be taken to imply that the Western example is a kind of 'package deal' – that 
incorporating a concept such as gender equality requires the acceptance of a broad range 
of the Western developmental experience. This, it is rightly feared, would mean either 
that 'development' is so uniquely Western that it cannot take root elsewhere or that it must 
consist in a Westernisation of the world and hence a return to the neo-imperialistic 
implications of twentieth century development. Such a fear only makes sense if the 
Western example is viewed as an imposition. Approaching it as a 'multiform elsewhere' 
raises the question not of whether a concept can be transferred as it is or contorted in 
order to fit into a new context, but rather of whether it can be confronted in such a way 
that its vitality can be maintained. This is done precisely by not trying to make it 'relevant' 
on behalf of someone else. Finding concrete form in this 'conglomeration of huge 
potential energy' is the first part of the active individual's creative role.  
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The other side of the coin is a similarly structured but deeper and broader engagement 
with one's inherited culture, the internal, which is the web into which external concepts 
are to be fitted. It was argued above that education for progress would be a 'present-
oriented' education – that it would enable students to give meaning to their present 
through an understanding of the past rather than asking them to build a specific future. 
This present does not have to be twisted and contorted in an effort to make it resemble 
something that it is not or serve a purpose that is not its own. Again, the urge to make the 
inherited cultural possession 'relevant' to modern concerns ought to be resisted.  Starting 
plans for schooling, as the GCE proposes, from the values we think it would be useful for 
children to find in their engagement with their society and the wider world places a 
significant obstacle between the child and the goal of education for progress. Reading 
great books (fiction and non-fiction), poetry, traditional songs and so on in order to find 
lessons on modern understandings of equality, democracy, the rule of law, and tolerance 
flattens and homogenises one's history and culture, narrowing its relevance to current 
political concerns and fashions. It implies that ‘unfashionable’ thinkers can find little 
connection with their cultural inheritance, and that even for the rest of us its value will 
fade as attitudes change. Again, it is precisely by to make the cultural inheritance 
‘relevant’ to today’s problems that the transcendent, enduring value of that inheritance is 
indirectly communicated to the next generation and that makes it a worthy focal point 
source of a sense of belonging. It is the most compelling reason for a student to take 
possession of 'the things that are part of us.'  
 
All this points to the conclusion that a policy of education for progress would reverse the 
'global turn' witnessed in education since the 1990s (Manion et al, 2011; Hutcheson, 
2011). Does this not make it quite provincial, quite ethnocentric? The answer must be 
yes. 'History' to the eighteenth century pedagogue meant national or European history, 
and 'universal history' was Western civilisation since the Greeks, which dealt with other 
cultures only as they impact or are impacted by the West. There are, however, good 
reasons for doing so. Dodsley and Franklin both argued that studying history would not 
reach its full formative potential if the student had no notion of the historical, social, and 
geographical context of the events and peoples they were learning about. Mere 
information is pointless. “No one was ridiculed more in the eighteenth century … than 
the pedant, the person who collected information without purpose, without connection to 
social life” (Postman, 2000: 86). We learn not by accumulating disconnected facts but by 
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making connections from what we know to what we does not yet know. This is why one's 
own culture is a logical starting point for the study of history: the child has more existing 
knowledge to make connections with. Writes Barzun (1991: 72-73): “He or she 
understands what houses look like, what being married means, and why people go to 
church or to an election booth. The very words for these and a thousand other things, as 
well as the motives and feelings linked with the actions or conditions they denote, do not 
need to be taught at all: they are the well-known facts of daily life.” When one considers 
that even with this foundation the study of Western history is too great a task to be 
completed by the time one leaves school, proposals along the lines of teaching the history, 
arts, and ideas of non-Western cultures – the construction of an other-oriented curriculum 
(Papastephanou, 2002) – seem sadly impractical. Inevitably, and despite the best of 
intentions, they descend into mere exotica; students spending a week or two learning 
about 'African' dance or 'South American' art, for example. The contextualised encounters 
with non-Western cultures in the universal histories of the eighteenth century are not 
meant to imply that only the Western world has historical agency or is worthy of deep 
study; rather, they are to act as a meaningful starting point from which the student can 
undertake the study of a culture to which their schooling can do no justice. Moreover, the 
recognition gained through historical study that one's own culture, which initially seems 
familiar and uniform, is in many ways strange and messy guards against the tendency to 
see these encounters as all the foreign culture has to offer. 
 
Clearly there is a distancing at work here, and with it an impulse towards the 'us' and 
'them' categories we find it so important to break down. Yet the sense of distance gained 
by this 'provincialism' – by approaching the internal and external as distinct yet formless 
conglomerations – serves to reduce the apparently overwhelming power of Western 
influences. Moreover, there is a simultaneous distancing in relation to 'the things that are 
part of us.' This ability to stand back was the great benefit foreseen by Turnbull and the 
other theorists of education cited above of their proposals. “Cultivation … calls for a 
certain detachment – standing off and looking, comparing, reflecting, concluding” 
(Barzun, 1991: 201). What convinced them of the need for such an education was the rise 
of 'public opinion' in the national newspapers and metropolitan coffee shops, through 
which people were exposed to a cacophony of opinions and ways of seeing the world. 
Education was intended to help people take a step back from the apparent confusion 
within their own society and not get swept along in its flow.  The prominent position of 
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the West in the modern world – which similarly subjects the developing world in 
particular to “the constant influence, the literal in-flowing, of the mental processes of 
others” (Trilling, 1972: 61) – is a difference of degree not type compared to Turnbull's 
time and makes his proposals all the more relevant.  
 
Nevertheless, one of the objections raised by the Progressives against what we have 
called education for progress was that what it taught and how it sought to teach it did not 
fit the plurality of the modern world. Their rhetoric of educational revolution, as Mirel 
(2003) has shown, has never truly left us. Where Dewey and others saw a world rapidly 
changing due to first-world industrialism, post-war development educationists saw a 
world rapidly changing due to third-world industrialism and modern educational 
reformers see a world rapidly changing due to globalisation. In each case it was argued 
that the new world was a more connected world, that individuals and communities could 
no longer see themselves as separate from one another, and that it was therefore an 
important task of education to promote the collectiveness and solidarity which the 
contemporary world was perceived to be lacking. Thus global citizenship education is, 
according to UNESCO (2012), “a psychosocial framework for collectiveness” which 
promotes “a sense of belonging to the global community and common humanity, with its 
presumed members experiencing solidarity and collective identity among themselves and 
collective responsibility at the global level.” It is certainly true that traditionally schools 
taught nothing of the sort: they did not teach children how to be tolerant, empathetic, 
global citizens. It is questionable, however, whether the failure to do so is a valid 
criticism of an institution which has contact with children for a few hours a day for ten to 
fifteen years of their life. Citizenship education has its ideal of the citizen just as what we 
have called education for progress has its ideal of the mature adult. However, as argued 
above, the task of the schools was to give students the tools and building blocks to effect 
this themselves. The self each child would create with these tools – as well as a myriad of 
other influences from their life – adds flesh to the abstract skeleton of the ideal of the 
mature adult, and must be uniquely and truly their own rather than, in Locke's words, “a 
counterfeit carriage.” It is a long process, which by no means ends with the child's school 
career. Education so conceived is ultimately an individual undertaking in which schooling 
has a clearly and narrowly defined role. Whatever qualities one associates with the 
educated individual, they were by-products of schooling. Education may be the hope of 
the world, but schooling alone certainly is not. 
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By contrast, as we saw above, Oxfam (2006) gives schools the unenviable task of 
teaching children values such as a commitment to social justice, concern for the 
environment, self-esteem, a sense of identity, and value and respect for diversity, as well 
as skills such as the ability to challenge injustice and inequality. The teacher, in addition 
to imparting knowledge and setting a good example, is asked to be a social worker and a 
psychiatrist. At best we might say that this is ambitious, at worst, folly. The values we 
expect of the 'good citizens' schools are supposed to turn out – tolerance, democratic 
participation, concern for social justice, respect for rule of law – are by-products of 
schooling. You can't directly teach someone to be tolerant any more than you can teach 
them to be happy or proud. Tolerance is an attitude, and attitudes are learned by repetition 
and moralising – neither of which are conducive to good teaching. Soon enough students 
will catch on and realise that all they need to do is display the outward signs of the 
appropriate attitude. It does not become a part of them, to be carried with them for the rest 
of their lives, as it would if it was the result of education rather than schooling.  
 
As Manion et al (2011: 453) argue, the idea present in GCE that something like self-
esteem or a commitment to social justice can and ought to be directly taught in schools 
reflects an “understanding of citizenship as a competence (i.e. as a set of skills and 
dispositions that individuals can possess).” It suggests that “if all citizens have the right 
competencies, democracy [or any other positive social outcome] will simply happen.” 
Certainly not all those who advocate citizenship education have such a simple view of 
what citizenship is or how democracy can be achieved. But in trying to reduce it to a 
systematic, teachable subject the end result seems inevitable. Instead, say Manion et al 
(2011: 453), citizenship should be seen as “an ongoing practice … something people do.” 
It is an art, and like all arts it cannot be 'given' to a student any more than development 
can be 'given' to a society. As Dodsley (1748: xvii) counsels with regards to the teaching 
of poetry, rhetoric, and drawing, their practice cannot be taught, so “nothing is attempted 
here but to teach the Mind some general Heads of Observation.” He recognised that the 
school must limit its activities and ambitions to what is teachable; its role in an 
individual's education extends no further. This may not be the most inspiring role for the 
school to play in social change, but once again we must insist that it is not an abdication 
of such a role: it is a call to do well what can be done.  
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Something else to remember when we are told that our rapidly changing world has 
rendered the educational philosophies of the eighteenth century irrelevant is that the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries saw significant changes of their own. Indeed, 
the shift from the horse-and-cart to the steam engine, from a rural and agricultural to an 
urban and industrial society was greater than anything seen in the twentieth century. It is 
precisely in times such as these that the classical education shows its true value. The 
habits of mind it is intended to instil – “of persistent scrutiny, of sensitivity to what is not 
said but implied, of patient meditation after encountering what is strange” (Barzun, 
1987[2002]: 416) – guard against the tendency to get swept up in what others proclaim to 
be the course of history, to, in Turnbull's (1742[2003]176) words, “live in a most 
tumultuous, irregular manner, and be a prey to every specious fancy that may be 
presented to [the] sense or imagination.” In short, it teaches students that they must deal 
with a rapidly changing society not by merely adjusting to it or to a perceived future state 
of it but by understanding the principles upon which the present had been built and by 
judging it and the changes taking place for themselves from the perspective of the solid 
self they have built, the inward liberty they have achieved, using the tools and building 
blocks found at school and elsewhere. The idea that we have to use what is new merely 
because we can without consulting prior knowledge and understanding is precisely what 
Goethe's maxim, cited above, cautioned against: “Anything that emancipates the spirit 
without a corresponding growth in self-mastery, is pernicious.”  
 
A corollary to the caution that schools can only teach teachable subjects is that they can 
only teach teachable children. Although perhaps offensive to our modern, democratic 
sensibilities, the courses of education described by Locke, Turnbull, Dodsley, Felton, and 
Franklin were not designed with universal education in mind. Indeed, there was a debate 
in the eighteenth century as to whether education so conceived could even be properly 
pursued in a classroom setting rather than with an individual tutor. Perhaps by force of 
argument, perhaps by practicality, the classroom won the day. Nevertheless, it remained a 
demanding form of education which not everyone was expected to complete. As Thomas 
Jefferson put it – a little harshly – the school system was to ensure that “the best geniuses 
shall be raked from the rubbish annually.” At least one commentator, Albert J. Nock 
(1932: 54-55), attributed the decline of this traditional education to the attempt to 
democratise it, to make it available to all. “Bring on your children [they said], and we 
will put them through this process under the sanction of an equalitarian and democratic 
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theory. It did not work. We discovered almost at once that it did not work, and that 
apparently there was no way of making it work. The reason it did not work was that this 
process postulated an educable person, and not everyone is educable.” Nock argued that 
what other critics saw as a decline in educational standards at the hands of Progressivism 
– such as vocationalism, the project method etc. – was in fact a succession of failed 
attempts to make of the classical education something that could be absorbed by all. If 
true, there would appear to be a conflict between this type of education and the modern 
goal – human right, even – of education for all. 
 
There are a few points we can make to downplay that conflict, although it remains a 
limitation of this approach. First, from the perspective expressed here a ‘right’ to an 
education is a misnomer, education being a result that the individual must achieve for 
himself. It cannot be guaranteed by an external power. At best we can say that the 
individual has a right to schooling, and with the goal of ‘schooling for all’ there is no 
necessary conflict. Still, it would remain the case that if Nock is correct not everyone can 
benefit from schooling based on the classical understanding of education. A second point, 
however, is that this overlooks the fact that, as William James argued, “[y]ou can give 
humanistic value to almost anything by teaching it historically.” This counts for anything 
from carpentry to chemistry as much as it does for history and literature. The habits of 
mind that education for progress is intended to instil come from studying historically 
rather than from studying history. Finally, Nock’s distinction between the educable and 
non-educable seems rather too rigid. He speaks of educable and non-educable as 
Jefferson spoke of geniuses and rubbish, but Jefferson certainly did not believe that the 
'rubbish' did not benefit from their education. The 'geniuses' were those who performance 
in school had qualified them to attend university. By that point, however, schooling had 
already done its work of producing responsible, mature adults – active individuals. John 
W. Burgess, who founded the first graduate school in the US at Columbia University, 
recognised this. As Barzun (1989: 17) reports, the two stated aims of his school were “to 
train teachers who would also do research and to form the minds of future politicians and 
civil servants. No nonsense about culture. … He explicitly took it for granted that the 
applicants for his school would have completed 'their study of universal history and 
general literature'.” Similarly, Locke, Turnbull, Dodsley, Felton, and Franklin dealt with 
schools, not universities. Whereas university provided the opportunity to specialise in an 
area of interest, the crucial task of constructing a map of intellectual life, filling the mind 
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with vicarious experience, and generally developing the habits of mind associated with 
maturity was the task of the child during their school years. This could be so because, as 
we saw in Felton's analogy, it does not take any special knowledge or technique to 
function as a mature adult, only experienced judgement: l'esprit de finesse. As Trilling 
put it: “[O]ur job is not to be intellectual, certainly not to be intellectual in this fashion 
or that, but merely to be intelligent according to our lights.” 
 
Being 'intelligent according to our lights' is something everyone can do; it is not the 
preserve of an intellectual elite. The school's aim is to create stout readers, not scholars 
(Barzun, 1945[1981]: ch. 11). The latter may be left to the universities. Nevertheless, 
some conflict between schooling for all and education for progress may remain. Because 
it is so vital that students truly imbibe what they learn, that they make it a part of 
themselves, it is of immense benefit if the teacher can tailor the style, pace, and – within 
limits – content of the lessons to the individual child. For this reason parental guidance or 
individual tutoring has generally been held up the ideal form of teaching. It has, however, 
always been economically prohibitive for the vast majority and so with schooling for all 
parents must turn to the best alternative: mass tutoring. This increases the distance 
between teacher and student, meaning that there will be some students who struggle to 
keep up and others who get bored waiting for them. While this much is unavoidable there 
is no reason to increase the distance further by following a method based on generalities 
about how 'the child' learns or by imposing a standardised curriculum. As far as possible 
schooling should approach the ideal of individual tutoring through a combination of good 
teachers, attentive parents, and some flexibility in the choice of subjects. 
 
Finally we must ask whether this is not a very Western understanding of education, based 
on a Western understanding of the relationship between individual and society, and hence 
not necessarily applicable to non-Western contexts. This is certainly an important 
consideration, although it seems less of a problem for education for progress than for its 
developmental counterpart. The school is seen as giving meaning to the present by 
connecting it with the past, rather being a bridge to a completely different world. 
Consequently it must necessarily be context-specific if it is to adequately perform its role 
in social change. In addition, because it downplays the role of the institutional school 
relative to the individual and the community, education for progress leaves a great deal of 
a child's education to the latter. Thus it would not, for example, try to demonstrate its 
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connection to the local context by teaching practices traditionally handed down by the 
community. Moreover, the situation that gave rise to this type of education and the 
associated ideal of the mature adult in eighteenth century Europe – the emergence of a 
'public' to whose ideas and opinions the individual was exposed – is now a global 
phenomenon, exacerbated by the emergence of modern telecommunications, to which 
some response must be made. Whether the response offered by education for progress 
will prove a valuable source of inspiration outside the Western world is impossible to say, 
but it certainly is important to recognise that it is not a uniquely modern problem that we 
are confronting. The knowledge that others have dealt with these difficulties is a sobering 
one and their experience valuable, even if their approach seems idiosyncratic or irrelevant 
to a particular circumstance. What has been offered here, it must be remembered, is not a 
method for schooling to be applied universally but a reason for schooling. Developing a 
comprehensive education for progress for today or for a specific community will involve 
taking this raison d'etre, the ideas and principles behind education for progress, and 
seeing what new meaning we can fill them with. That is, it must be treated as the active 
individual treats external things.  
 
Clearly that is not a task that can be completed in these pages because it cannot be done in 
isolation from the internal, but hopefully an example of what is meant will suffice. As 
Neil Postman has argued, due to the increased importance of technology in our modern 
world, understanding and judgement now requires a school subject on the history or 
philosophy of technology. “If we want our students to live intelligently in a technological 
society, I don't see how this can be done if they are ignorant of the full meaning and 
context of technological change” (Postman, 2000: 171; 1996: 39-43). Put simply, the 
child would study the emergence, implementation, and spread of important technological 
innovations, from the alphabet and the printing press to the car and the internet, for the 
positive and negative effects they had on society. He hopes that this will encourage a 
more critical relationship with technology: a recognition that, being both good and bad, 
new technologies are not something that society and its institutions must adapt to but 
rather must be able to incorporate in compatible ways, investigating how they have 
changed our society in the past and continue to do so in the present. Postman recognises 
that there is no need for schooling to be forward looking for it to contribute to social 
change because there is, strictly speaking, “nothing yet to see in the future. If looking 
ahead means anything, it must mean finding in our own past useful and humane ideas 
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with which to fill the future. … I am referring to ideas of which we can say they have 
advanced our understanding of ourselves, enlarged our definitions of humanness” 
(Postman, 2000: 13-14). For this reason it fits so well with social-change-as-progress. 
Education for progress reminds students that they are already making a political response 
whenever they act in the world, including their own education. “The recipient does not 
take the gift as he would a stamped coin. For he can take it up only by using it, and in this 
use he imprints upon it a new shape” (Cassirer, 1942[2000]: 115). It asks of them only 
that they leave their imprint with consciousness of its shape, the material in which it is 
left, and the person making it. 
 
In sum, by conceptualising the Western example as a 'multiform elsewhere' that must be 
given concrete shape in its interaction, conducted by individuals, with 'the things that are 
part of us' we can see it not as something inherently oppressive of the free movement of 
societies but as a potential source of creative energy. Mediating this relationship from the 
outside – which has been a large part of the task development theorists and practitioners – 
makes little sense as it is only in this uniquely individual interaction that they gain their 
temporary shape. This breaks down the one aspect of twentieth century development's 
paternalism that has survived relatively unscathed, namely, the need for developing 
societies to be protected from internal Eurocentrism. This has neutralised (in Glissant’s 
sense) the Western example, taking away its connection with a specific cultural totality 
and hence making it less amenable to creative 'imitation.' Re-imagining the place of the 
Western example as part of such creative engagement helps further solidify the active 
individual’s role at the heart of social change. Education, it was argued, must change to 
reflect this, with the global turn making way for education for progress with its focus on 
the knowledge and habits of mind necessary to create an individually meaningful present. 
Does this not reduce greatly the place and significance of development theory and 
theorists in the process of social change? In fact, it will be argued in thesis' conclusion 
that this understanding of social change as progress and the active individual's role within 
it provides a way of doing what development theory has been trying to do since the 
impasse: make a positive and normative contribution to social change in developing 
societies from the 'outside' without falling back into the paternalistic or technocratic 
tendencies of past approaches.  
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“Soon we will know everything the 18th century didn't know, and nothing it did, and it will 
be hard to live with us.” 
– Randall Jarrell (in Postman, 2000: v) 
 
Conclusion 
Back in the introduction it was noted that the UN's post-2015 development agenda was 
one that seemed oddly uncomfortable in its own skin. This uncomfortableness, it was 
argued, stems from a failure to reconcile the idea that development must be something 
done by people rather than for them or to them with the idea that deliberate guidance is 
absolutely necessary to positive social change – or, in short, the failure the overcome the 
internal-external problem. Now in the conclusion we can return to the post-2015 agenda, 
bringing together the arguments made in the intervening pages to outline an alternative 
way forward for development theory and theorists. Development theorists in the modern 
facilitator role are in principle envisaged as standing outside the process of deciding 
where social change is heading and how it occurs – any meddling here could be 
interpreted as an imposition. Once the 'world we want' is clear they may step in to act, 
accomplishing what others have demanded of them but cannot achieve themselves. 
Intuitively this seems a wise, sensitive, and uniquely modern compromise. Utilising the 
understanding of development and progress expressed in this thesis it shall be argued that 
it is not. In its place, the conclusion will give some consideration to the requirements for a 
broader theory of progress which takes the centrality of the active individual as a starting 
point, leading us to an understanding of the development theorist's role based on that of 
the art critic, who fulfils a normative and 'expert' task which influences change without 
implying the passivity of the people involved. 
 
The problems of twentieth century development theory lay, by common estimation, in its 
'we develop it' mentality; that is, in the arrogance of theorists who presumed to know the 
universal desires of mankind and assumed that the fulfilment of these desires would 
involve the re-creation of Western societies across the world. The cure follows from the 
diagnosis: development theorists must be more humble in their dealings with the 
developing world. The search for universals must be a collaborative effort and we must 
recognise that the particulars of our own society cannot simply be transferred to another. 
At the same time, however, this normative foundation cannot be lost. As Frans 
Schuurman (2000: 19) put it, the task of development is studies is to “re-establish its 
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continued relevance to study and to understand processes of exclusion, emancipation and 
development – not particularly by clinging to its once treasured paradigms but by 
incorporating creatively the new Zeitgeist without giving up on its normative basis, i.e. 
the awareness that only with a universal morality of justice is there is a future for 
humanity.” Critical of both the arrogant Eurocentrism they find in development theory's 
past and the complete rejection of Western influence they find in post-development, many 
development theorists have counselled precisely this: we ought to steer a middle course 
between them. Thus Nederveen Pieterse argues that we ought to look through Western 
history to determine which aspects of it are part of a 'universal human heritage' and which 
are particularistic and context-specific. The former can legitimately be part of a transfer 
of contents from developed to developing; the latter cannot and may be disregarded by 
developing nations. Post-development, according to Nederveen Pieterse (2001a: 30), was 
correct in its assertion that the supposedly universal truths of capitalist modernity were a 
“veil of Western ethnocentrism” but wrong to conclude that universals therefore cannot 
exist. Rather, “the question of what is universal is to be posed anew, not in Eurocentric 
but in polycentric ways.”  
 
The post-2015 agenda fits neatly into this assessment of the problems of development and 
the appropriate response to them. When the 'A Million Voices' report says that the post-
2015 era cannot be 'business as usual,' it is not referring to the era it is replacing, the 
Millennium Development Goals which were destined to end in 2015 anyway, but to that 
semi-mythical era of development where it was not yet known that external intervention 
alone is not enough to produce positive social change. In contrast to this the post-2015 era 
will, according to Ban-Ki Moon, be the most inclusive to date. The inclusiveness of the 
post-2015 agenda is manifested in both its formulation and its content. The former 
because defining the agenda was a 'bottom-up' process; the latter because the agenda is 
designed so that the fruits of development reach all members of society. The build-up to 
the post-2015 era involved a global campaign known as 'The World We Want,' as part of 
which the UN held consultations on every continent, bringing together people from all 
walks of life to have their say on what they wanted the new development era to look like. 
In addition, an associated website featured an online poll through which people could 
identify the aspects of development that were most important to them. The findings from 
this process were published in a report entitled 'A Million Voices' – a polycentric 
statement of the universal aspirations of development. The most immediately striking 
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feature of the report is that the world we want is, coincidentally, precisely the world that 
the UN has been advocating since it was founded. It is a world free from poverty and 
hunger, political persecution and discrimination, ignorance and fear; a world where every 
child can receive a good education and look forward to secure employment; a world of 
peaceful societies coexisting with an understanding of the universal humanity underlying 
their diversity. Looking at how these idealistic aspirations are understood reveals quite 
clearly that the post-2015 agenda still envisions a world of prosperous, liberal, social-
democratic nation-states.  
 
It would be easy to conclude from this that the consultation process functions as a badge 
of legitimacy rather than providing any formative influence. However, if this were the 
case we would surely expect it to feature more prominently in the final draft of the post-
2015 agenda, which was released in July 2015. A badge of legitimacy must be worn 
proudly to have any effect, yet the consultation process is alluded to just once. If, 
however, we look at it with what we have described in this thesis as the concept and 
tragedy of development, the intention behind the 'World We Want' campaign is clear and 
familiar: it is an attempt to overcome the internal-external problem, to bridge the divide 
between the internal and external forces motivating development. The post-2015 
approach attempts to resolve the internal-external from the other side, as it were. 
'Development' remains a transfer of finished contents from one discrete entity to another – 
the external to the internal across the border dividing them. Now, however, this transfer 
occurs only at the request of the internal. The consultations have revealed the world they 
want; it is for the post-2015 agenda to provide it for them. Thus development theorists 
take the role of facilitator (a nicer word than 'technocrat') of the autonomous demands of 
the developing society.  
 
Contemporary development approaches overstate their own novelty by portraying 
modernisation theory as little more than a celebration of the achievements of the West. 
This thesis has instead argued that it has always been seen as a key aspect of the 
development theorist's role to protect developing societies from excessive Eurocentrism. 
The post-war modernisation theorists were far more clear and in far greater agreement 
about which aspects of the West ought to be rejected than which ought to be adapted or 
adopted by the developing nations. The latter were largely at the discretion of the 
particular developing nation; the former were threatening to social-change-as-
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development wherever it occurred. To be rejected were of course the values and practices 
associated with social change that was not development – represented again by 
selfishness and materialism. Throughout the modernisation literature these are presented 
as constant dangers of the development process; they could be kept in check with the help 
of the knowledge created by development theorists. If it wasn't for the protection afforded 
by the development industry, all traditional patterns of life that were not conducive to 
growth would be swept away. Moreover, one of the costs of economic growth, as 
identified by Arthur Lewis, was an increase is economism and individualism. If set free, 
as they would be without proper development policies, a country's 'valued patterns of life' 
would be threatened from within, by an internal Eurocentrism. These individualistic 
Western values led young people to abandon their fragile traditional villages and cultures 
to seek white-collar jobs in the cities. This educated urban minority was regarded as self-
seeking and materialistic, and disruptive of attempts to promote community and national 
development. Disconnected from their traditions, these displaced persons could not hope 
to be the engine of true development (see e.g. UNESCO, 1961; Thompson, 1981). 
 
Understanding the importance of the threat of this internal Eurocentrism is vital to a full 
understanding of the modernisation approach. It is an approach that led to a mistrust of 
the 'masses' which has been interpreted by critics as authoritarian and anti-democratic 
(Kesselman, 1973; Gendzier, 1985). While the policy consequences may have been such, 
we must recognise the theoretical underpinning as based not on some ill-defined 
assumption of Western superiority, but rather on a genuine concern that without them 
developing countries would experience the unguided and hence egoistic and Darwinist 
social change they believed the West had gone through in the nineteenth century – 
particularly in an international system which due to the power of the developed nations 
was deemed “essentially hostile” to the developing (Apter, 1971: 46). The failure to 
appreciate this results in a failure to move beyond it. The history of development theory 
has been characterised by a succession of failed attempts to bring the people back in to 
development, of which the post-2015 agenda is the latest. The search for a middle ground 
between external or internal dominance is not one that we with our modern sensibilities 
are uniquely capable of pursuing; rather, it practically defines development. 
 
It has been argued in this thesis that development thinking sees the internal and external 
motive forces as originally separate because positive social change is conceptualised as a 
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self-conscious endeavour; that is, something that is deliberately pursued rather than 
something that happens spontaneously. This is so for two reasons. First, social-change-as-
development has a telos in mind. We found this telos expressed in Mill's distinction 
between the 'art of getting on' and the 'art of living,' Marshall's conception of gentlemanly 
occupations, and Keynes' predictions for the society of our grandchildren. It was most 
clearly expressed in the modernisation era by W.W. Rostow in his final, post-mass 
consumption stage of economic growth. All describe social change as a deliberate 
harnessing of the unsavoury forces within capitalist society with a view to their abolition. 
Thus if social change is to be positive, society will need intentional guidance. A society 
can change without such guidance but it cannot develop. Although this division exists in 
Mill, Marshall, and Keynes its full significance is not felt because they were concerned 
with development done by a society to itself along principles that exist throughout it. 
Marshall did not believe that the development of the working classes needed to be rooted 
in working class culture, for example. Its full significance is felt when the external 
foresees a different development than the internal would pursue on its own. Herein lies 
the significance of Keynes, according to whom society itself was irrationally mired in the 
'money motive' and hence incapable of spontaneously producing positive social change. 
This is the second reason that social-change-as-development must be intentionally given: 
individuals cannot be trusted to pursue true development. They are either susceptible to or 
controlled by precisely those forces that require abolition, and hence cannot be trusted to 
spontaneously effect the transition from the art of getting on to the art of living. However, 
while development has as a consequence of this often been interpreted as an imposition of 
alien (i.e. Western) values the very recognition of an internal external problem (in 
addition to the distinction previously observed by Mill and Marshall) is evidence that 
development in the post-war era was always more than mere Westernisation. The 
development of non-Western societies would ultimately have to be rooted in those 
societies – it could not simply be given from developed to developing. Any attempt to do 
so would, it was recognised, not be development, as the mere imposition of new forms 
upon a society would not raise that society to their level, even if they were objectively 
'higher' in the linear trajectory of social change.  
 
It is not an assumption of Western superiority that causes the role of people in developing 
societies to be undermined, but rather the conceptualisation of social-change-as-
development itself, according to which deliberate guidance – by those with superior 
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knowledge of such matters – is necessary for positive social change to occur. Social-
change-as-development's positing of the supremacy of the external as the guiding force of 
positive social change a truly active role for the internal is precluded. How can one 
reconcile the sincere desire to conceptualise people as active producers of their own 
development and the perceived necessity of a conceptualisation of the role of 
development theory and theorists in which those people must ultimately be passive 
recipients of development, guided along a proper path? In such situations, where one is 
confronted with two contradictory yet desirable aspects, there is no neutral middle-ground 
from which to interpret their relationship. Instead, one side must be given primacy and the 
other interpreted on that basis. We saw above how this is manifested in the UN's attempts 
to devise an education for development which would produce active citizens. 'Active,' in 
this approach, has been interpreted according to the perceived need for the world to be 
guided toward a new society, and consequently extends little further than demanding the 
'rights' that are part of that society. In other words, the role of the 'active citizen' in the 
creation of a new society consists in demanding that it be created for them.  
 
This is precisely how the 'activity' of developing societies has been interpreted for the 
post-2015 agenda, which the language of the A Million Voices report makes that quite 
clear. Bringing together the results of the consultations held across the globe, it at no 
point states, for example, that participants at the consultation in X stated that they wanted 
to do Y. Rather, the consultation in X has, according to the report, revealed that 
participants demand that Y be done. Responsibility for actually 'doing' development has 
been ceded to those with superior knowledge – the technocrats and development 
professionals at the UN and development agencies. As previously mentioned, this is not 
activity in the sense that Humboldt or Cassirer would have understood the term – nor as 
Illich or Esteva would have understood it, though coming from a different perspective. 
People in developing societies are here no more active in the process of their own 
development than a customer in a restaurant is active in the process of cooking their meal 
– the customer demands, the chef facilitates. 
 
What is missing here, the second part of the thesis has argued, is an 'active individual' 
standing between internal and external and in whose activity those two conglomerations 
of energy gain meaningful shape. Although everyone contributes to social change 
unconsciously – in the sense that any action within a given context alters it in some way – 
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the active individual is engaged in a conscious relationship with their inherited context 
and with the external influences which they perceive have made that inherited context 
appear inadequate in some way. Positive social change according to the concept of 
progress is something that happens consciously in that it occurs through a deliberate and 
active engagement with a recalcitrant reality, in much the same way as a poet grapples 
with the inherited language in order to turn it into a vehicle for the expression of 
something new. This is a process that takes place at the individual level, occurring on the 
basis of an individual-level goal. Social change from this perspective is therefore 
individually teleological. It is not socially teleological because progress does not – and 
indeed cannot – occur according to societal-level goals. Internal and external are turned 
from abstract conglomerations of energy into concretely meaningful entities by an act of 
individual creativity. It is not a self-conscious growth, that is, 'society' deliberately and 
intentionally acting towards a vision of what it ought to be. Rather, it is the contingent 
and unplanned (although not therefore unforeseen) outcome of many individual-level 
teleological actions and interactions. It is conscious by virtue of its engagement with the 
present, rather than self-conscious by virtue of its engagement with the future: it occurs 
within and emerges from a given context. This, it must be stressed, quite different from 
the truism that we need to take the social context into account when making changes to 
the way a society functions. The linguist in C.S. Lewis' analogy already does this. The 
changes themselves must emerge from (rather than simply being made in) the inherited 
context, through an engagement of it with 'the multiform elsewhere,' as Glissant put it. It 
is not a normative commitment to that inherited context that makes this necessary, but 
rather the individual-level understanding of social change, the consequence of this being 
that any change made by an individual must be communicable to others if it is to make a 
noticeable contribution to social change and not remain a minor idiosyncrasy. Thus 
according to Cassirer the work – the product of an individual engagement with the 
internal and external – completes its task by 'kindling the activity of others' and in so 
doing repeating the cycle. The work once again becomes an external thing – seemingly 
rigid and unsatisfactory from the point of view of the creator yet able to be incorporated 
into a new life on the basis of a new understanding and appraisal of it and the inherited 
context. 
 
Ultimately that engagement with and reconciliation of the internal and external must be 
an individual one, because only on that level and from that perspective – from the 
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perspective of one's 'solid self' – can these conglomerations of potential energy be given 
concrete meaning. In this way the fluidity of cultural forms can be regained, which 
Simmel recognised was necessary for one to have a cultivating encounter with them: only 
in this way do they become 'a part of us' and can one grow through them. In this sense, 
the active individual is akin to Barzun's and Trilling's reader. Both are ultimately on their 
own, with no method to follow and no pre-made syntheses to adopt. Both find themselves 
in a world whose interpretation requires l'esprit de finesse. It must be stressed once again 
that this does not require uncommon ability, precisely because there is no special method 
to learn and no hidden reality to discover. The active individual is not a genius, nor does 
one need to be. As cited above, George Orwell, writes Trilling (1955: 157-158), was no 
genius, but through his example one can see that you don't have to be in order to function 
as an active individual. His mind is what ours could be  
 
“if we but surrendered a little of the cant that comforts us, if for a few weeks we paid no 
attention to the little group with which we habitually exchange opinions, if we took our 
chance of being wrong or inadequate, if we looked at things simply and directly, having 
in mind only our intention of finding out what they really are, not the prestige of our great 
intellectual act of looking at them. He tells us that we can understand our political and 
social life merely be looking around us; he frees us from the need for the inside dope. He 
implies that our job is not to be intellectual, certainly not to be intellectual in this fashion 
or that, but merely to be intelligent according to our lights.” 
 
It is the specific type of independence of mind expressed here that education for progress 
is intended to instil. It became important in eighteenth century Europe when the 
emergence of an urban 'public' exposed individuals to all manner of ideas, opinions, and 
practices, and is surely no less important today when internet, television, and radio have 
made that exposure almost constant. The habits of mind it encourages provides a bulwark 
against being swept along in what others imagine is the course of history. By teaching 
historically and with a focus on reading it gives a sense of perspective and proportion, 
vicarious experience with the strange and unfamiliar, and the “solid Self, full of 
experience, which stands as a back-stop to the every-day Self, which is engaged in 
dealing with the vicissitudes of life” (Barzun, 1991: 200). In this sense it is the diametric 
opposite of modern education for development – the global citizenship education 
advocated by the UN and major charities and NGOs – which seeks to prepare the advent 
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of a new society by teaching students to be 'outraged by social injustice' (Oxfam, 2006). 
Education for progress provides the knowledge of the social world in which action takes 
place (as opposed to the future which action ought to lead to) and the values and habits of 
mind to construct the 'solid self' from which action takes place. In short, it gives students 
the tools that enable them to act consciously in the world. 
 
This understanding of the concept of progress offers a fresh perspective on and response 
to the challenges faced by development theory in the post-2015 era and beyond. In its 
attempts to move beyond the perceived problems of twentieth century development the 
post-2015 approach has counselled humility, understood in contrast to the supposed 
Western arrogance and blind optimism of the past. It shall be argued here that in doing so 
it has weakened the very aspect of that period which must, from the perspective of social-
change-as-progress, be salvaged: its bold normativity. The post-2015 agenda is certainly 
bold, in the sense that it sets ambitious targets, and normative, in the sense that it contains 
a vision of what ought to be, but it is not boldly normative in the way post-war 
development in particular was. Despite what we now see as the absurdly optimistic belief 
that the developing nations could 'catch up' within a decade, the modernisation theorists 
counselled against the impatience they observed in what Daniel Lerner called the 
'societies-in-a-hurry' (1958[1966]: 68). They were at pains to remind everyone of how 
momentous the task of development was, of achieving what the West had achieved and 
more in a fraction of the time. Following Mill, Marshall, and Keynes they were aware of 
the fact that the 'fruits' of development lay at the end of a long road which would require 
letting go of some traditional ways of life and adopting or adapting to aspects of Western 
civilisation for which they themselves had no love. The art of living comes after the art of 
getting on. The criticism Rostow – apparently the 'prophet of capitalism – had of the New 
Left was not that they wanted to abolish capitalism, but that they wanted to do it too 
early:  
 
“The creation of a setting of assured affluence and security for men and nations – and 
seeing what man will make of it – is the object of much striving by many hands for social 
an economic progress and for stable peace. But … the human community still has a long, 
hard road ahead on which all it can summon in human dedication and endurance, talent 
and idealism – and resources – will be required for ultimate success.” (Rostow, 1971: 
360) 
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The present system was not something that could simply be abolished, but that had to be 
harnessed and overcome. The modernisation theorists did not hide from these difficulties, 
as Rostow believed the New Left were doing, but tackled them head on. Somewhat 
paradoxically, it may have been their Eurocentrism that enabled this. They assumed that 
people in the developing world would want the world people in the West wanted – 
prosperity, democracy, equality – so they did not need to propagandise it. Instead, they 
had to remind people in the developing world (and in the developed) that it would not be 
enough for them to simply want these things: it would involve hard work (intellectual and 
spiritual as well as manual) and a lot of difficult choices. Critics such as Gilbert Rist have 
portrayed development as a secular faith in an attempt to make it appear ridiculous, but its 
post-war era proponents would not have been ashamed of that fact. Indeed, they quite 
explicitly believed that development required such a narrative in order to give flesh and 
meaning to the tough choices it entailed.  
 
The post-2015 agenda does try to be inspirational. It still puts forward the bold vision of a 
world of prosperous, liberal, democratic nation-states and will do what is required to 
achieve it. Yet one cannot help but feel that it is impatient for the former and ashamed of 
the latter. Now ideology is seen as a bad thing and big ideas, boldly proclaimed are seen 
as conversation-stopping. Unwilling to be associated with the old all-encompassing 'faith' 
of development, which is considered an exercise in Eurocentric arrogance, the UN has 
sought with the post-2015 era not a new ideology – in the sense of a coherent body of 
ideas or a 'grand narrative' – but bureaucracy: development by focus group. While it 
would seem that the UN has taken on board the idea that social change ought to proceed 
via a 'global conversation' – to which we shall return in a moment – this has been 
interpreted quite literally: as people coming together in a given location to talk about a 
given topic. That significant economic growth and industrialisation will be required if 
broader development objectives are to be met is rather implicit in the UN's publications, 
as is the need for many countries to adopt more open, market-oriented economies to 
secure the required growth. The same can be said for formal institutional structures, 
bureaucratic rationality, and for Western attitudes toward work, society, and political life. 
These aspects of development have been swept under the rug, with the focus instead 
turning to areas such as equality, the environment, and discrimination. That the 
difficulties and demands of development have been hidden under kinder rhetoric has led 
some to argue that this is all a ploy to mask the 'capitalist rationality' that is the true nature 
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of development. A less conspiratorial explanation would be that having imbibed the post-
development critiques these manifestations of development have been found guilty, but 
that having retained our basic conception of social change, they cannot be left out of a 
development agenda. Thus they are implicit, but difficult to acknowledge and confront. 
 
As a direct consequence, while the words and ideas of the post-2015 agenda sound 
similar to previous eras they no longer contain that recognition of the recalcitrant nature 
of the reality they deal with which permits an individual to continue, on their own terms, 
the task of grappling with them. Its 'democratic' nature, whereby development theorists 
and practitioners act merely as conduits for the will of the people, may bring it closer to 
those actually consulted but distances it from everyone else. The 'we' in the 'world we 
want' is not the UN but the entire world speaking through it and therefore already 
includes the 'you' whose activity it is supposed to kindle. That 'you' is not the active 
recipient of ideas as is envisioned by the concept of progress but the passive recipient of 
the results of a conversation already held. A million voices have already revealed the 
'world we want' – the remaining task is to raise the support to give it to us. Thus the 
approach to formulating the post-2015 agenda gives it a false finality, an impression that 
this is the final word on the matter and that all that is left is to put it into practice. 
Consequently it will be no great surprise to see the familiar critiques of development 
resurface for the post-2015 agenda: that it has become an external force attempting to 
impose 'development' from without and that the solution is to bring the people back in. 
William Easterly's recent Tyranny of Experts (2014) makes this argument about what 
Nobel-prize winner Angus Deaton (2015: 411) calls in a review, “a modern development 
industry that somehow believes that it is possible to 'develop' someone else's country from 
the outside.” Public action, proposes Easterly (2014: 193) as a solution, must be 
“democratically demanded by the populace.” This thesis will hopefully remind the reader 
that such diagnoses and cures have been proposed before, only to founder upon the 
concept of development and its separation of the internal and the external as the original 
problem of social change.  
 
The post-2015 agenda is, in short, too concerned with which ideas it is acceptable to put 
forward; with which 'finished contents' can be transferred from the external to the internal 
without this being interpreted as an imposition. It seeks an approach to development 
which everyone can agree on rather than one people can engage with. What it neglects is 
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the process by which these two terms – internal and external – are given meaning and 
acquire their significance for individuals; the process by which these ideas would 
complete their proper task of 'kindling the activity of others.' By failing to explicitly re-
think the concept of development the activity of the developing people extends little 
further than demanding a 'manufactured maturity.' By failing to engage with big ideas it 
fails to stimulate the individual-level inspiration that is key to large-scale social change. 
By finding a substitute for ideology in bureaucracy – development by focus groups – it 
compounds both of these problems. The great challenge of social change now appears as 
a bureaucratic one, a technical issue of resource allocation. Here we might return to 
Sachs' ruins metaphor, referred to back in the introduction, and find that it is perhaps 
more apt than he knew. What he saw was the deconstruction of development thinking, 
now ripe for reconstruction upon a different scheme – not alternative development but an 
alternative to development. This deconstruction/reconstruction dichotomy overlooks the 
fact that a deconstructed edifice may not be completely destroyed. Like a fallen empire, 
development, as theory and practice, has not disappeared – its ruins are still with us, but 
its animating spirit has faded. We are rather like the peoples who, after the fall of Rome, 
took up residence in the Colosseum. We live inside this great but crumbling edifice with 
the feeling ever-present in the back of our minds that its makers must have intended it for 
grander purposes than we are now using it; yet we dare not rebuild it, for fear of losing 
what little we have left.  
 
Social-change-as-progress offers a way forward which reconciles the normative 
ambitions of development theorists with the activity of developing societies. To allow for 
a genuinely active role for development people, so that they become producers of their 
own development, development theory and theorists will indeed need an injection of 
humility regarding the place and significance of their contribution to the process of social 
change – a humility of a different kind than offered by the post-2015 understanding. 
Simultaneously, they will need to regain the explicitly normative and, to a degree, the 
'expert' role lost to accusations of Eurocentrism and neo-imperialism. From the 
perspective of the concept of progress social change is an intellectual, spiritual, and moral 
problem. It is a problem of ideas and ideologies. And above all it is difficult. It is not a 
problem that can be solved once and for all but a challenge that must be met repeatedly 
by individuals on their own terms. It involves choosing ways of living that are 
incompatible with other possible choices. These are not choices that are made the UN or 
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by national governments but by people in their everyday lives. How an individual 
evaluates their society, approaches social change, decides what it means to them and it 
requires of them, how it is incorporated into their own lives, is not something that can be 
decided for them at the UN, no matter how many people attend their focus groups. These 
choices can only be informed by an active and personal engagement with ideas and 
events, new and inherited, by turning the abstract conglomerations of potential energy we 
have called internal and external into something tangible.  
 
The idea that social change might operate as a grand conversation has quite rightly caught 
the imagination, and it would be on much firmer ground with the concept of progress, 
with its understanding of social change as a conscious rather than self-conscious process 
and its insistence on the centrality of the active individual. Future thinking about a full 
theory of progress could fruitfully be based on the conversational model, for 
conversations are a paradigmatic example of a ‘wandering without getting lost’ beneficial 
to all involved. Conversations take place between voluntarily and freely interacting 
rational beings on a foundation of a shared but often unspoken understanding, yet they are 
crucially different from similarly voluntary relationships, such as contracts, in the sense 
that they have no directional purpose or goal. Contractual relationships benefit all 
involved and are geared toward achieving those benefits; conversations also produce 
many valuable goods – fun, friendship, mutual respect – but these are by-products of an 
activity that is essentially purposeless. Indeed, to deliberately and explicitly pursue 
friendship by means of a given conversation, to reform that conversation into a self-
consciously friendship-producing device, would be to undermine the nature of the 
conversation and hence the process by which it results in friendship. The place and 
significance of the participants in a conversation is fundamentally altered when one of 
them is clearly pushing it toward a specific end, just as the concept of development’s 
addition of a purpose to the purposeless process of social change displaced the active 
individual. 
 
To say that social change ought to be thought of as occurring without a self-conscious 
purpose is, however, not to deny the possibility of morally evaluating actual social 
change. The analogy with conversations makes that clear, for while identifying a 
‘successful’ conversation may be difficult it is undoubtedly possible to distinguish good 
and bad conversations. There are rules involved in a good conversation that go far beyond 
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the libertarian position that anything goes so long as a fight does not break out. 
Politeness, manners, etiquette, a basic level of knowledge, formal procedures and so on 
all serve to impose a certain discipline on the participants. These will differ considerably 
over time and space but the basic purpose remains to facilitate this particular form of 
social interaction by coordinating the activity of individuals in such a manner that they 
freely and willingly – even unknowingly – maintain and renew the conditions that make 
the conversation possible. 
 
At this level – the level of the practices and attitudes that maintain and renew the 
conversation as an interaction among free and rational beings – a broader theory of 
progress would require a clear moral framework, despite the fact that specifying in 
advance a morally desirable end would be out of bounds to the extent that it undermines 
the fundamental objective of ‘renewing’ the conversation. This was, in part, the moral 
justification for the ‘present-oriented’ approach to education set out in section II.7 which 
Roche (1969: 14, 24) described as “the quest for 'structured freedom,' freedom for the 
individual to choose within a framework of values. … The individual must be free to 
choose, yet must be provided with a framework of values within which meaningful, 
civilized choice can take place.” In other words, it did not set out to prepare the advent of 
a new society but rather sought to ensure that children became adults capable to the 
responsible exercise of the freedoms afforded by modern society – adults capable of 
being good conversation partners. 
 
At this level too we might find the role of the state in a full theory of progress to be 
something more than a mere nightwatchman. Certainly the state must not be ‘up and 
doing’ as Marshall proposed, attempting to shape society according to some purpose not 
already contained within it, yet at the same time the spaces it leaves open for individual 
action ought not to be a vacuum into which anything but physical harm is permitted to 
flow. Both would undermine, directly or indirectly, the stability and renewability of 
conversational relationships. We see here the logic behind some of the arguments made 
by post-development theorists which have led them to be accused of ‘romanticising the 
local’ or downplaying the impact of poverty. When Esteva and Prakash (1998: 113), for 
example, complain of “'social services' that fail to genuinely satisfy or be 'social'” they 
do so in memory of local means of poverty relief which were the beneficial by-product of 
a communal relationship very different to the deal offered by the modern state to its 
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citizens.  
 
A theory of progress would surely have to recognise the importance of these local and 
autonomous institutions created by the voluntary association of active individuals, and 
impress upon the state a duty to protect rather than undermine them by re-organising them 
according to a goal that is not their own. This role may extend to the delicate task of 
protecting the shared identity and common stock of knowledge required to make 
conversational relationships possible. The point to remember is that it is the role of the 
state not to prop up particular forms but to ensure that the new forms are protected from 
excessive incursion by non-conversational relationships, whatever form they may 
eventually take. Hence the advice offered by Benjamin Constant (1815[1988]: 157) 
would make an excellent starting point: 
 
“Obey time; do everything what the day calls for; do not be obstinate in keeping up what 
is collapsing, or too hasty in establishing what seems to announce itself. Remain faithful 
to justice, which belongs to all ages; respect liberty, which prepares every sort of good; 
let many things develop without you, and leave to the past its own defence, to the future 
its own accomplishment.”  
 
It is, of course, quite possible for a conversation to follow a course one finds 
objectionable, though the standards of good conversation have been followed, in the same 
way that one might be displeased at the outcome of an election despite acknowledging the 
validity of the process. At this level too a moral framework must be brought to bear in 
order to evaluate good and bad social change, and a full theory of progress would need to 
account for this. Here we might find a role for development theorists within the grand 
conversation, which would involve neither drowning out other voices nor simply 
implementing the results. A model for this new role may be found in the art critic. It goes 
without saying that there are numerous understandings of that role, but inspiration has 
been taken from Jacques Barzun and Lionel Trilling, with whom the reader will by now 
be familiar, and the American poet and critic Randall Jarrell (1955[1973]), whose 
understanding of the role of the critic in relation to art bears some similarities with the 
aforementioned pair. If the active individual at the heart of social-change-as-progress is 
akin to their mature reader, the development theorist may find a counterpart in their critic. 
As we shall, the great benefit is of this role is that its understanding of the relationship 
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between the critic, the artist, and the public would allow development theorists to make a 
genuine and empowering contribution to social change without implying the passivity of 
people in developing societies. 
 
Barzun, Trilling, and Jarrell believed that the critics of their day overstated their own 
importance in the relationship between criticism and art (Barzun 1989: 19-20; Jarrell, 
1955[1973]: 73). At best these critics saw themselves as standing side by side with artists, 
as creative partners in the production of art. At worst, these critics saw pieces of art as 
'raw material' with which they worked, as if they themselves were the real creative force. 
They argued that art critics should be far more humble than this. Not in the sense of 
refusing to make bold statements or hiding away from one's own normative position – 
which is how humility has been interpreted in post-2015 development. Quite the opposite. 
Humility was instead about recognising that criticism is ancillary to the arts, coming after 
the 'feat of creation' and adding nothing to the work of art as it actually exists (Barzun, 
1989: 72; Jarrell, 1955[1973]: 90). Critics are certainly not indispensable to the creation 
and development of art. Much like the critics opposed by Barzun, Trilling, and Jarrell, 
development theorists have overstated the significance of their place in social change. 
The knowledge they create is perceived to be indispensable to positive social change, 
because in the world of self-conscious social-change-as-development there is a need for 
them to envision, design, and guide the world towards a new order. Even without a 
strictly defined telos this guidance remains necessary because the alternative to the world 
of 'development' is, according to the concept of development, a world of unconscious 
social change in which individuals remain (or become) mired in a materialistic and selfish 
individualism. The contribution of development theory is therefore vital to social-change-
as-development: positive social change will not occur without it. It is here rather than in 
its Eurocentrism that the arrogance of development lies, and it is here rather than in its 
Eurocentrism that humility is needed.  
 
That humility is present in social-change-as-progress, according to which the act of social 
change occurs at the level of the active individual in their personal engagement with the 
internal and the external. Because it is a personal engagement development theorists must 
be thought of as standing outside it – they cannot effect it on behalf of another – yet 
because it is a conscious rather than a purely spontaneous process they can aid it in some 
specific ways. The art critic's role is, for Barzun, Trilling, and Jarrell, to help the public 
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engage with art. From their various writings on this subject we can identify, for the sake 
of brevity, three functions that enable the critic to perform their role which will be called 
the ordering, critical, and communicative functions. The role Barzun, Trilling, and Jarrell 
had in mind for art critics involved them standing as a mediator between the artist and the 
public, clearing the path to art but adding nothing to it themselves. 
 
The ordering function sees the theorist supply some degree of order and unity to a diverse 
and messy world. In the world of art this involves establishing connections between 
artists, tracing influences, and detailing styles, techniques, and approaches. For the 
development theorist it involves investigating the rules by which the social order hangs 
together, thereby creating the general ideas according to which the whole or a part of that 
whole can be understood. Here the development theorist acts as a student of social 
change. Coyne and Boettke (2006) have contrasted this 'student' function with that of the 
'saviour,' where the economist – their primary concern – steps in to cure some ill in the 
social order. In the latter case, they argue, the desire to understand what can be done takes 
a back seat to the desire to do something. Because the theorist-as-critic's focus is on the 
recipient rather than the feat of creation this will not do. Rather, their expert knowledge of 
the social order – the ideas, concepts, and information they create and disseminate – 
serves to help others in their interpretation of the workings of the social order and the 
effects of their actions within it. 
 
The critical function acts as a sort of counter-balance to the ordering function, serving to 
prevent stagnation in general and in particular solidification into specific categories. It 
involves taking ideas, practices and so on related to social change that seem rigid, 
inflexible, or simple and recalling them to their original vitality, implying a recognition of 
difficulty and complexity (Trilling: 1951[1970]: 14). In development theory as in other 
intellectual fields ideas and concepts can become sterile and empty. Concepts such as 
sustainability, empowerment, education, democracy are thrown about as if we know 
exactly what they mean, but are prone to becoming buzzwords. This happens when ideas 
lose their connection with concrete reality and become generic 'Good Things,' which 
makes them seem simple and certain. The critical function tries to prevent this sterility by 
recalling the complexity, difficulty, and recalcitrance of these concepts. This is important, 
because it is only when the complexity of a thing is recognised that it can serve as 
material for the cultivating personal encounter described in section II.5.  
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The communicative function overlaps with the other two, both of which require 
communication with the public, but is a little more neutral. It consists for the art critic in 
making difficult aspects of the art world intelligible to the interested layman (Jarrell, 
1955[1973]: 92; Barzun, 1989: 19). It requires knowledge that extends far beyond the 
bounds of the work itself because it involves, for example, clearing up obscure passages 
or placing a work that is distant in time or space in its proper context and in a way that is 
understandable to one's audience. This function serves to bring the work closer to the 
public, and it is an important function for development theorists to have in their aid of the 
active individual. New ideas and practices, which are part and parcel of social change, 
frequently come with more cultural 'baggage' than meets the eye. While the theorist 
certainly does not need to (and indeed cannot) remove this baggage, which would 
undermine the recognition of difficulty and complexity involved in the critical function, 
placing it in its proper context and providing a background for these ideas and practices 
nevertheless makes them less distant and hence more approachable. In addition, the 
communicative function involves communicating to people other individuals like them 
have done in their personal engagements with the internal and external. Consequently, the 
theorist must be intelligible to non-specialists. Impenetrable jargon may impress one's 
peers, but it forms a linguistic barrier which prevents the proper functioning of this 'public 
service' aspect of the development theorist's place in social change. 
 
Applied to social change, these three functions combine to carve out a place for 
development theorists within social-change-as-progress that is both empowering of others 
and humble. Social-change-as-progress is about individuals making an active engagement 
with the internal and external aspects of social change. Active individuals can correspond 
to the artist or the public depending on the individuality and consciousness of their 
engagement: the more conscious that engagement is, the more powerful in terms of its 
potential contribution to actual social change. The development theorist's role is to help 
individuals make that engagement as conscious as possible: people empower themselves 
with their engagement with the internal and external; theorists can empower people by 
making those individual syntheses and changes more conscious. It must be stressed that 
this is the whole role, and indeed it is precisely the fact that the role extends no further 
that gives theorists a formative influence. There is no saviour function to be added, nor 
guide or facilitator. To do so would distract from and diminish the true focus of the role, 
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which is the consciousness of the active individual. While they cannot, as social-change-
as-development proposes they do, effect this reconciliation of internal and external on 
behalf of others, it being a process that occurs within the individual mind, they can make 
a positive contribution to the process by helping to give shape and meaning to the 
inherited context and by presenting new cultural forms as a 'multiform elsewhere' rather 
than as 'monolithic necessities' (to use Glissant's phrases). Theorists can bring order to the 
various individual reconciliations occurring, make them intelligible, communicate them 
to others, and recall them to their original vitality.  
 
As mentioned above, the primary value of this understanding of the role of development 
theorist lies in its relation to the active individual. In this sense it functions in tandem with 
education as described earlier. Education for progress aims to create and nourish in the 
child the capacity and inclination to judge, understand, and incorporate – all from the 
perspective of one's individual self and within a framework of values – which defines the 
active individual. Because education is according to this understanding ultimately an 
individual endeavour rather than a transmission of knowledge from one mind to another, 
people will not be capable or desirous of educating themselves to the same level. If they 
were, development theorists would be entirely unnecessary: “Around the throne of God, 
where all the angels read perfectly, there are no critics – there is no need for them” 
(Jarrell, 1955[1973]: 90). The critic, lacking a special language that sets them apart or a 
special technique that affords unique insights invisible to everyone else, is simply a 
particularly sensitive and voracious 'reader' of art (Jarrell, 1955[1973]: 89). The same is 
true of the development theorist in social-change-as-progress, who is also simply a 
particularly good 'reader' of social change. This is not to imply that it is an easy task. As 
Barzun (1989: 20) puts it: “It is foolish to think that these are tasks for journeyman labor; 
on the contrary, they require the greatest of tact and sensibility; they call for cultivated 
minds willing to do a certain amount of drudgery for the sake of giving a jewel the setting 
it deserves.” It requires broad knowledge – history, economics, politics, culture, ethics, 
current affairs, as well as an intuitive 'finger on the pulse' of contemporary life and it 
requires the right mindset – the 'historical sense' described in the introduction. 
 
In sum, the theorist as critic still has an important role to play: they remain 'experts' and 
regain their normative input, but their influence on social change, like the critic's on the 
development of art, is based on an evaluation and judgement of the past and the present 
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rather than a vision for the future and techniques for moving towards it. They do not act 
as 'saviours,' stepping in to help move social change in pre-approved directions. 
Ultimately they remain ancillary to the changes that occur rather than productive of them. 
Their influence works indirectly: they examine and communicate the nature of changes 
that occur within the world, and by evaluating changes they help popularise some and 
reject others as incompatible, thereby aiding the individual judgement required to 
reconcile the internal and external.  
 
This is, we believe, consistent with the contemporary desire to find a place for 
development theory that recognises the need (normative and pragmatic) for people to be 
the producers of their own development on the one hand, and the desire for development 
theorists to have an empowering influence on the course of social change on the other. 
However, it presupposes a way of thinking about social change which the concept of 
development does not provide. If we think of social change as something that is self-
conscious, as a society acting upon itself or another society with the intention of creating 
a definite future, this role will seem like an abdication of responsibility, much like Dewey 
believed that a school that did not educate its students towards a society of the future was 
neglecting its social duty. If, however, we think of social change as something that 
happens consciously, with active individuals as mediators of the inherited and the new as 
they seek new vehicles for their self-expression, the development theorist as critic shows 
its value. The combination of the 'critic' role and the understanding of social-change-as-
progress means that development theorists can limit themselves to this role without 
thinking they've given up their formative influence on social change and left it to blind 
forces.  Back in section I.3 a line from Gustave de Molinari's Society of Tomorrow 
(1899[1904]: 95) was cited in which he defines the purpose of progress, concluding that, 
at least with regards the future of society, this cannot be done. This is a social change 
neither blindly rushing forwards nor dutifully marching towards a goal, but instead a 
'wandering without ever getting lost.' To the chagrin of Hodgson Pratt, who wrote the 
introductory essay to the English translation, it was Molinari's final sentence, as it will be 
ours. Hopefully the reader will now find it less unsatisfactory than did Pratt. 
 
“Less suffering and more pleasure may be accidents of progress, but they are not its end 
and purpose. Nor can we define that purpose more clearly than by saying that it is the 
enlargement of human powers to fit men for a future of which they have no knowledge.” 
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